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Abstract 
 The papers of this dissertation explore two dimensions of wars of occupation. The first 
paper concerns the outcomes of such wars. It proposes a theory of democratic accountability that 
links the level of casualties suffered by an occupying force to its leadership’s decision to 
withdraw from the contested territory. I argue that war casualties act as the cost that drives 
patterns of domestic support in democratic states.  Political elites seeking electoral gain will give 
meaning to those casualties, frequently arguing that the benefits that might come with continued 
fighting will not justify those costs, and that such wars are not necessary for the state’s survival. I 
suggest that once these divisions occur at the elite level, it becomes very difficult to maintain 
support among the population. This leads to the finding that while democracies may not win or 
lose any less than autocracies, they consistently abandon them at significantly lower levels of 
casualties. In the second paper, I use an experimental survey to determine if news of American 
casualties or elite opinion drives attitudes about the war in Afghanistan. Existing experiments in 
this area typically portray elite support as split along traditional partisan lines, and support or 
opposition among the subjects is usually driven by their partisan attachments. But this approach 
rarely reflects reality, where elite foreign policy and security opinions frequently cut across 
partisan divisions. The findings reveal that news of American casualties has little independent 
effect on attitudes towards the Afghanistan conflict. Instead, overall support for the conflict only 
declines when elite opinions in response to those deaths cut across standard partisan divisions. 
The final paper pivots to a discussion of the dynamics of violence in these wars. Here, I examine 
xi 
 
whether the factors that were effective in reducing attacks against counterinsurgents in Iraq had 
the same effect on patterns of selective and indiscriminate violence against civilians. I find that 
greater American troop density in a given district is associated with declines in targeted attacks 
on Iraqi civilians, but this has no effect on the rate of indiscriminate attacks.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 Between 2006 and 2008, I served on the staff of Senator Barbara Boxer, handling foreign 
policy and defense issues. Most of my work involved assisting the senator in her capacity as a 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, conducting oversight of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. That experience serves as the backdrop for this dissertation, and some of my 
observations from that time motivate the questions it addresses.  
 Fundamentally, I was inspired, and frustrated, by the lack of an adequate explanation as 
to why these counterinsurgency wars conducted abroad were so difficult. The common refrain 
about Iraq was that there were “no good options,” and when it came to Afghanistan, the United 
States and its NATO allies would somehow “muddle through” it. During this period, military 
leaders and planners looked to the well of history and past experience for any lessons that could 
be learned and put to use, as other global powers have also struggled when fighting so-called 
“small wars” in territories abroad. They studied the work of counterinsurgency practitioners such 
as David Galula, whose 1964 Counterinsurgency Warfare was reissued after being out of print 
for years.
1
 But in addition to looking at the work of these counterinsurgents, contemporary 
strategists also sought out some of history’s most famous insurgents – T.E. Lawrence (of 
Arabia), Vladimir Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, and Che Guevara. Those searching to create a realistic, 
                                                 
1
 Most recently published in 2006. Other older books being re-issued include Alastair Horne’s A Savage 
War of Peace (1978, 2006) and Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966, 1978, 
2005). 
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actionable, and effective counterinsurgency doctrine also probed case studies of conflicts 
including the Philippine Insurrection, Malaya Emergency, Arab Revolt, Spanish Civil War, and 
the Troubles of Northern Ireland.  
 In the years since I left Washington for Ann Arbor, violence against American forces 
declined dramatically in Iraq, but that country has clearly not achieved the stability policymakers 
had hoped it would. In Afghanistan, American forces continue to “muddle through,” with few 
people holding any expectations that its government could manage on its own for very long. 
After so much time, effort, money, and blood, the question still remains: why is 
counterinsurgency abroad so difficult?  
 The answer that emerges through the essays in this dissertation involves the dynamics of 
domestic politics and public opinion within the occupying state as much as it does the dynamics 
of war within the occupied state. Existing research into the outcomes of these kinds of wars has 
acknowledged the importance of domestic support (e.g., Mack 1975, Edelstein 2004, Simpson 
2010), suggesting that it is difficult to win them before it runs out. But this loose assertion drawn 
in the existing literature is lacking in concrete details. What exactly is the process by which 
domestic popular support evaporates? Further, this idea that the loss in support back home leads 
to adverse outcomes has taken on a conventional wisdom-like quality, but none of these efforts 
actually demonstrate a connection between the factors that might lead to declines in support and 
ultimate war outcomes.  
 The first two papers of this dissertation aim to fill these gaps. Chapter 2 concerns the 
outcomes of counterinsurgency wars conducted overseas. It is motivated by Lyall’s (2010) recent 
finding that despite this conventional wisdom, democracies are no more likely to lose 
counterinsurgency wars than their autocratic counterparts. It proposes a theory of democratic 
3 
 
accountability that links the level of casualties suffered by an occupying force to its leadership’s 
decision to withdraw from the contested territory. I argue that war casualties act as the cost that 
drives patterns of domestic support in democratic states. Political elites seeking electoral gain 
will give meaning to those casualties, frequently arguing that the benefits that might come with 
continued fighting will not justify those costs, and that such wars are not necessary for the state’s 
survival. I suggest that once these divisions occur at the elite level, it becomes very difficult to 
maintain support among the population. To maintain their positions as elected officials, leaders 
responsible for the war must change course and withdraw or they will be replaced by leaders 
who will. This leads to the finding that while democracies may not win or lose any less than 
autocracies, as Lyall finds, they consistently abandon them at significantly lower levels of 
casualties.  
 Chapter 2 finds a link between casualties and war outcomes, but does not concretely 
identify the mechanism leading to a loss of public support. Chapter 3 uses an experimental 
research design to determine if news of American casualties or elite opinion drives attitudes 
about the war in Afghanistan. This is not the first effort to uncover the relationship between 
casualties, opinion, and support for conflict; indeed, American boots were still on the ground in 
Southeast Asia when Mueller (1971, 1973) first argued that logged American casualties were 
inversely related to public support for the war in Vietnam. Where this study differs, however, is 
in the portrayal of elite opinion. Existing experiments in this area typically portray elite support 
as split along traditional partisan lines, and support or opposition among the subjects is usually 
driven by their partisan attachments. But this approach rarely reflects reality, where elite foreign 
policy and security opinions frequently cut across partisan divisions. Both Republicans and 
Democrats have ‘hawks,’ who view military power as a necessary tool for preserving American 
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interests in the 21
st
 century, and ‘doves,’ who argue that America’s has been too quick in the 
post-9/11 world to rely on military action, and doing so has led to some disastrous consequences. 
The findings reveal that news of American casualties has little independent effect on attitudes 
towards the Afghanistan conflict. Instead, overall support for the conflict only declines when 
elite opinions in response to those deaths cut across standard partisan divisions.  
 At first glance, the final paper of the dissertation is a substantial departure from the first 
two. Whereas the earlier papers were broadly concerned with war outcomes from the perspective 
of the occupying state, Chapter 4 applies to those who are most impacted by these conflicts – the 
people living in these contested and war-ravaged territories. In an effort to determine what 
“works,” the United States military has collected exceptionally large amounts of sub-national 
data from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and has made it available to social scientists. But 
I respectfully suggest that these scholars have largely taken a short-sighted view of what 
“working” actually means, focusing almost entirely on the factors that lead to a decline in violent 
attacks against counterinsurgent forces (e.g, Condra and Shapiro 2012; Shaver and Shapiro 2015; 
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Berman et al 2013). This understandably reflects the concern 
over casualties detailed in the two preceding chapters, but rarely is counterinsurgent-insurgent 
violence the only kind of violence that occurs in these contexts. Indeed, Kalyvas notes that 
intrastate conflicts such as these are “likely to open a Pandora’s Box of violence” (2006:20).  
 The violence and instability that continues to plague Iraq demonstrates that the absence 
of such violence cannot be taken as evidence that the war has been a success. Understanding the 
dynamics of civilian violence in these conflicts allows researchers to enter into a much more 
broad and, perhaps more meaningful, discussion of what is needed for social and political order 
to re-emerge in these societies. States take on these counterinsurgencies campaigns and the 
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occupations under which they occur because they have particular policy goals that require them. 
And they presumably want the benefits from those policies to continue, regardless of whether 
they plan to remain in the territory or turn it over to an allied domestic authority.  
 Therefore, Chapter 4 relaxes the assumption that victory in these contexts is measured 
solely by the elimination of violence targeting counterinsurgents, and instead conceptualizes 
victory as the establishment of a self-enforcing social order that reflects the occupation’s policy 
goals. In this extended chapter, which could easily be broken up into its own series of papers, I 
seek to determine whether or not the factors that were effective in reducing attacks against 
counterinsurgents in Iraq – increasing troop density accompanied by targeted public goods 
spending – had the same effect throughout the rest of the conflict space. Specifically, I evaluate 
their effect on patterns of selective and indiscriminate violence against civilians in the various 
regions of Iraq. At the same time, Iraqis did not leave their fate entirely to the American effort, 
as political actors throughout the country also worked to reduce the violence that had taken hold 
of their lives, and I evaluate these efforts as well.  I find greater American troop density in a 
given district is associated with declines in targeted attacks on Iraqi civilians, but this has no 
effect on the rate of indiscriminate attacks. Further, public goods investments have no significant 
effect on either form of violence. Additionally, the emergence of the Sons of Iraq produced 
declines in both types of violence, while the ceasefire ordered by Muqtada al Sadr in the summer 
of 2007 is associated with reduced levels of targeted violence.  
 The first two chapters stand individually on their own, but together, they contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between public opinion and domestic political institutions at 
home and military operations overseas. Specifically, they show when and how casualties impact 
support within democratic societies for wars of occupation, and how that support in turn impacts 
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the outcomes of such conflicts. The final substantive chapter sheds light on what has to this point 
been an understudied area of the burgeoning literature of conflict dynamics from the recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the study of violence experienced by civilians 
allows us to move beyond commonly accepted understandings of what we mean by ‘victory’ in 
these wars and more fully appreciate the problems and limitations of waging war abroad.   
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Chapter 2 
Casualties, Regime Type, and the Outcomes of Wars of Occupation
2
 
 
Introduction 
Conventional wisdom among military scholars and policymakers has long maintained that 
democracies are poorly-suited to engage in counterinsurgency campaigns and that doing so is a 
prescription for foreign policy difficulty, if not outright disaster (Mack 1975; Horne 2006; 
Merom 2003; Jentleson 1992; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Arreguín-Toft 2001, 2005; Galula 2006; 
US Army 2007). The argument is simple: to successfully coerce an insurgency into laying down 
its arms and accepting the incumbent’s authority requires an acceptance of the costs of fighting 
and a willingness to use highly repressive violence. Democratic publics are believed to be 
fundamentally uncomfortable with both of these. As costs increase, the public withdraws its 
support, which compels its electorally-minded leaders to abandon the effort before the 
insurgency can be defeated and their goals met. And democratic leaders, so the thinking goes, 
will not allow their forces to employ extreme levels and methods of violence, which would 
violate their public’s (or the international community’s) beliefs regarding human rights and the 
                                                 
2
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proper conduct of war (Merom 2003). Such normative restraint prevents democracies from 
decisively defeating their opponents, which in turn, allows for the costs to continue to accrue. 
However, in a recent large-n study of counterinsurgency campaigns from the past 200 
years, Lyall (2010) directly challenges this claim, finding no relationship between regime type 
and outcomes in these wars. Indeed, Table 2.1 suggests the relationship between democracy and 
losing is minimal. In the 202 counterinsurgencies fought by nondemocracies between 1800 and 
2005, 107 of them emerged victorious, a success rate of 53%. Somewhat surprisingly, and in 
contrast to the arguments surrounding the difficulties that confront them, democracies actually 
outperform their autocratic counterparts, achieving victory 55% of the time by winning 46 of 84 
conflicts. 
 
Table 2.1. Outcomes of Counterinsurgency Wars by Regime Type 
 All Counterinsurgency Wars Counterinsurgency Wars Abroad 
 Nondemocracy Democracy Total Nondemocracy Democracy Total 
Win 107 46 153 39 25 64 
Draw 36 19 55 2 7 9 
Loss 59 19 78 25 16 41 
Total 202 84 286 66 48 114 
 
Table 2.1 also shows the success rates if we just look at those conflicts taking place in 
territories overseas. As Lyall (2010:182) notes, most democracies conducting counterinsurgent 
campaigns are doing so as occupying forces, as they tend not to face insurgent rebellions at 
home. We can see that while nondemocracies win about 59% of the time (39 of 66) in 
counterinsurgency wars abroad, democracies win slightly over half of such campaigns (25 of 
48), or 52%. It is clear that democracies do not perform as well in these conflicts as they do in 
interstate wars, where they win about 93% of the time (Reiter and Stam 2002:29); however, we 
10 
 
certainly cannot conclude that defeat is a preordained outcome. In light of the conventional 
wisdom, these findings are rather puzzling, leading us to wonder what, if any, is the relationship 
between regime type and the outcomes of these wars. 
This paper strives to develop some degree of understanding of this relationship. 
Specifically, I identify the conditions under which democracies will be more likely than other 
regime types to abandon these counterinsurgency wars abroad. To do so, I return to the notion of 
costs, but I do so by theoretically identifying which costs matter most to democracies – casualties 
– and develop a statistical model that takes those costs into account by interacting them with 
regime type. Occupying forces, regardless of their regime type, can potentially leave at any time, 
and they win such wars when they either convince the insurgent enemy that they have no 
intention of leaving before they accomplish their goals, and, thus, resistance is futile, or they kill 
off anyone who is willing to fight. This requires a willingness to pay the costs of staying in the 
territory, and frequently that means a willingness to incur casualties. I argue that when 
democratic states lose, meaning they abandon the territory before fully suppressing violent 
opposition and achieving whatever aims they may have, their electorally-minded leaders choose 
do so because the level of casualties they have incurred surpasses a threshold that their publics 
deem acceptable. Insurgents, therefore, are motivated to keep fighting despite experiencing their 
own mounting costs, fully aware that their ability, not to win militarily, but at least to inflict 
casualties brings them one step closer to the departure of the occupier and victory. This stands in 
contrast to autocratic states involved in counterinsurgency campaigns overseas. Leaders in such 
states are largely unconstrained by the views and concerns of their populations, and, thus, do not 
fear removal from office through electoral loss due to high levels of casualties. We should then 
11 
 
expect these types of regimes to be much more willing to accept higher casualties before 
withdrawing than their democratic counterparts.  
I test the claim that democracies have a lower tolerance for casualties than autocratic 
regimes in counterinsurgency wars overseas against a dataset of such conflicts between 1800 and 
2005. I restrict my universe of cases to counterinsurgencies conducted overseas for two reasons, 
one theoretical and the other for reasons related to policy. As just suggested and as I will discuss 
in greater detail below, wars of occupation constitute a distinct category of civil war and 
insurgency in that the incumbent counterinsurgent can leave the territory at any time. This 
possibility of exit does not exist for indigenous incumbents, and thus, we require a distinct theory 
to explain when and why occupiers might give up the fight and go home. Second, democratic 
states typically select into wars that they can and do win (Reiter and Stam 2002:29). But their 
relative lack of success in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad suggests that it may be useful 
from a policy perspective to identify the factors associated with defeat so that they can perhaps 
be avoided or mitigated. 
 I also examine the potential validity of competing mechanisms linking regime type to 
conflict outcomes. In particular, I assess the relationship between the duration of these conflicts 
and regime type, as democracies may be more likely to withdraw as government commitment 
and public attention turns away from the war to other issues, either at home or abroad. If other 
crises emerge that demand attention or the public is no longer interested in a conflict or its 
outcome, there may be little incentive for continuing it. The statistical results, however, strongly 
suggest that rather than being separated by differing thresholds of duration, regime types are 
distinct in the level of casualties they are generally willing to accept. This finding is largely 
robust to several alternative measures of regime type and several model specifications. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I begin by discussing the connection 
between casualties and democracy in greater detail, paying particularly close attention to how 
casualties become salient in democratic societies. Next, I briefly offer alternative hypotheses and 
discuss their potential theoretical shortcomings. Following from this, I present the data and 
empirical strategy, explaining how the interaction of regime type with casualties is needed to 
accurately assess the theory. I then report the results, which suggest that regimes where leaders 
are accountable to mass publics do, indeed, withdraw from these conflicts at significantly lower 
levels of casualties than those where leaders answer only to smaller groups of political elites. I 
conclude by stressing the need for future work to further explore the relationship between costs 
and regime type and I suggest that democratic leaders should think hard about the prospects for 
success when putting troops in harm’s way. 
 
Why Casualties Matter 
Casualties are a cost of conflict, but I begin this section with a brief step back to discuss how 
states conducting counterinsurgency abroad are likely to view the general notion of costs 
differently than an indigenous counterinsurgent force. Leaders who select into counterinsurgency 
wars abroad, or the occupations where they occur, may view them as imperative to their own 
political survival, but the survival of the state usually is not in question. Nevertheless, such a 
leader will seek to demonstrate not just his own, but his entire state’s dedication to victory and 
the attainment of whatever objectives brought it to the territory in the first place, whether it be to 
acquire raw natural resources, secure policy concessions, or install and protect a favored leader. 
They will frequently do so through statements of resolve. For example, following the passage of 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August 1964, Lyndon Johnson stated, “Let no one doubt that we 
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have the resources and we have the will to follow this course as long as it may take us” 
(Patterson 2012:24). Similarly, in 2003, George Bush argued: 
Enemies of freedom are making a desperate stand there [Iraq] -- 
and there they must be defeated. This will take time and require 
sacrifice. Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend what is 
necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to 
promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure (Bush, 
September 3, 2003). 
 
These statements and countless others are efforts to signal to a variety of audiences, from 
domestic populations at home to the insurgents and populations abroad, that the occupier is no 
different than an indigenous incumbent fighting an internal challenger. These latter leaders do 
not have any trouble convincing their challengers that they are committed to remaining in the 
territory, as defeat would spell the end of their tenure in power and may even result in some sort 
of extreme punishment (e.g., imprisonment or execution) (Lake and Baum 2001:594). As such, 
they have no option but to fight on regardless of the costs.  
 Costs, however, do influence the decision-making calculus of an occupier: such a state 
can simply leave the territory if they get too high. Scholars have located the motivations for 
insurgent action in a variety of other sources, from the desire to acquire selective and communal 
incentives (Olsen 1965; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Stoll 1993; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Mueller 2000; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2006) to a need to survive against what is thought to be 
certain death or enslavement (Mack 1975; Simpson 2010), as well as the desire to exact revenge 
(Tishkov 2004:142; Hashim 2006:99-104; Anderson 2005:46-47; Wood 2003:18-19; Lyall 2009) 
or seek protection (Leites and Wolf 1970:112-18; Mason and Krane 1989; Goodwin 2001; 
Kalyvas 2006:151-59, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007:183). These factors potentially enable 
insurgents to overcome any collective action problems that might limit an individual’s 
willingness to participate in risky behavior such as rebellion. In confronting a domestic 
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incumbent, these motivations must sustain a rebel group all the way to military victory, but in the 
case of a challenge to an occupying force, they need only to exist to allow the group to continue 
to extract some sort of costs to the point where the occupier is no longer willing to maintain its 
presence. 
I have discussed costs to this point in rather general terms. We can imagine that they 
might fall into two general categories, financial and human. Financial costs would obviously 
include those required to send fighting forces to the territory. In some instances the state may 
have to design and construct the equipment needed to transport trained troops and their 
equipment, and once in theatre, these troops need to be paid, fed, and clothed while the 
equipment must be cleaned and maintained. On top of the costs of bringing troops and equipment 
to the territory, there are the added costs of maintaining the gains made through the capturing of 
territory. The “clear and hold” sequence requires the occupier to pay the costs of garrisoning 
potentially remote or hostile regions, which can also be very costly from a logistical standpoint. 
Jacobsen writes of the situation in Iraq prior to the 1920 Revolt: 
These posts [garrisons throughout the country] were not always 
readily supported or even supplied reliably….The outposts, too 
weak to defend themselves and too immobile to tour the 
countryside or reinforce other sites, drew criticism from home. 
However, in the political climate that obtained both in Iraq and in 
the region as a whole, withdrawal of forces anywhere suggested  
that the British were about to evacuate the entire country 
(1991:324). 
 
 Such financial costs are certainly significant, but they are not the only costs of conducting 
counterinsurgency. Troops are killed and injured in the course of these campaigns. The 
asymmetric nature of guerrilla warfare (Arreguín-Toft 2001) means that front lines disappear and 
conventional battles become less frequent, although they certainly do exist. Insurgent actors 
adapt to employ technologies (e.g., improvised explosive devices) and tactics (e.g., suicide 
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bombings) that can kill uniformed service personnel wherever they are located, whether it be 
when they are on patrol, travelling in convoys, or eating in mess halls.  
 
The Centrality of Casualties to Democracies 
While all states incur costs through the course of conflict, who bears the brunt of those 
costs can vary. In democracies, leaders decide how resources at their disposal collected from the 
population are to be allocated across competing priorities, and upon doing so, the public then 
renders a decision through an election as to whether those resources were allocated in a way that 
reflects their interests. Relative to the financial costs, which can be obscured or delayed through 
budgeting mechanisms, battle deaths are a much more immediate and tangible cost that must be 
borne by democratic publics. News outlets will announce the names of the fallen, flags are flown 
at half-staff, memorials are erected, and entire towns might attend a servicemember’s funeral. 
Furthermore, enhanced media freedom within democracies also means that insurgents may 
attempt to carry out spectacular attacks likely to attract the attention of citizens in the occupying 
country.  
With the widespread dissemination of these images through open and free media, a 
democratic public does not always need the assistance of opposing domestic elites to know that 
deaths are occurring. But these elites can play a role in letting a democratic public know if those 
sacrifices are worthwhile and what the patterns of violence might suggest about the eventual 
outcome of the conflict. Both Baum and Groeling (2010) and Berinsky (2007) find that opposing 
political elites will potentially foster foreign policy interest within the public through vocal 
dissent, and Schultz (1998:832) notes that this usually occurs when those opponents of the 
incumbent detect the possibility of electoral gain from doing so. Many of these conflicts may 
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start out with near-consensus among elites regarding the need to emerge victorious, although it is 
unclear if such agreement is a result of true beliefs, groupthink, or fears over being labeled as 
unpatriotic during what is known to be a brief “rally around the flag” effect (Mueller 1970, 1973; 
Brody and Shapiro 1989; Brody 1991; Jordan and Page 1992; Lian and Oneal 1993; Parker 
1995; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner 1996). However, the electoral incentives Schultz (1998:832) 
identifies may lead opposition leaders to abandon the argument that the state’s immediate 
security or survival are threatened.
3
 Once this elite consensus breaks down, it then becomes very 
difficult for a leader to convince the public that the human cost is worth it (Burk 1999:60), as 
media coverage becomes more critical in response to the elite dissention (Zaller 1994). These 
elites and the public who they have engaged through their dissent also can use casualty patterns 
to give meaning to current casualty rates (Gartner 2008) and to approximate future costs (Gartner 
and Segura 2005; Nisbett and Ross 1980).
4
  
The resulting shift in public opinion can be quite dramatic. In July of 2003, two months 
prior to President Bush’s speech noted above, a USA Today/Gallup Poll included the question, 
“In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Iraq, do you think the United 
States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not?” Twenty-seven percent of respondents 
said that the United States “made a mistake,” while seventy-two percent said, “did not make a 
                                                 
3
It is here where we perhaps see the difference in the records for democracies in interstate wars and 
counterinsurgencies abroad. In interstate war, democratic elites are likely to remain unified in their belief 
in the need for the conflict, even in spite of the casualties that accrue, as victory is seen as crucial for the 
security and survival of the state. See Schultz (1998, 2001) for an extended discussion of the role 
opposing elites in democratic societies play in crisis bargaining and conflict.  
4
 Merom (2003) makes a somewhat similar argument to account for why domestic support declines. 
While he acknowledges the role of force casualties, his primary argument is that the middle class and its 
elected representatives are unwilling to allow their armed forces to engage in the brutal methods that 
accompany these counterinsurgent campaigns, leading them into protracted conflicts where they are 
effectively constrained from doing what it takes to win. However, many of these conflicts are marked by 
extreme violence from the start, much of which the public is aware, and it is unclear that this supposed 
discomfort is causally related to the decline in support. Future research may want to more fully 
investigate this argument.  
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mistake” (PollingReport.com). When the question was asked for the last time in this poll in July 
of 2007, sixty-two percent of respondents said that the invasion was a mistake, while just thirty-
six percent stated that it was not (PollingReport.com). 
 As elite messages from the opposition erode support for the conflict (Gartner and Segura 
1998; Mueller 1973) and the leaders responsible for it (Gartner and Segura 2000), those leaders 
must either respond to those shifting preferences or face the electoral consequences. This logic 
has underpinned many existing studies that show casualties influence the outcomes of elections 
to multiple branches of government within the United States (Carson, et. al. 2001; Gartner, et. al. 
2004; Karol and Miguel 2007; Voeten and Brewer 2006) and their overall effect on leader tenure 
(Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. 2003).  
 However, it is not a foregone conclusion that occupiers will always suffer casualties at 
levels that shift public support for the conflict downward. A technological advantage might allow 
the occupier to incapacitate insurgents while largely staying protected from harm. For example, 
the arrival of military aircraft in the middle of Britain’s 1920 conflict in Iraq allowed it to kill 
insurgents with minimal human risk. Royal Air Force Commander Arthur Harris noted:  
They [i.e., the Arabs and the Kurds] now know what real bombing 
means, in casualties and damage; they now know that within 45 
minutes a full sized village…can be practically wiped out and a 
third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five machines 
which offer them no real target, no opportunity for glory as 
warriors, no effective means of escape, and little chance of 
retaliation or loot such as an infantry column would afford them in 
producing a similar result (from Tanaka 2010:21). 
   
Following the deployment of airplanes, the British were able to maintain control of the region at 
minimal human or financial cost into the next decade. Local inhabitants would still occasionally 
target British assets, but the use of air power allowed for those attacks to be dealt with swiftly 
and harshly, which lessened their frequency and lethality. 
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Similarly, an insurgent group inspired by the possibility of an occupier’s exit and defeat 
can only succeed if it possesses the capability to extract costs. If they do not have the means to 
carry out attacks that would make an occupier’s continued presence untenable, it is unlikely to 
have any effect on the domestic audience’s concerns over the course of the occupation. For 
example, in the 1906 Zulu Rebellion against the British in modern day South Africa, local 
tribesmen armed only with seven guns and the rest, spears and shields, were no match for the 
rifles and cannon of British soldiers (Thompson 2003:546). Insurgents do not need to be able to 
win militarily, but they must at least possess a minimum capacity to extract costs, and, as this 
example suggests, that is not always the case. These strategies suggest that significant casualties 
in a conflict are not a given. But when democratic states are unable to adopt strategies and 
operations that weaken the likelihood of suffering such casualties, the theory suggests that 
leaders responsible for the conflict come under increasing pressure to withdraw, ceding control 
back to their indigenous opponents.  
By contrast, autocratic regimes largely do not possess the institutional mechanisms that 
allow for casualties to shape outcomes in the same way they do in democracies. To be sure, if a 
state suffers casualties to the point where it can no longer effectively fight or control territory, it 
is likely to ultimately lose. But this is likely the result of poor battlefield performance, not public 
discontent that compels a shift in policy. Rather, autocracies generally lack meaningful media 
freedom, which suggests that their publics may not even know the extent of the casualties being 
incurred. Also, the absence of visible and vocal elite opposition prevents them from acquiring 
any sort of context in which to place those casualties. Finally, even if the public were aware of 
the casualties the state was suffering, the lack of competitive elections would leave those 
individuals opposed to further involvement from having the opportunity to voice their desire for 
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a change in policy. Therefore, we would expect that relative to democracies, autocracies will be 
more willing to accept higher levels of casualties before withdrawing in defeat from 
counterinsurgency wars abroad. More formally:   
Hypothesis 1: Democratic regimes are likely to withdraw from counterinsurgency wars 
overseas at lower levels of casualties than autocratic regimes.  
 
Alternative Explanations 
We can imagine, however, that democratic states might also withdraw from 
counterinsurgency campaigns overseas for a number of other reasons. Here, I focus on two 
plausible alternative explanations offered in the existing literature. The first is that democratic 
publics come to no longer believe in the prospects of winning. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) and 
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005-06) argue that the public’s belief in the likelihood of victory, 
however individuals choose to define it, outweighs all other considerations. If success is viewed 
as unlikely, a democratic public becomes less willing to support the conflict, which, in turn, 
forces the leadership of the state to end the conflict. Unfortunately, testing the validity of this 
mechanism requires the use of experimental surveys over a period of time, as Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler (2005-06) did with public opinion surveys during the early periods of the Iraq War, and 
so I will set it aside for further research. 
Nevertheless, Berinsky and Druckman (2007:134) give us reason to be skeptical of the 
logic that underpins such a claim. They raise the possibility that the relationship between support 
for war and belief in its success may run in the opposite direction from Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler’s (2005-06) argument: “Similarly, just as the observed correlation between vote choice 
and economic perceptions is a result of voters bringing their economic assessments in line with 
their political judgments, the causal arrow between perceived success and latent generalized 
20 
 
support for war could run from the latter to the former, rather than vice versa…(134).” Indeed, in 
2004 at a time of high partisan division with respect to support for the Iraq War, Berinsky (2007) 
found that 85 percent of Republicans and only 51 percent of Democrats thought that the conflict 
would be successful, suggesting that underlying partisan preferences may be driving both 
support for a conflict and belief in its success (Druckman and Berinsky 2007:134).  
The other causal argument found in the literature involves the duration of the conflict and 
can be tested with available data. Reiter and Stam (2002) and Bennett and Stam (1998) find that 
the likelihood of victory for democracies in interstate war declines with time. As war persists, 
not only are human and financial costs accruing, but other crises and events both at home and 
abroad may reshape how the public views the war and its perceived necessity. Economic crises at 
home or new security threats abroad may arise that reduce the public’s demand for an ongoing 
conflict, which then leads decision-makers to reevaluate the need for continuing it, likely 
resulting in withdrawal as ongoing involvement no longer possesses any electoral value. An 
autocracy, on the other hand, may be more immune from such concerns regarding the duration of 
the war for the same reason it might be insulated from the public’s aversion to casualties: it is not 
accountable to the public and so its beliefs and opinions largely do not matter. These conjectures 
produce the following hypothesis for testing: 
Hypothesis 2: Democracies are likely to withdraw from counterinsurgency wars overseas 
earlier than autocratic regimes. 
However, we have reason to be skeptical of this hypothesis, as well. Whereas casualties 
may impact the public and not necessarily the elite policymakers in autocratic societies, time 
likely impacts both groups through two potential pathways. First, like democratic leaders, 
autocrats must pursue evolving agendas overseas and at home in their effort to remain in power, 
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which means that their attention spans may be limited. Just as a public’s attention can shift, so, 
too, can that of an autocratic leader, and Goemans (2000) suggests that they are unlikely to pay a 
price for abandoning the conflict, as he finds that dictators are unlikely to lose power or suffer 
other punishments for losing wars.
5
 The second explanation for why autocratic states might be 
just as likely as democracies to lose these wars as time goes on involves challenges to their 
leadership. Relevant political elites who are in a position to challenge the leader who oversees 
the conflict may grow frustrated with the ongoing diversion of resources from their own 
preferred priorities, producing a potential challenge to his authority. If the leader is replaced 
through such a challenge, we would then expect the new leader to withdraw from the conflict, as 
his supporters are not tied to or invested in its success. The former pathway, changes in the 
leader’s priorities, is likely to be present in institutional arrangements where would-be 
challengers possess little ability or incentive to organize, while the latter, regime change, will 
likely occur under configurations where organization is possible and the punishments for failed 
challenges are not sufficient enough to deter such efforts. However, regardless of which is 
operating, we have reason to believe that there should be little difference between the effects of a 
counterinsurgency war’s duration across regime types. Such a null finding would mirror earlier 
research that has found no link between regime type and the duration of civil wars (Lyall 2010; 
Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004; de Rouen, Jr. and Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004). 
This section discusses three potential mechanisms underpinning the relationship between 
democratic regime type and loss in counterinsurgency wars. The first involves numbers of deaths 
among the occupier’s forces. As these increase, democratic publics turn against the idea of 
ongoing involvement, forcing their leaders to withdraw in defeat, abandoning whatever aims 
                                                 
5
 Instead, Goemans (2000) finds that only leaders of mixed regimes are likely to suffer loss of office, as 
well as additional punishments, for losing conflicts.  
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they may have had. Rather than a concern over casualties, the second mechanism surrounds the 
public’s sense of whether success is achievable. When democratic publics no longer believe in 
the possibility of victory, they withdraw their support. Finally, the third potential mechanism is 
time. As the duration of the conflict increases, democratic regimes will be less willing to 
maintain their involvement due to the declining salience of the war or the emergence of other 
crises that demand the public’s attention. In the next section, I outline the research strategy to 
adjudicate between two of these three plausible explanations. 
 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
To evaluate the role of regime type in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad, I begin with a 
dataset of the 114 cases of occupation between 1800 and 2005 based off of data collected by 
Lyall and Wilson (2009a).
6
 Lyall and Wilson code a state “as an external occupier if its military 
forces crossed an internationally recognized border in order to suppress an insurgency” 
(2009b:4). To enter the dataset, a conflict had to meet two primary criteria. First, it must have 
experienced a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths, with at least 100 casualties on each side of the 
conflict. Also, the insurgency, which Lyall defines as “a violent, often protracted struggle by 
nonstate actors to obtain political objectives such as independence, greater autonomy, or the 
subversion of existing political authority” (2010:175), must employ guerrilla warfare, a strategy 
that “(1) uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment through hit-and-run strikes while 
avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least some portion 
of the noncombatant population” (2010:175).  
                                                 
6
 I have made a number of changes to the original coding of cases by Lyall and Wilson (2009a). 
Information regarding those changes, which are focused on the number of casualties threshold and 
whether an incumbent was an occupying force, are contained in the supplementary appendix at 
www.matthewswells.com. 
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Dependent Variable 
 Conflict outcomes are operationalized in two ways, both of which come from Lyall and 
Wilson (2009a). The first is an ordered win-draw-loss variable. A win occurs when the 
incumbent defeats the insurgency through military force, either remaining in the territory without 
granting any insurgent demands or leaving after it has secured the policy objectives the 
occupation was intended to secure. An outcome is coded as a loss when the incumbent occupier 
gives up control of the territory prior to military victory and the insurgent group and its 
supporters either assume control or go on to fight indigenous supporters of the occupier for it. A 
draw occurs when the occupier concedes to some, but not all of the insurgents’ demands. This 
means that the occupier remains in the territory, but grants the opposition some measure of 
regional autonomy or self-governance. In the 114 cases, there are 64 incumbent wins, 41 losses, 
and 9 draws. I also use a dichotomous win-loss variable that drops the 9 draws. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 The model requires two primary explanators to evaluate Hypothesis 1, regime type and 
casualties. Lyall and Wilson state that “militarily ineffectual rebels can… still win politically if 
they are able to influence the incumbent’s domestic scene…” (2009a:72). I argue that for 
democracies, such influence primarily comes through the taking of casualties through the forms 
of irregular warfare noted earlier. The theory suggests that regime type on its own does not 
sufficiently explain why certain states win or lose counterinsurgency wars overseas. Rather, it is 
the combination of democratic governance and the level of casualties that serve as the proper 
explanation. As such, we need a model that observes the interaction of the two.  
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As is convention in international relations, democracy is a binary variable that assigns all 
states with a Polity2 score of ≥7 in the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) with a 1; 
all others receive a 0. Polity2 ranges from -10, the most totalitarian regimes, to 10, which is 
generally given to the most consolidated democracies. There are 48 democracies and 66 
nondemocracies in the dataset.  
  The second explanatory variable, casualty ratio, will be interacted with democracy. The 
casualty ratio variable captures the number of occupying forces killed during the course of a 
conflict over the total number of occupying forces who fought in the territory. I use a ratio, as 
opposed to logged casualties, because the denominator contextualizes the casualties incurred 
across conflicts. For example, ten battle deaths reveal little information or meaning regarding 
prospects for success, unless it is accompanied by some indication of the larger war effort. If 
these ten deaths were suffered by a force of 100 in one conflict, it would contain a different 
meaning for an engaged domestic audience than if they were suffered by a force of 1,000 in 
another. For information on occupier battle deaths, I consulted several datasets and historical 
accounts of these conflicts, including the Correlates of War (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) and 
Clodfelter (2002). Data on force size comes largely from Friedman (2011), as well as Clodfelter 
(2002) and other qualitative sources. The data collected represents the best estimates for 
casualties and force size available for the occupying state, and while I was able to collect data 
regarding the occupier’s force size and casualties for many of the wars, 70 in total, much of this 
data remains unknown, unsubstantiated, or incomplete.
7
  
                                                 
7
 It is important to note that occupying forces frequently used local troops to fight in their campaigns 
abroad, particularly during the colonial era. These troops should not be included in the total force size or 
total casualties because the theory argues that domestic publics care about their own forces and does not 
address how they might feel about foreign troops fighting on their behalf. Therefore, when possible, I 
have made an effort to differentiate force size and casualties attributed directly to the occupying power 
from the total number of those who fought and died on their side in a given conflict. For example, Sepoys 
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To evaluate Hypothesis 2, which posits that democracies are likely to abandon 
counterinsurgency wars abroad earlier than autocracies, I interact the length of the war with 
regime type. Taken from Lyall and Wilson (2009a), duration is operationalized by the natural 
log of the number of months the war lasted.  
 
Control Variables 
 In order to properly identify the causal effects of these interactions, it is important to 
account for some other factors that might be correlated with them or the outcomes of these 
conflicts. First, highly mechanized militaries are thought to be especially vulnerable to defeat by 
insurgents. Lyall and Wilson (2009a) argue that military technology developed to win 
conventional interstate wars, such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc., actually make forces 
less capable in the conduct of counterinsurgency because they prevent troops from interacting 
with the local population, which is seen as key to success in counterinsurgency. Lyall and 
Wilson (2009a) operationalize the level of mechanization as the ratio of soldiers per motorized 
vehicle, which is taken in the year prior to the war. Mechanization carries five values; 1 to 4 
based on the level of mechanization and 0 for all conflicts prior to 1917, which is commonly 
viewed as the beginning of the mechanized era (Lyall and Wilson 2009a:74). 
 Second, support from a third party is believed to increase an insurgent group’s chances of 
winning against an incumbent force, as such support frequently means access to weapons, 
funding, recruits, and sanctuary (e.g., Regan 2002; Record 2007; Salehyan 2008). An 
observation receives a 2 if the insurgency received both material aid and sanctuary from a third 
                                                                                                                                                             
fought alongside the British in many of its campaigns in the Indian Subcontinent; however, the sources 
frequently distinguish between the two when providing information regarding how many troops 
participated or were killed. 
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party, a 1 if it obtained only one type of aid, and a 0 if it did not receive any third party 
assistance. The data is taken from Lyall and Wilson (2009a). 
 Third, as a state’s power increases, so should its likelihood of victory. Stronger countries 
should be able to adapt and manage the costs of counterinsurgency campaigns better than 
smaller, weaker states. I follow Lyall (2010) and measure power using the Correlates of War’s 
Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) from the year 
prior to the onset of violence, which captures a state’s share of global economic and military 
power.
8
   
 Fourth, the ruggedness of a territory’s terrain has been found to be significantly 
associated with rebel victory, as insurgents will frequently use remote, mountainous areas as 
sanctuary from incumbent forces, who typically control the large, urban centers (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Galula 2006:23-25). I borrow from Lyall and Wilson 
(2009a), measuring terrain as the average altitude, in meters, of five different locations within 
the territory experiencing the conflict. 
 Finally, I discussed earlier the added costs of shipping soldiers and equipment long 
distances. One can imagine it is much easier from a logistical standpoint to fight a 
counterinsurgency next door than on the other side of the world (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). 
Therefore, to account for the possibility that occupier success declines with distance, I include a 
measure of the logged kilometer distance between the occupier’s capital city and the occupied 
territory (Lyall and Wilson 2009a). Table 2.2 contains the descriptive statistics for these 
variables, which will be tested using logistic regression. 
                                                 
8
 In addition, I also run the model with the logged total number of the incumbent’s military personnel. 
While not indicative of the number of forces within occupied territory, it does convey some information 
about the general power of the occupying state. The results are consistent with the original model and can 
be found in the online supplementary appendix. 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Win/Draw/Loss 114 1.202 0.942 0 2 
Win/Loss 105 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Democracy (Pol2≥7) 114 0.421 0.496 0 1 
Casualty Ratio 70 0.155 0.196 0.004 0.97 
Duration (Logged mos.) 114 3.257 1.275 0.347 5.911 
Mechanization 114 1.14 1.43 0 4 
External Support 114 0.447 0.692 0 2 
Power (ln(100*cinc)) 114 1.9 1.266 -1.329 3.515 
Terrain 114 5.804 1.431 0 8.497 
Distance 114 8.238 1.106 1 9.843 
 
Results 
Table 2.3 reports the statistical results of the models that test these hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 
display the regression results for the win/draw/loss and win/loss models without the interactions 
of democracy with casualty ratio and duration, while Models 3 and 4 show the results with those 
interactions. We see in the first two models that while increasing casualty ratios lead to a 
decreased likelihood of victory, regime type has no significant independent effect on the 
outcomes of these wars, nor does duration of the conflict.  
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Table 2.3. Regime Type and the Outcomes of Counterinsurgency Wars Abroad 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Win/Draw/Loss Win/Loss Win/Draw/Loss Win/Loss 
 Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Democracy 
 
-0.738 
(1.01) 
-1.223 
(1.481) 
-0.247 
(4.348) 
0.303 
(3.131) 
Casualty Ratio (CR) 
 
-5.662*** 
(1.925) 
-7.306** 
(2.827) 
-4.843*** 
(1.869) 
-6.6*** 
(2.521) 
Democracy*CR 
 
  -6.943 
(4.511) 
-10.473*** 
(2.185) 
Duration 0.02 
(0.433) 
0.264 
(0.412) 
-0.023 
(0.304) 
0.228 
(0.284) 
Democracy*Duration   0.037 
(1.022) 
-0.205 
(0.701) 
Mechanization 
 
-0.473* 
(0.243) 
-0.411 
(0.361) 
-0.527** 
(0.22) 
-0.421 
(0.291) 
External Support 
 
-1.961** 
(0.854) 
-3.484** 
(1.704) 
-1.782** 
(0.815) 
-3.548** 
(1.417) 
Power 
 
0.207 
(0.328) 
0.502* 
(0.268) 
0.235 
(0.292) 
0.578** 
(0.27) 
Terrain 
 
0.061 
(0.176) 
0.035 
(0.162) 
0.032 
(0.146) 
-0.028 
(0.211) 
Distance 
 
-0.049 
(0.131) 
0.266 
(0.391) 
-0.04 
(0.122) 
0.306 
(0.443) 
Cutpoints/ 
Constant 
 
-3.062 
-2.431 
-0.488 
(2.112) 
-3.078 
-2.439 
-0.643 
(1.918) 
N (clusters) 70(14) 65(13) 70(14) 65(13) 
R
2 
0.3784 0.5725 0.3867 0.5826 
    P≤0.1*; P≤0.05**; P≤0.01*** 
 
However, interpreting coefficients of interaction terms in logit models is somewhat 
difficult, and so Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide a graphical interpretation of the results of 
Hypothesis 1 found in Models 3 and 4. They depict the predicted probabilities of winning for the 
different regime types as their casualty ratios increase, with .95 confidence and holding all other 
variables constant at their means.  
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Figure 2.1. Predicted Probability of Winning as Casualty Ratio Increases 
 
In both graphs, we can clearly see that democratic states become much more likely to 
withdraw at lower casualty thresholds relative to their autocratic counterparts, meaning that 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. It is worth noting here that while the coefficient on the interaction 
term in Model 3 is insignificant, this is due to the fact that a large portion of the casualty ratios, 
approximately 50% of them, are less than 7%. At this low threshold, we cannot say with a great 
deal of confidence that regime types act all that differently. However, as casualty ratios begin to 
increase, we can see that separation between regime types becomes much more clear.  The left 
panel (Model 3) suggests that democracies are statistically differentiated from nondemocracies 
once the casualty ratio approaches just under 20%. Also, their chances of winning fall below 
50% once the casualty ratio reaches between 5% and 20%. Nondemocracies, in contrast, do not 
fall below a 50% probability of winning until their casualty ratio reaches between 25% and 75%.  
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 In the right panel, the win/loss model (Model 4), a similar pattern emerges. Democratic 
counterinsurgents become statistically more likely than autocratic forces to withdraw with a 
casualty ratio of around 15% and their chances of winning fall below 50% when they incur a 
casualty ratio between 10% and 25%. As was the case in the full win/draw/loss model, 
autocracies show much less sensitivity to casualties, as they do not fall below a 50% chance of 
winning until suffering somewhere between 30% and 65% casualties.  
Figure 2.2. Predicted Probability of Winning as Duration Increases 
 
In contrast, Figure 2.2, which relates to Hypothesis 2 as tested in Models 3 and 4, 
illustrates the predicted probabilities of winning for democracies and autocracies as conflict 
duration increases, again with .95 confidence and holding all other variables constant at their 
means. In both panels, we are unable to discern any meaningful difference between democratic 
and autocratic occupiers in terms of their likelihood of victory as duration increases. From these 
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two graphs, we can conclude that the effect of regime type is unlikely to be conditional on the 
duration of the counterinsurgency war, meaning that we can reject Hypothesis 2.
9
 
 To return to Table 2.3, we can also assess the significance of the remaining variables 
discussed above. In both interaction models and as was the case in the non-interaction models, 
we see that independent of casualties, regime type possesses no statistically significant effect on 
the outcomes of these wars, a finding consistent with Lyall’s (2010) results. Conversely, casualty 
ratios play a significant stand-alone role in determining outcomes. As the ratio increases, a state 
becomes less likely to win, regardless of regime type. Finally, the only significant control 
variable that finds statistical support in all four models is external support; as it increases, so, too, 
does the likelihood of defeat. Increasing levels of mechanization also lead to an increase in the 
likelihood of defeat, although this finding only achieves statistical significance in the full 
win/draw/loss models.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 In addition to these tests using both the trichotomous win/draw/loss and dichotomous 
win/loss outcome variables, I also conduct a series of robustness checks. The results are 
presented in the online appendix to this paper and only briefly summarized here. I first run the 
model with a number of alternative measures of regime type. The first, W, captures the size of 
the occupying state’s winning coalition and is a five-point scale taken from Bueno de Mesquita 
                                                 
9
 As an alternative test, I further follow Lyall (2010:187) and also run a Weibull hazard regression model 
of all outcomes, as well as a restricted set of only defeats. The results, which can be found in the online 
supplementary appendix, further demonstrate that the interaction of democracy and casualty ratio has no 
significant effect on the duration of all conflicts, regardless of the outcome, as well as those conflicts 
where the occupier lost.  
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et al (2003).
10
 The second alternative operationalization, audience cost capacity (ACC), is a four-
point scale taken from Uzonyi, Souva, and Golder (2012) and captures two key components of 
Polity’s democracy measure, the availability of challengers to the leader and the cost of 
mobilizing against him. I also use two alternative measures of democracy used by Lyall (2010) 
in his earlier analysis. I include the full continuous 21-point Polity2 scale (Polity2), which 
captures relative levels of democracy. Lyall also includes Geddes’ (2003; Weeks 2008) regime 
typology, and codes this alternative measure of democracy (alternative demo) as a binary 
variable that generates 49 observations being assigned a 1, while those coded as nondemocratic 
receive a 0. Second, I include a number of additional controls, including those for new states, the 
occupying state’s population, as well as conflicts occurring during World War II and the Cold 
War. The findings of all of these models, except for the Geddes alternative coding of 
democracies, are consistent with results presented in Table 2.3 and Figures 1 and 2. Finally, to 
demonstrate that these findings are not due strictly to the changes in coding from the original 
Lyall and Wilson (2009a) data set, I also test these models using their original coding scheme, 
which results in a slightly different universe of cases. The results remain consistent and are 
contained in the appendix. 
 
Potential Concerns 
 While the results clearly demonstrate that democracies behave differently in these 
conflicts than autocracies, three issues may be cause for concern. First, one might be concerned 
that the missing casualty ratio data is not missing at random but in some sort of systematic 
fashion, leading to biased estimates. Forty-four of the 114 conflicts in the data set are lacking 
                                                 
10
 See Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) for a full description of Selectorate Theory, as the size of a leader’s 
winning coalition is a central component. 
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either the number of casualties, force size, or both. One can imagine that certain regime types or 
occupiers would be less willing or able to either report or disclose these data. In particular, 
record-keeping in older conflicts may not be as complete as it is in modern war, and closed 
autocracies may be disinclined to release these statistics, particularly if they find themselves on 
the losing side.  
An analysis of the data, however, suggests that such systematic biases are unlikely to be 
present in this case. Of the forty-four cases where at least one of the two elements of the casualty 
ratio are missing (casualties or force size), twenty-two were conflicts that took place prior to 
World War I, while twenty-two occurred after its onset, suggesting that the period in which a 
conflict took place has little bearing on whether or not data for it are available. Conflicts 
conducted by autocratic states account for twenty-five of these cases, which at first glance, might 
suggest the possibility of bias. However, eight of these took place during World War II, and we 
can imagine that determining whether these occupying troops were present and dying in fighting 
the insurgencies rather than through the course of the larger conflict is difficult, if not 
impossible. Further, these occupiers – Germany, Italy and Japan – lost these occupations due to a 
factor exogenous to the occupations themselves: they lost World War II.
11
 Absent these eight 
cases, we have seventeen cases of missing data coming from autocratic occupations and nineteen 
coming from those conducted by democracies. This suggests that such a bias is unlikely to be 
present.  
                                                 
11
 The sources do provide counts for force size and casualties in a number of occupations that took place 
during World War II, such as the German occupation of France, the Warsaw Uprising, and the Japanese 
occupation of parts of China. However, counts were unavailable for the German occupations of portions 
of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and Italy; Italian occupation of Albania; and Japanese 
occupation of Malaysia and the Philippines. As noted earlier, I control for World War II in Section I of 
the online appendix and the results do not change.  
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Also, one might be concerned that the suffering of casualties does not cause losing but 
that it is the definition of losing. This may be true when we think of warfare more generally, but 
in the case of counterinsurgency, and occupation more specifically, this is unlikely to be the case. 
Recall that according to the definition offered above, occupations are efforts to combat 
insurgencies, which involve guerrilla warfare and indirect tactics, as defined by Lyall 
(2010:175). Further, it is also important to remember that the occupier’s decision to withdraw, 
while coded as a loss, is not necessarily a signal of its inability to continue to fight, hold territory, 
and perhaps even inflict further damage to the insurgency. As suggested above, these 
insurgencies do not need to win battles, only maintain the capacity to extract costs. This may 
mean that they “lose” every direct engagement, but the casualties they inflict, while perhaps 
limited in comparison to their own, may still be enough to influence the occupier’s decision to 
withdraw. Accordingly, Table 3.2 notes that the mean casualty ratio for these conflicts is .155, 
and this fairly low threshold suggests that a state’s decision to withdraw from an occupation is 
not predicated on its (in)ability to keep fighting.
12
  
The final concern is one of selection; that democracies select into different types of wars 
than autocracies and that this is what drives the observed results. Specifically, they might select 
into wars that will not require significant casualties (See Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010). 
Indeed, we can imagine that policymakers are acutely aware that domestic populations have the 
potential to grow weary of the fight should casualties get too high. While it is undoubtedly the 
case that democracies engage in these conflicts with the assumption that casualties will be kept 
                                                 
12
 However, the findings illustrated in Figure 2.1 suggest that autocrats may indeed stop fighting because 
they have lost on the battlefield. Also, two cases do have exceptionally large casualty ratios. The First 
British-Afghan War (1838-1842) and the War of Dominican Restoration (1863-1865) saw incumbent 
casualty ratios of .97 and .93 for the British and Spanish, respectively. To assess the possibility that these 
two cases are driving the results, I drop them from the analysis. The results, which can be found in the 
appendix, remain unchanged.   
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to a minimum, accompanying that expectation, however, is the belief that the campaign will also 
end in victory. But the findings show that while the occupations in which they engage do not 
result in high casualties, it is not because they always win them. Rather, it is because they will 
frequently depart, or lose, before those casualties can mount to extreme levels or even those 
experienced by nondemocracies. Thus, while many democratic leaders may believe that they are 
selecting into different types of occupations (i.e., those that are clearly winnable at minimal 
cost), the findings suggest that a number of them are actually selecting into occupations that 
would require far greater casualties than their publics are willing to tolerate, which would lessen 
our concerns about this particular selection effect.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper provides the first cross-national, quantitative evidence of democracies’ increased 
sensitivity to casualties in counterinsurgency campaigns. Seeking electoral advantage, opposing 
elites capitalize on the media’s coverage of the growing death toll and argue that the war is 
unnecessary for state security and not in the national interest. In turn, the electorate demands that 
their leaders change course to end these conflicts or they will elect leaders who will. Knowing 
this, insurgents do not need to win militarily, only demonstrate their ongoing ability to extract 
these costs from the occupying democratic state.  
The results shown in this paper do not necessarily indicate when those elites will make 
the decision to break ranks and engage in public opposition; rather, they suggest the thresholds 
where that opposition leads to a change in war policy and the decision to withdraw from the 
territory, which constitutes a loss in the conflict.
13
 Specifically, the data suggest that democracies 
                                                 
13
 This result can come about either through the installation of newly-elected leaders or by the leaders 
who are responsible for the conflict’s ongoing prosecution. 
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become more likely to withdraw than their autocratic counterparts when they reach a casualty 
ratio between 15% and 20%, and their chance of victory falls below 50% at casualty ratios 
beginning between 5% and 25%, depending on the model specification. This contrasts with 
autocrats, who do not fall below this threshold until achieving a ratio of between 25% and 75%.  
Contrary to existing findings in interstate war (Bennett and Stam 1998), it does not 
appear that democracies are sensitive to time in these conflicts. In light of the results with respect 
to casualties, this result makes sense. Casualties may accrue at a very slow rate, which may 
decrease the salience of the conflict among the public. If the public stops paying close attention 
because few people are dying, one might think it may lead leaders to withdraw from it, as there is 
little to gain from continuing it. But, as is suggested by the data, it appears that the opposite it is 
true. Leaders respond to this lack of attention by continuing the war because there is fairly little 
to lose. If we look at the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, we can perhaps see this logic at work. 
American casualties in Afghanistan have accounted for less than half of those that took place in 
Iraq. This might explain why public opposition to ongoing involvement in Iraq led to American 
withdrawal after eight years, while operations in Afghanistan have continued for over a dozen 
years. 
 These findings suggest a number of avenues for future research. The focus in this paper 
has been on the sensitivity of regimes to one particular type of cost. However, states, particularly 
nondemocracies, may be vulnerable to other forms of cost, namely financial. Nondemocratic 
leaders frequently must satisfy a coalition of other elites to remain in office (Geddes 1999, 2003; 
Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., 1999, 2003; Haber 2006), and conducting such wars can exhaust a 
state’s financial resources and divert them from the priorities of members of that coalition. This, 
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in turn, may result in a challenge to the leadership, which, if successful, would bring about a 
withdrawal. Future work will want to assess this possibility. 
 Also, the results of this paper suggest that democratic leaders should be aware of their 
publics’ sensitivity to casualties when considering such campaigns. Yet, they still select into 
these wars where the margins in terms of the public’s willingness to accept casualties are rather 
slim, and may frequently dismiss the possibility that casualties may be significant. Future 
research will want to tease out why leaders appear to discount the possibility of high casualty 
levels in the beginning of these conflicts only to take them seriously later on and subsequently 
change course. 
 Finally, the argument made here prioritizes structural determinants of outcomes rather 
than events on the ground and the “how” of fighting. However, scholars and practitioners are 
also engaged in a vigorous debate over the merits of population-centric “hearts and minds” 
warfare vis-à-vis those of brute force and conventional power.
14
 Using fine-grained data from 
Afghanistan and Iraq, scholars have sought to identify what strategies and operations “work” in 
reducing insurgent violence (Berman et. al., 2013; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Berman, 
et. al. 2011), but they have yet to connect those efforts to final outcomes. If it is true that 
democracies enhance their prospects for winning simply by reducing casualties, ongoing 
scholarship and theory may want to focus on identifying which strategies yielding a reduction in 
casualties in a particular location over a particular period of time are sustainable over the long 
term.  
However, both categories of counterinsurgency strategy – brute force and “hearts and 
minds” – will likely require that an occupying force incur casualties. Those deaths may engender 
sufficient opposition within the domestic population back home such that leaders will be forced 
                                                 
14
 See Gentile (2009) for an overview of this debate, which has been ongoing since the Vietnam War.  
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to withdraw before that stability can be achieved. Therefore, democratic leaders may want to 
reconsider the aims of these campaigns abroad. If casualties are required to achieve the policy 
goal of the leader, the evidence suggests that the goal may be unattainable before the public 
demands the occupation come to an end. Instead, policymakers should perhaps focus on 
achieving policy goals that may take time but do not require casualties. For example, 
independent of their normative implications, drone strikes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 
allow the United States to carry out one of its primary goals stemming from the original mission 
into Afghanistan, which was to disrupt the ability of terrorist groups to organize and plan attacks. 
The drone program does not allow for the United States to have as much a say in the politics of 
the Afghan state, but, as the findings of this paper imply, the people of the United States may 
believe that those dynamics, and others like them in other parts of the world, have little to do 
with their own security and survival.  
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Chapter 3 
Following the Leaders?: War Support When Elites are United and 
Divided15 
 
Introduction 
How do Americans, who are generally far removed from theaters of war, construct their attitudes 
about military conflicts overseas? On one hand, scholars of international relations have argued 
that news from the battlefield, primarily about casualties, shapes attitudes about a military 
operation. Others, however, view the use of military force in the same light as other policy areas, 
suggesting that the attitudes of partisan elites inform individual opinions. At the same time, a 
parallel debate has also emerged that explores the related question of whether individuals update 
their attitudes in response to either of these cues, or whether they only pay attention to news that 
confirms their existing beliefs.  
 Recent experimental work (e.g., Gelpi 2010; Berinsky 2007) has sought to tease out these 
competing hypotheses along both dimensions. We complement these studies by introducing what 
we believe to be an important characteristic of elite opinion regarding military operations that 
has so far been absent. In particular, we examine how the public responds when elite opinion, 
either in support or opposition to the conflict, cuts across partisan lines. Both parties - Democrats 
                                                 
15
 I thank Timothy Ryan, with whom I collaborated on the design of the experiment and discussed the 
results. I use the pronoun “we” throughout because following my dissertation defense, he will come on 
board as a co-author of the paper and will contribute to any further revisions prior to sending it out for 
review and publication. 
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and Republicans – contain ‘hawks’ who view military power as a vital tool for preserving and 
protecting American interests overseas in a post-9/11 world and ‘doves’ who believe that the 
United States has been too quick to rely on force and doing so has had disastrous effects on 
America’s image and interests abroad. It is worthwhile, then, to examine how people might make 
sense of this information when formulating their own opinions. Do they take any cues at all from 
it? Do they respond differently when elite support for a conflict cross-cuts versus when both 
parties have prominent supporters and opponents of a particular conflict?  
To understand how cross-cutting elite opinion influences support for the use of military 
force, we present an experimental survey regarding the war in Afghanistan on a national sample 
of the American public that manipulates whether elites appear divided, or united, and examine 
how support for the conflict responds. We find that news of American casualties does not 
influence overall attitudes, but elite opinions do. However, this only happens when the line 
between elite support and opposition cuts across standard partisan divisions, leading to a drop in 
support. Additionally, we find that despite this overall effect, individuals from both major 
political parties do not respond significantly to news of American casualties or elite opinion. 
Only independents, who lack discernable partisan attachments, respond directly to news of 
casualties with increased opposition. Also, these independents appear unmoved by the elite 
divisions that motivate the overall effect, but they withdraw their support when elites from both 
parties advocate further military action.  
We also address a second issue of debate in existing work. Berinsky and Druckman 
(2007) argued that an influential study by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (hereafter, GFR) 
(2005/2006) erred in treating belief in a conflict’s ultimate success as a determinant of one’s 
level of support for it. Instead, they argue that both are signs of latent partisan identification, and 
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that to properly address this possibility, it is important to for researchers to employ multiple 
indicators that might capture these two variables rather than one, as GFR do. In keeping with this 
suggestion, we directly measure support and success with a battery of complementary questions 
for each. In contrast to the concerns of Berinsky and Druckman (2007), we find that the two 
concepts – belief in success and support – are not reflective of the same underlying (partisan) 
predispositions.  
We begin by briefly reviewing the state of knowledge regarding the formation of 
attitudes towards military operations. 
 
Public Opinion and the Use of Force 
Following Mueller’s (1971, 1973) influential work linking American military casualties to public 
support for the Vietnam and Korean Wars, scholars began to reconsider the longstanding 
assumption that American opinions on the use of military force lacked any consistent grounding 
or structure. In the decades since, a debate has taken shape between those who believe that those 
opinions are informed primarily by news from the war theater, specifically news of American 
casualties, and those who maintain that the statements and views expressed by partisan elites 
regarding the conflict provide the basis for the public’s attitudes. The former camp has argued 
that these casualties represent a cost that is then compared with the gains likely to come from 
continued fighting (Mueller 1971, 1973, 2005; Gartner and Segura 1998; Larson 2000; Gartner 
2008), the importance of the mission (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998), or the 
likelihood of success (Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/2006, 2009; 
Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007; Kull and Ramsay 2001). At the same time, others have provided 
further nuance to the casualty tolerance argument, arguing that it is not the cumulative count of 
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casualties that matter. Rather, opinions change if the casualties that one hears about are local 
(Althaus and Coe 2011; Gartner 2004; Gartner and Segura 2000) and recent (Althaus, Bramlett, 
and Gimpel 2012), as such deaths are likely to “provide highly salient signals about current and 
future costs” to impacted communities (Gartner and Segura 2008: 96).  
In contrast, the latter school maintains that these arguments ignore the dominance of 
partisanship in all areas of politics, including foreign policy and war (Zaller and Feldman 1992; 
Zaller 1992; Bartels 2002; Berinsky and Druckman 2007; Berinsky 2007). Iyengar and Kinder 
(1987), Krosnick and Kinder (1990), Mendelberg (2001), and Druckman and Holmes (2004) all 
demonstrate that individual attitudes are primed by elites, and a number of other efforts have 
shown how narrative frames can shape these attitudes (Iyengar and Simon 1993; Allen, et. al. 
1994; Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Aday, Cluverius, and Livingston 2005; Boettcher and 
Cobb 2006; Berinsky and Kinder 2006).  
This debate addresses the issue of what information, or cues, matter in the formation of 
attitudes regarding war: news of war dead or news from the political arena. But Gelpi (2010) 
recognized a second unsettled question: how does the content of the information shape the 
response to it? In other words, do individuals respond to new information – either about 
American casualties or elite opinion – with a change in attitude or do they reject it and maintain 
their existing beliefs? Known as “motivated processing,” the tendency to discount or reject cues 
that conflict with existing opinions in favor of those that provide confirmation (Lord, Ross, and 
Lepper 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006) has long been associated with partisan or party 
identification (Abramowitz 1978; Bartels 2002; Lenz 2006; Achen and Bartels 2006). Under this 
logic, individuals should rarely change their opinions when introduced to news about events or 
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elites, unless is to update their attitudes so that they match those of partisan figures with whom 
they identify.  
As Gelpi (2010:90-91) notes, cues coming from both events and political elites abound 
within the contemporary political-media environment, and myriad experimental options exist for 
teasing out the conditions under which individuals might respond to either events or elites, or 
perhaps reject these cues altogether. In Gelpi’s study and others like it (e.g., Berinsky 2007) 
partisan cues are present and reflect the assumption that Democrats and Republicans hold policy 
preferences and attitudes that are clearly distinct from one another. In reality, however, views on 
the use of military force and foreign policy more broadly frequently can cut across traditional 
partisan divisions, as both parties now contain their respective ‘hawks’ – those who view 
military power as a necessary and vital tool for ensuring America’s security in a post 9/11 world 
– and ‘doves’ – those who believe that American has become overly-reliant on military 
capabilities, often with unintended negative consequences. For example, Senators John McCain 
and Rand Paul are both prominent Republicans, but they hold very different views regarding the 
role of the military, with the former being a strong advocate for intervention in many parts of the 
world and the latter frequently voicing restraint. On the Democratic side, members of the Obama 
administration wrangled over the proper response to the Syrian civil war, as Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton argued that President Obama erred in his decision not to provide weapons and 
training to the moderate Syrian opposition, which placed her more in line with Senator McCain 
than her boss. Her position contrasts with that of another prominent Democrat, Elizabeth Warren, 
who drew eyebrows with her vote against a continuing resolution in Congress explicitly because 
it directed funding to those opposition forces (Vinik 2014).  
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Expectations 
This discussion prompts a series of open questions concerning American casualties, elite 
opinion, and support for conflict. Under what conditions does news of American deaths affect 
opinion? When presented with such news and cross-cutting elite attitudes simultaneously, do 
those elite cues matter, and if so, how? And finally, do all individuals react to each of these cues 
in the same way, regardless of their partisan affiliations?  
Concerning the effect of American casualties on attitudes about conflict, we anticipate 
most respondents will not respond to such news by altering their level of support, regardless of 
their political attachments.
16
 We do not believe that members of either political party will be 
moved by one report of unsettling news, particularly if it is unclear as to which party “owns” a 
particular conflict. As discussed below, this experiment concerns the war in Afghanistan, which 
has been prosecuted by Republican and Democratic administrations, and has been more or less 
supported by elites of both parties. However, we do expect independents to react negatively and 
withdraw their support upon hearing news of American deaths, as they are not bound to the 
attachments that can prevent partisans from receiving such news and updating their positions.  
 Our next set of expectations relate to the conditional effects of cross-cutting elite opinion. 
Here, it is perhaps a bit more difficult to develop a priori expectations, particularly when elites 
are divided. If elites of the same party who generally agree on a broader array of non-security 
issues do not agree about the proper course of action in a conflict and instead find themselves in 
agreement with some members of the other party, with both support and opposition cutting 
across partisan lines, we can imagine that partisans will struggle to connect whatever attachments 
they may hold to the confounding information before them. As such, they can react in one of two 
                                                 
16
 While we detail the findings of other measures outlined below, the expectations we discuss here pertain 
only to support for conflict.  
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ways, either by reducing their support or ignoring this information and falling back on whatever 
prior beliefs they held about the conflict. We predict that partisan respondents will be more likely 
to simply ignore such cues. When elite co-partisans disagree, this sends an unclear signal to an 
individual of the same party which ultimately offers little concrete information about which way 
(i.e., support or oppose) they should react, and so they will resort to their prior, existing beliefs. 
While partisans may be confused by cross-cutting elite divisions, we do not expect the 
same of pure independents. Dennis (1988) notes that independents come in a variety of forms, 
from those who believe parties no longer represent voters’ interests or see no difference between 
parties to those who maintain independence so as to be able to make unbiased decisions. 
Regardless of which category they fall into, independents who learn that partisans are not getting 
along are likely to respond by thinking such a dynamic represents nothing new, and so we expect 
that they will not respond in any significant manner.     
 When elite support for conflict exists within and across both parties, arguments by Larson 
(1996, 2000), Berinsky (2007), Berinsky and Druckman (2007), and Gelpi (2010) suggest that 
overall public support should increase in response. In isolation, we agree that news that political 
elites are on the same page would lead people to respond by increasing their own support. 
However, when combined with news of American deaths, we anticipate a freezing effect, as 
those casualties will prevent the consensus that exists from producing a significant change in 
support among respondents in both parties. Instead, we suggest that any inclination to increase 
one’s support is tempered by the reality that more individuals are likely to die as a consequence 
of the war continuing.  
 But we again hold different expectations of independents. As discussed, independents are 
likely to discount the messages of elites, but here, we expect that instead of simply rejecting or 
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ignoring consensus support among elites in response to news of Americans killed, these 
respondents will actually go a step farther and reduce their support. The expression of 
unflinching support for the conflict by partisan elites may arouse a sense of anger and frustration 
by those who already don’t trust the parties to faithfully represent their interests, and as a result, 
they believe that continuing prosecution of the conflict should not be entrusted to those elites.    
 
Research Design 
To evaluate the validity of these claims, we conducted an experimental survey on a national 
sample of Americans regarding their attitudes toward the war in Afghanistan. The conflict in 
Afghanistan was chosen as the context for the experiment because it represents a “hard case” for 
testing the idea that people’s attitudes might change in response to single pieces of information 
from the conflict or political elites. The United States has been fighting in Afghanistan for over 
thirteen years, and as such, opinions have had ample opportunity to solidify. Also, and in 
contrast to the Iraq War, it is a conflict where partisan divisions among elites have been difficult 
to discern (as opposed to a case such as Iraq), as presidential administrations of both parties have 
maintained what amounts to essentially the same policy.
17
  
The survey was carried out by Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI maintains a 
diverse national panel of research subjects through targeted recruitment in various online 
communities, and our sample compared favorably with a U.S. Census benchmark in several 
demographic dimensions (see Supporting Information). The study was fielded from January 7 to 
January 13, 2015 and contained 603 subjects.  
 
                                                 
17
 This contrasts with Gelpi’s (2010) experimental study regarding opinion toward the Iraq War, where, 
despite the early bipartisan support, it was clear that Republicans “owned” that conflict and Democrats 
opposed it. This led to strong partisan effects, which we test for here, but do not anticipate. 
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Experiment 
Respondents began by completing a brief questionnaire that included measurements of political 
identification using the standard 7-point measure. They were then asked to read a recent news 
story which delivered a 2 X 2 manipulation of who was killed by a bomb (American military 
personnel or Afghan civilians) and whether American political leaders were united or divided in 
response. To manage the possibility that some of the participants, who are paid by SSI for each 
survey they complete, may have not given the story more than a passing glance in an effort to 
complete as many surveys as possible, we drop from the analysis those who spent less than ten 
seconds on the page of the survey that displayed it. We believe that ten seconds is an appropriate 
cut-off, as spending more than that amount of time on the page suggests that the subject engaged 
with the story beyond the headline or the first couple of lines. Sixty-five participants spent less 
than ten seconds, reducing our sample by just over ten percent to 538.  
The title of the news story was “Killing of [American Troops/Afghan Civilians] 
Underlines [Unity/Divisions] Among U.S. Leaders.” As indicated here, the first treatment related 
to news of a casualty event from Afghanistan. In all cases, respondents read a story about a 
hidden bomb exploding in a crowded Kabul market on a Saturday morning (see Supporting 
Information). The first condition, which we use as the base condition, states that the attack killed 
eleven Afghan civilians who were shopping in the market. In the second condition, only 
American servicemembers – seven soldiers and four Marines – died in the bombing (American). 
Our intention in presenting news of casualties in both treatments was to hold constant the 
information that a bombing had taken place that resulted in people dying. In this respect, such a 
design is perhaps more conservative than one where no deaths are reported in the base treatment. 
Were we instead to randomize American deaths and no deaths at all, we would expect a much 
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larger effect than we do here, where respondents might still react to the deaths of Afghan 
civilians, although not at the level approaching the reaction to the American deaths. On the other 
hand, some may worry that presenting news of American casualties would not change attitudes 
at all. To ensure that it does, we conducted an experiment on a separate sample where subjects 
read similar news stories of Afghan and American casualties, but without partisan cues of any 
kind. We found a significant effect of the American casualty manipulation, and we present these 
results in the Supporting Information. 
The second treatment concerns news of elite opinion. In the first condition, respondents 
read that political elites responded to the bombing and the deaths with a united front (Unified). It 
reads:  
The attack stood out for the unified response it evoked from American political 
leaders, with almost all saying that the attack called for a renewed commitment to 
suppressing the insurgency in Afghanistan.  
Responses were consistent across partisan lines. Secretary of State John Kerry, a 
Democrat, took a hard line, saying the United States “will never back down in the 
face of such evil.” Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat who some have encouraged to 
run for president in 2016, echoed this resolve, calling destroying the Taliban a 
“Number 1 priority.” 
Republican politicians were of a similar mindset. Senator John McCain said that 
the United States “must accept our share of the responsibility to stop” terrorism. 
Senator Rand Paul, the Kentucky Republican considering a run at the presidency 
in 2016, also responded by saying that the United States has no choice but to 
destroy the Taliban militarily. 
 
The second condition presents elite opinion in response to the marketplace bombing as fractured 
(Divided):  
The attack stood out for the divided response it evoked from American political 
leaders, with some saying the attack calls for a renewed commitment to 
suppressing the insurgency in Afghanistan, and others arguing that it underscored 
the need for America to decrease its presence there. 
Responses scrambled typical partisan lines. Secretary of State John Kerry, a 
Democrat, took a hard line, saying the United States “will never back down in the 
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face of such evil.” Jim Webb, a Democrat who is considering a presidential run in 
2016, did not back down from his conviction that American foreign policy 
requires more “prudence” and “restraint.” 
Republican politicians were divided, too. Senator John McCain said that the 
United States “must accept our share of responsibility to stop” terrorism. Senator 
Rand Paul, in contrast, called for a more “moderate” foreign policy “where we’re 
not always at war.” 
These treatments introduce news of American casualties from Afghanistan, as well as 
elite reactions to those casualties. Respondents’ attitudes towards the conflict may be shaped by 
one or both of these factors, or by neither, instead being largely informed by existing attitudes 
that may be informed by partisan attachments or other prior beliefs. Next, we discuss the various 
attitudes we measured.  
 
Measures 
Following the treatment, respondents then read a series of questions intended to capture their 
attitudes about the conflict in Afghanistan. The primary dependent variable in the study is the 
public’s level of support for continuing American military efforts in Afghanistan. Mueller (1973) 
first recognized the difficulty in accurately measuring public support for war. In particular, he 
discovered that how questions were worded could play a large role in the types of responses 
given. To manage this, he and others (Burk 1999; Eichenberg 2005; Berinsky and Druckman 
2007) have advocated the use of similarly worded questions. Therefore, rather than rely solely on 
one question, Support is a 0 to 1 scaled composite variable using the mean response by an 
individual to a series of five standard five-point questions.
18
 For example, in addition to asking 
respondents, “Do you support the use of U.S. military force in Afghanistan, or do you oppose 
it?” we also asked how much they agree or disagree with statements such as, “The U.S. should 
                                                 
18
 The Cronbach’s alpha for the support battery = 0.89, suggesting high internal correlation among 
responses to these five questions.  
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immediately withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan.” (We report all question wordings in the 
Supporting Information.) 
We also measure respondents’ belief in the likelihood of success, again with a scaled 
composite variable using three questions that provide various potential interpretations of what 
success might actually mean, and these are also included in the Supporting Information.
19
 
Previous research has debated the relationship between support for a conflict and a belief in its 
ultimate success. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005/2006, 2009) argue that expectations of success 
are a critical factor in determining support for a conflict, while Berinsky and Druckman (2007) 
suggest the two kinds of questions measure the same thing. In their view, support for a conflict 
and a belief in its success are both potentially driven by a third factor – the individual’s partisan 
predisposition (2007: 133). We adjudicate between these competing arguments below.  
A number of studies have linked casualties to election outcomes for multiple branches of 
government (Carson et al. 2001; Gartner et al. 2004; Karol and Miguel 2007; Voeten and Brewer 
2006). To get a sense of how new information about casualties and cross-cutting elite opinion 
might affect broader political evaluations, we include two additional dependent variables. We 
first wanted to examine general approval of how Barack Obama is handling his job as president 
(Obama). But since we were concerned that opinions about a president who has been in office 
for seven years might be too deeply ingrained in partisanship, we also asked about support for a 
congressional candidate (candidate) whose platform includes increased military involvement in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Results 
                                                 
19
 Here, the Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84, again suggesting high internal correlation among the responses to 
these three questions.  
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Before discussing the findings concerning our theoretical expectations from the experiment, we 
begin by addressing the relationship between support and success. While Berinsky and 
Druckman note that “[t]he core construct in any study of public opinion and war must be support 
for that war” (2007: 129), they maintain that one’s partisan identification likely influences both 
of these, and that success is an indicator of support rather than a cause, as Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler suggest (2005/2006) (134-135). Table 3.1 provides a matrix of the correlations between 
the different measures of these two variables in our sample. We can see that the support 
measures “hang together” quite well, with 0.5884 being the lowest correlation between any two 
of the five questions. The same is true for the three success questions, with the lowest correlation 
being 0.6075. On the other hand, the highest correlation between any support question and any 
success question is 0.4983. Taken together, we have evidence that these concepts are indeed 
distinct and that belief in a conflict’s likelihood of success is not an indicator of either latent 
support for the conflict or partisan attachments.  
 Table 3.1. Measures of Support and Success 
Measure Support 
1 
Support 
2 
Support 
3 
Support 
4 
Support 
5 
Success 
1 
Success 
2 
Success 
3 
Support 1 1.0000        
Support 2 0.6571 1.0000       
Support 3 0.5884 0.7929 1.0000      
Support 4 0.5943 0.7629 0.8060 1.0000     
Support 5 0.6086 0.6730 0.6256 0.6423 1.0000     
Success 1 0.4038 0.4276  0.3176 0.3415 0.4983 1.0000   
Success 2 0.2361 0.2868 0.1646 0.2023 0.3121 0.6573 1.0000  
Success 3 0.2271 0.3000 0.1826 0.2119 0.3347 0.6075 0.6695 1.0000 
 
 In moving to the effect of the experimental treatments, we first investigated the factors 
that contribute to support. The mean level of support across the sample for the Afghanistan 
conflict on the 0 to 1 scale was 0.51, suggesting that respondents were rather ambivalent overall. 
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Table 3.2 looks at the determinants of that support. As will be the case with all of the results 
presented, a positive coefficient indicates increasing opposition, while a negative coefficient 
suggests opposition decreases (i.e., support increases). The variable we want to highlight here is 
Party ID, which shows that support increases, or opposition decreases, as respondents 
increasingly identify with the Republican Party.
20
  
Table 3.2. Observational Determinants of Support for Afghanistan War 
 Support 
Follow Politics -0.192*** 
 (0.041) 
Party ID -0.178*** 
 (0.035) 
Race  
  Black 0.014 
 (0.032) 
  Asian -0.001 
 (0.051) 
  Other -0.008 
 (0.045) 
Education  
  Diploma 0.001 
 (0.081) 
  Some College -0.035 
 (0.08) 
  BA -0.002 
 (0.081) 
  Grad Degree -0.038 
 (0.084) 
Age -0.001* 
 (0.001) 
Constant 0.776*** 
 (0.087) 
  
                                                 
20
 When broken down into partisan categories, the level of opposition among Democrats and independents 
was 0.55 and Republican support was 0.41. (Again, a higher number means increased opposition and 
lower support.) A t-test reveals that Democrats and Republicans are statistically distinct from each other 
in their levels of support, as p=0.0005. 
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N 536 
R-squared 0.1076 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
The Effect of Casualties 
To determine the effect of news of American casualties compared to Afghan deaths on 
respondents’ attitudes regarding the conflict in Afghanistan, we estimated the following: 
𝐷𝑉 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 +  𝜀  
Table 3.3 shows the effect on support for the conflict and beliefs about success. From the first 
three columns, we see that American deaths did not have a statistically significant impact on 
support across the sample overall or among those possessing partisan attachments (i.e., those 
who identified as having some attachment to the Democratic or Republican parties), as was 
predicted. This finding contrasts with the results of the study briefly discussed above where 
partisan cues are absent and news of American casualties do impact levels of support. This raises 
the possibility that the mere mention of partisan considerations freezes the effect of casualties, 
leading most respondents, or at least those who identify with one of the major political parties, to 
look to elsewhere for some direction on how to interpret news of American casualties if other 
cues are available.  While not significant, it is worth noting that the coefficient concerning 
Democratic respondents is negative, suggesting that support increased among Democratic 
respondents who read news of American casualties. 
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Table 3.3. Effect of American Casualties on Attitudes towards Afghanistan War 
 Support Success 
Effect among…   
   
All respondents 0.023    -0.005    
 (0.021)    (0.02)    
Republicans  0.023    -0.022   
  (0.035)    (0.033)   
Democrats   -0.025    -0.013  
   (0.034)    (0.034)  
Independents    0.087**    0.024 
    (0.037)    (0.037) 
Constant 0.499*** 0.394*** 0.565*** 0.051*** 0.559*** 0.591*** 0.549*** 0.054*** 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.014) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
   
N 538 154 219 165 538 154 219 165 
R-squared 0.0022 0.0028 0.0025 0.0338 0.0001 0.0030 0.0006 0.0026 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
Pure independents in the sample, however, act differently. Regardless of their own 
motivations, or what elite treatment they received, these respondents do react to news of 
American deaths. Here, such casualties are associated with a statistically significant increase in 
opposition to the conflict in Afghanistan, which matches our prediction. 
Moving to the second measure in the table, we see no evidence that American casualties 
significantly altered respondents’ beliefs in the likelihood of success, regardless of their partisan 
identification or lack thereof. At first glance, the lack of an effect for both support and success 
would appear to corroborate Berinsky and Druckman’s (2007) assertion that both are linked to 
partisan considerations, rather than American casualties. But if it partisan attachments drive 
perceptions of success, we might expect that the signs on the coefficients for the two parties 
would be in opposite directions, as they are with support. Instead, we see that, although the 
results lack conventional significance, respondents in both parties actually become more positive 
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about the prospects of success. This suggests that respondents, regardless of party, are unlikely to 
view one event in Afghanistan as diagnostic of the entire effort. Also, because pure 
independents’ attitudes regarding success are not swayed by casualties either, we are given 
reason to believe that the ingredients of such opinions may extend beyond partisan attachments, 
as others have suggested (Abramowitz 1978; Bartels 2002; Lenz 2006; Achen and Bartels 2006), 
to broader beliefs about the efficacy of military force, specific knowledge regarding 
Afghanistan’s history, terrain, or population, or any other number of factors. Of course, it might 
also be the case that the thirteen years of ongoing conflict may shape those opinions, as well. 
 
Table 3.4. Effect of American Casualties on General Political Attitudes  
 Obama Candidate 
Effect among…   
   
All respondents 0.013    0.021    
 (0.031)    (0.023)    
Republicans  0.02    0.023   
  (0.038)    (0.04)   
Democrats   -0.031    -0.027  
   (0.041)    (0.037)  
Independents    0.027    0.082** 
    (0.051)    (0.041) 
Constant 0.426*** 0.138*** 0.663*** 0.4*** 0.586*** 0.584*** 0.657*** 0.592*** 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.03) (0.025) (0.016) (0.02) (0.027) (0.027) 
    
N 538 154 219 165 538 373 216 165 
R-squared 0.0004 0.0018 0.0026 0.0017 0.0015 0.0000 0.0026 0.0241 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
Table 3.4 shows the effect of news of American casualties on broader political 
considerations. In the first set of columns, we see that this news did not have any significant 
impact on respondents’ approval of President Obama. Indeed, this is not surprising, as he has 
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been in office for seven years, and much like beliefs about success, news of a single casualty 
event should not move the meter of approval among all respondents all that much. When we 
move to the opinions regarding the Congressional candidate who supports increasing 
involvement in Afghanistan, we see results similar to those of support, as respondents overall 
and partisans do not alter their views of the candidate, while independents are increasingly likely 
to reduce their support. This is most likely due to the ability of independents to make judgments 
of political candidates based on policy positions without having to overcome any of their own 
preexisting political attachments. Finally, and consistent with the earlier finding regarding 
support for the conflict, approval of President Obama and support for the Congressional 
candidate experienced increases among Democrats who read news of American casualties, but 
again, the effect lacks conventional levels of statistical significance.  
 
The Interactive Effects of Cross-Cutting Elite Opinion 
To determine how attitudes depend on the configuration of cross-cutting elite opinion and the 
respondent’s partisanship, we estimated an interactive model for partisans and independents: 
𝐷𝑉 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 +  𝛽3𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 × 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 +  𝜀  
Because interactive results are difficult to interpret, we calculate the marginal effects of these 
combinations and present these results below, while presenting the full models in the Supporting 
Information. 
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Table 3.5. Marginal Effect of American Deaths on Attitudes toward Afghanistan War  
 Support Success 
 Elites are... 
Effect among... United Divided United Divided 
     
All respondents -0.004 0.051* 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.029) 
     
Republicans -0.037 0.077 -0.041 -0.005 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) 
     
Democrats -0.066 0.017 -0.017 -0.009 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) 
     
Independents 0.117** 0.056 0.063 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
Table 3.5 reports the marginal effect of the divided and unified elite treatments when 
respondents are exposed to news of American casualties. Among all respondents, we see a 
statistically significant increase in opposition when elite opinion is scrambled across 
conventional partisan lines, but no discernable effect when there is consensus among elites of all 
political stripes that the war must continue. However, when we look just at partisan identifiers, 
they do not appear to be significantly impacted by either elite configuration, as we anticipated.
21
 
When elites are divided, the lack of significant change in support among Democrats and 
Republicans suggests our expectation that such confusion leads them to fall back on existing, 
perhaps, partisan, beliefs may be correct. Likewise, independents do not appear to be moved by 
cross-cutting divisions, either. The lack of a significant result here provides confirmation of our 
                                                 
21
 This provides further evidence against the notion that success and support capture underlying partisan 
attachments. Democrats and Republicans have nearly the same reaction in terms of beliefs about success, 
regardless of the elite treatment, which is consistent with the main effect of the American casualty 
treatment on success.  
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belief that they would not be surprised by such a dynamic, and are thus less likely to change their 
level of support as a result.  
When exposed to the unified elite treatment, partisan respondents again appear unmoved. 
While we cannot say for certain that this is due to a muting or freezing effect of casualties, it is 
certainly suggestive. This finding obtains despite the connections drawn from earlier work 
(Larson 1996, 2000; Berinsky 2007; Berinsky and Druckman 2007; and Gelpi 2010) between 
bipartisan elite consensus and public support. Independents, following our expectation, do react 
strongly upon reading news that partisan elites on both sides of the political aisle remain 
supportive of the conflict despite the deaths of American service personnel, as opposition 
increases significantly among this group.  
Table 3.6. Marginal Effect of American Deaths on General Political Attitudes  
 Obama Candidate 
 Elites are... 
Effect among... United Divided United Divided 
     
All respondents 0.003 0.024 0.002 0.041 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.033) (0.033) 
     
Republicans 0.092* -0.044 0.000 0.043 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.059) (0.056) 
     
Democrats -0.089 0.028 -0.043 -0.013 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.052) (0.053) 
     
Independents 0.019 0.038 0.077 0.092 
 (0.07) (0.074) (0.056) (0.059) 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
 
In Table 3.6, we see the marginal effects of the two elite conditions on respondents’ views of 
President Obama and the unnamed Congressional candidate. Approval of President Obama 
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remains largely unchanged under the divided condition in the full sample, an unsurprising result 
when we again consider the fact that the treatment is just one news story from one policy area 
over the seven years of his administration. When we look at the effect on partisans, we see no 
significant effects either, although the directions of the two coefficients are somewhat surprising, 
as Republican opposition decreases while Democratic support declines. Independents do not shift 
their views of the president in any significant way, either, a result that is consistent with our 
expectations about support for the conflict.  
 When looking at the effect of the unified condition, we again observe the absence of any 
significant changes in opinion among all respondents. However, approval of the President 
declined at a statistically significant level among Republicans. This result is surprising, as we 
would expect that if all elites appear to be on board with the current policy, there would be no 
reason to ‘blame’ the president for the American deaths. At the same time, approval among 
Democrats increases when elites are unified, and while the result does not achieve conventional 
levels of significance, the p-value of 0.129 is certainly suggestive of a effect. This finding is less 
surprising, as Democratic partisans might interpret such consensus as a positive signal that the 
president’s war policy is the right one, which might lead them increase their support for him. 
Independents, once again, do not appear to alter their views when subjected to this treatment; 
their minds about the president appear to be made up.  
 With respect to the Congressional candidate, elite divisions do not have any significant 
effect on evaluations when looking at the entire sample or when restricted to partisans. Again, 
this muddled signal appears to be discarded by Republicans and Democrats alike, although one 
can note that the direction of the two parties’ reactions is different, although not a significant 
level. Independents, similarly, show no significant change in support of the candidate, but the 
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0.122 p-value on the positive coefficient suggests that the candidate’s support for further 
involvement does lead to reduced approval. 
 Finally, we turn to the effect of the unified treatment on support for the candidate for 
Congress. Overall, unified elite support for maintaining operations in Afghanistan had no real 
measurable effect on the candidate who advocated for the same. When looking only at 
Republicans and Democrats, we also see that they were not swayed to increase their support for 
the candidate despite the elite signal that they, too, shared such a policy position. Non-partisan 
independents here act in a fashion similar to when they received the divided condition, with 
lowered support that is at a statistically insignificant, but certainly substantively suggestive level 
(p=0.169). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
How do Americans develop their attitudes towards war? The existing literature has suggested 
that individual beliefs are informed either by news about deaths from the conflict or by the 
attitudes of partisan elites. In this paper we presented an experiment where cues from both are 
present, but instead of presenting elites as divided by party, we portray them as split along a 
‘hawk’ and ‘dove’ dimension that cuts across conventional boundaries. We find that news of 
casualties from Afghanistan only impacts support among nonpartisan independents, whose 
opposition to the conflict increases. Further, we find that elite responses to American deaths do, 
in fact, matter, but only in very limited circumstances. When supporters and dissenters fall along 
both sides of the partisan divide, the results suggest that members of the public tend to oppose 
the conflict, as well. If elites across the political spectrum are unified in support of the conflict, 
however, we see no significant evidence that support among the public also increases. Instead, 
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we find that only pure independents react to news of a unified and supportive elite class; and 
they react by reducing their own level of support for the conflict. 
 In addition to determining the effect on support for the Afghanistan War, we also 
explored the effect of casualties and cross-cutting elite opinion on attitudes about eventual 
success. Berinsky and Druckman (2007) maintained that both of these measures capture latent 
partisan attachments. Our results indicate that this is not the case, as Democrats and Republicans 
hold comparable (static) views of success when exposed to news of American casualties. Also, 
independents’ attitudes about success are static as well, suggesting that factors other than 
partisan attitudes can inform beliefs about the likelihood of eventual victory.  
 To understand how these cues can play into broader political considerations, including 
potential decisions at the ballot box, we also examine their effect on opinions about President 
Obama and a candidate for Congress who advocated maintaining American involvement in 
Afghanistan. Here, attitudes tend to remain constant across the various treatments. In other 
words, Americans’ views of the president are likely to be informed by many factors well beyond 
news of a single casualty event from Afghanistan, and voters are likely to look beyond this single 
issue when making a decision about candidates for office.
22
 Independents, however, divert from 
this trend, as they appear less willing to vote for the pro-war candidate, a result that is 
statistically significant when looking at the main effect of casualties and strongly suggestive 
when looking at the conditional effects of elite opinions.    
These findings further unpack how attitudes about conflict develop among the electorate. 
The current political environment is highly partisan, and attitudes about any number of policies 
are frequently colored by attachments to party. Indeed, the Iraq War serves as once such example 
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 The exception to this is the effect of the unified treatment on Republican attitudes towards 
President Obama, where approval declined.  
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where support and opposition were highly linked with party. However, the Afghanistan War 
demonstrates that attitudes can cut across partisan lines, as President Obama has maintained the 
policies of President Bush, despite minimal support for the war among Democratic voters and 
persistent Republican backing for ongoing involvement. While this study concerns the war in 
Afghanistan, it is not the only foreign policy or security issue where elite attitudes are scrambled, 
giving our analysis broader applicability. Ongoing elite debates about the proper course of action 
concerning the Syrian civil war and the Islamic State, efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear program, 
and even the United States’ détente with Cuba are all marked by dividing lines that are not 
readily apparent. 
This research opens up additional questions for scholars. First, it is worth investigating 
the factors that produce cross-cutting fractures of elite opinion. Iraq and Afghanistan were both 
wars of occupation and insurgency, but only the latter experienced significant cross-cutting 
divisions. Similarly, Lyndon Johnson conducted the Vietnam War, but the focal point of 
opposition to the war was Senator J. William Fulbright, a fellow Democrat. By contrast, 
following the attack on Pearl Harbor, American participation in World War II saw limited 
organized opposition at the elite level. Identifying the conditions that lead to elite breakdown is 
potentially a first step in understanding why wars of occupation end sometimes end prior to the 
policy goals being achieved.   
Additionally, this experiment represented a difficult test for both of the new information 
hypotheses because the war in Afghanistan has lasted for so long, which more than likely has 
allowed attitudes within the mass public to become reasonably fixed. But one can just as easily 
imagine an experimental design where the shoe is on the other foot. A hard test for the motivated 
processing hypothesis might involve a case where the conflict is new and opinions, both at the 
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elite and individual are still unsettled. Such would likely be the case with a potential operation 
against the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria. As noted, elite opinion in this area cuts across partisan 
lines, and with a limited amount of time upon which to form an opinion, one can imagine that 
casualties might be the only clear information with which individuals could form an opinion.  
We conclude with a note about potential implications for our broader understanding of 
conflict outcomes and duration, and for policy. If casualties generally do not shape attitudes 
about a conflict (except among independents), advocates of an aggressive war policy may have a 
freer hand in maintaining it, which could lead to longer wars. However, if elites respond to those 
casualties differently and disagree over whether the conflict is prudent policy, and they 
frequently have electoral incentives to do so (see Schultz 2001), it appears that public support 
declines in response. In other words, these initial findings suggest that scrambled elite 
disagreements over the direction of war policy, which are likely given the institutional 
configuration of the American political system, may responsible for the loss of support and 
eventual withdrawal of forces, rather than the casualties themselves. Given this, policymakers 
and war planners who are concerned about maintaining support for a war until the policy goals 
motivating it are achieved will perhaps want to consider how to proceed in light of what may be 
gradual but inevitable opposition.  
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1. Sample Characteristics 
 
Table 3.7. Sample Characteristics of Survey Sample 
 
SSI Sample  
Census 
(2013) 
    
White 74.6%  77.7% 
Black 13.3  13.2 
Asian 5.1  5.3 
Other 7.0  3.8 
    
No Diploma 1.5%  12.6% 
HS Diploma 24.7  29.5 
Some College 32.0  28.9 
BA 29.0  18.7 
Grad degree 12.8  10.2 
    
Male 48.9%  49.2% 
Female 51.1  50.8 
    
20-29 20.7%  18.9% 
30-39 16.9  17.4 
40-49 17.1  18.7 
50-59 18.1  18.9 
60+ 24.7  26.1 
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2. Treatments 
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3. Measures of Support 
 
Do you support the use of U.S. military force in Afghanistan, or do you oppose it? 
[Strongly oppose, Oppose, Neither favor nor oppose, Favor, Strongly Favor]  
 
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 
The U.S. is making a mistake by keeping troops in Afghanistan. 
[Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree] 
 
The U.S. should immediately withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan. 
[Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree] 
 
Keeping U.S. troops in Afghanistan does more harm than good. 
[Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree] 
 
The war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. 
[Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree] 
 
 
4. Measures of Success 
 
Which statement comes closest to your views? 
[Ultimately, the US is [very/somewhat/not very/not at all] likely to succeed in 
Afghanistan.] 
 
Under its current approach, how likely is the United States to achieve each of the 
following objectives? 
Thwart insurgent activities in Afghanistan. 
[Almost certain, Very likely, Somewhat likely, Not very likely, Not at all likely] 
 
Install a stable democratic government in Afghanistan. 
[Almost certain, Very likely, Somewhat likely, Not very likely, Not at all likely] 
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5. Second Experiment 
 
To address potential concerns that news of American casualties might not have an effect 
on support for conflict, we conducted a second experiment that still varies Afghan and 
American casualties, but does not include or manipulate elite opinion. Instead, it 
manipulates the vividness of the description of the bombing in the market. It also 
included a control condition that detailed an unrelated news story that described the use 
of sonar to locate a steamship that sank in San Francisco Bay in 1888. As the results here 
show, the American casualty treatment (American) had a highly statistically significant 
effect on support for the Afghanistan conflict.  
 
Table 3.8. Effect of American Casualties on War Support, Second Experiment 
 Support 
American 0.15*** 
 (0.055) 
Constant 1.104*** 
 (0.036) 
  
N 1120 
R-squared 0.0065 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
6. Marginal Effects Models 
 
Table 3.9. Marginal Effect of Divided to Unified Elite Condition on War Support  
 All Respondents Republicans Democrats Independents 
American 0.051* 0.077 0.017 0.056 
   (0.030)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.053) 
Unified 0.008 0.044 -0.029 0.002 
   (0.030)  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.050) 
American × -0.056 -0.114 -0.082 0.061 
   Unified  (0.042)  (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.073) 
     
Constant 0.495*** 0.374*** 0.580*** 0.511*** 
  (0.021)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.037) 
     
N 538 154 219 165 
R-squared 0.007 0.021 0.031 0.042 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3.10. Marginal Effect of Divided to Unified Elite Condition on Beliefs of Success  
 All Respondents Republicans Democrats Independents 
American -0.011 -0.005 -0.009 -0.020 
   (0.029)  (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.054) 
Unified -0.032 -0.010 -0.030 -0.047 
   (0.028)  (0.047)  (0.050) (0.050) 
American × 0.012 -0.036 -0.008 0.083 
   Unified  (0.040)  (0.066)  (0.069)  (0.074) 
     
Constant 0.575*** 0.596*** 0.564*** 0.569*** 
  (0.020)  (0.032) (0.035)  (0.037) 
     
N 538 154 219 165 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.011 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
Table 3.11. Marginal Effect of Divided to Unified Elite Condition on Obama Approval  
 All Respondents Republicans Democrats Independents 
American 0.024 -0.044 0.028 0.038 
   (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.059)  (0.074) 
Unified 0.022 -0.075 0.058 0.034 
   (0.043)  (0.053)  (0.060)  (0.069) 
American × -0.021 0.136* -0.117 -0.018 
   Unified  (0.062)  (0.076)  (0.083)  (0.102) 
     
Constant 0.414*** 0.173*** 0.635*** 0.381*** 
  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.051) 
     
N 538 154 219 165 
R-squared 0.001 0.023 0.012 0.003 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 3.12. Marginal Effect of Divided to Unified Elite Condition on Candidate Approval  
 All Respondents Republicans Democrats Independents 
American 0.041 0.043 -0.013 0.092 
   (0.033)  (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.059) 
Unified 0.021 0.024 -0.036 0.064 
   (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.055) 
American × -0.039 -0.043 -0.030 -0.015 
   Unified  (0.047)  (0.081)  (0.074)  (0.082) 
     
Constant 0.576*** 0.476*** 0.675*** 0.556*** 
  (0.024)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
     
N 534 153 216 165 
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.036 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Chapter 4 
 Patterns of Selective and Indiscriminate Violence against Civilians 
in Iraq 
 
Introduction 
On May 24, 2007, The Washington Post ran a front-page story, “Morgue Data Show Increase in 
Sectarian Killings in Iraq.” The story reports that during the first three weeks of May, 321 
unidentified corpses, many showing signs of torture, had been discovered across Baghdad. It was 
expected that at that rate, May’s total would more than double the 182 bodies discovered in 
April. This increase came fourteen weeks into the new security plan that would come to be 
known as “The Surge,” which saw the insertion of additional troops into the country and 
widespread implementation of the “clear, hold, and build” strategy defined by substantial public 
goods provision and a more visible troop presence. In early March, just a month into the new 
plan, American officials were claiming progress in the effort to reduce these types of killings, as 
the State Department’s Iraq coordinator stated that such attacks were “down over the past 60 
days to the lowest level since early spring of last year. And that’s a good thing.” But just as these 
execution-style killings were once again on the increase, mass attacks were increasing in 
frequency as well. Specifically, in the three months prior to The Surge, readers learn that 821 
people were killed in eleven mass bombings (e.g., suicide car bombings), and that in the three 
months after, at least 1,098 had been killed at least twenty such attacks. 
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The violence described takes two forms. The primary focus is on the bodies found 
throughout Baghdad that were brought to the city’s morgues. The victims of selective violence, 
these individuals were presumably tortured and killed by those who believed their loyalties were 
on the other side of the sectarian divide. The attacks that killed large numbers of people in 
marketplaces and other public spaces, on the other hand, reflect an indiscriminate approach, 
where those who are killed – and their individual loyalties – are unlikely to be known to the 
perpetrator. Scholars have devoted significant effort to identifying the conditions that lead 
violent actors to use these two different forms of violence. They are both efforts to control the 
population and prevent defections to the other side of the conflict. But at the same time, they 
have different consequences. Violent actors would prefer to use selective violence, as it carries a 
reduced risk of alienating the larger population that they hope to control since it allows for 
defectors to be punished but without the attenuating breakdowns in social order that can 
accompany large scale violent attacks.  
Even though a violent actor seeking to exert lasting, meaningful control would prefer to 
use selective violence, the ability to do so is frequently hampered by a thorny identification 
problem. It is simply quite difficult to sort the friend from the enemy. In these contexts, the 
ability to identify those who (want to) defect and give their support to the opposing side depends 
heavily on the willingness of other individuals within the community to provide intelligence 
regarding the identities of those defectors. Existing theory argues that an individual’s willingness 
to collaborate with a particular side is likely to increase as that side’s control over an area 
increases, which led Kalyvas (2006) to develop a model of control and collaboration that allows 
scholars to predict the type of violence that is likely to be observed in a given area based on an 
actor’s degree of control within it. Where an actor holds total control, the model predicts limited 
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violence of any kind, while in areas of incomplete control, we would expect the dominant actor 
to primarily rely on selective violence. Finally, in areas where neither side can claim control, the 
model predicts little violence of any kind.  
This paper brings the matter of selective and indiscriminate violence against civilians to 
the case of the Iraq War. Existing discussions about the Iraq War have tended to do one of three 
things: treat all violence as a monolithic phenomenon and cast all attacks on counterinsurgents 
and civilians into a single bucket (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro 2012), examine the violence 
experienced by civilians only when it impacts insurgent-incumbent violence (Condra and 
Shapiro 2012; Shaver and Shapiro 2015), or ignore it altogether (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 
2011; Berman et al 2013). However, understanding the dynamics of civilian violence allows us 
to move beyond these efforts which inform and improve counterinsurgency policy to a much 
more broad discussion of how social and political order re-emerged in Iraq. In doing so, and as 
the ongoing instability in that country would suggest is necessary, it forces us to (re)consider 
what victory looks like within the context of wars of occupation. In other words, in beginning to  
look at the disorder experienced by civilians in these conflicts, we must relax the assumption that 
victory can be defined by nothing more than stopping violence targeting an incumbent force. As 
will be discussed, Iraq suffered from numerous conflicts beyond that which involved the 
occupation, and it is perhaps a fault with both existing academic research and policy thinking 
that in addressing that source or pattern of violence, everything else will simply follow suit.  
After the initial invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein from power by American 
forces in 2003, the country experienced at least seven violent conflicts. In addition to the Sunni 
insurgency fighting the United States, there was the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia, 
Shia militias combating the United States, the conflict between rival Shia militias, the 
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intrasectarian strife between Sunni tribes and insurgents known as the Anbar Awakening, the 
conflict between Arabs and Kurds in the northern part of the country, and violence between 
criminal gangs and rogue militias.
23
 These produced the patterns of violence depicted in Figure 
4.1.
24
 
 
Figure 4.1. Rates of Indiscriminate and Targeted Violence per Month in Iraq (2004-2008) 
 
 
 
 
These patterns show variation not just across the different regions, but also within them 
over time. We can see that civilians living in the Sunni and mixed areas experienced the most 
                                                 
23
 Kalyvas and Kocher cite all of these (2007:186) except for the US-Shia conflict and the Anbar 
Awakening, which grew large and noticeable after that article’s publication. 
24
 A district is considered to be dominated by one of the three primary ethnic groups if an ethnically-
aligned political party gathered over 60% of the vote share at the governorate level in the 2005 elections 
and no other ethnic group’s party or set of parties garnered over 10% of the vote.   
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violence. In some respects, this might not be surprising, as the mixed areas were where Sunni 
and Shia militias engaged in their sectarian conflict, while the insurgency dedicated to expelling 
American forces was concentrated in the Sunni areas. Conversely, we see that Kurdish areas 
remained relatively calm throughout, and Shia areas experienced slightly more violence, but not 
anywhere near that which was recorded in the Sunni or mixed areas.
25
 Importantly, we also see 
that the Sunni areas experienced large-scale violence much sooner than the other areas.  
As the Post article suggests, the relevant political actors sought to exert control over the 
territory at different times. The goal of this chapter is to develop some sense of the relationship, 
both theoretically and empirically, between the actions of American and Iraqi actors and the 
patterns of violence shown above. Did The Surge, which in some respects acted as an exogenous 
shock to the conflict environment, reduce selective violence in the regions where it was put into 
effect? What effect, if any, did its constituent parts of increased troop levels and public goods 
provision, have on patterns of violence experienced by civilians, and what inferences can we 
draw from those relationships about the mechanism of civilian collaboration first articulated by 
Kalyvas (2006)?  
While the answers to these questions might provide some clarity for policy questions in 
America, domestic actors and the decisions they made certainly shaped – and responded to – 
these patterns, as well, and untangling such dynamics will also contribute to our collective 
understanding of civil wars. I will focus here on two sets of such actors and steps they took to 
reclaim or maintain control in certain portions of the country: the decisions by Sunni tribal 
leaders to switch allegiances away from the insurgency and to the side of the American 
occupation in 2006-2007 and the August 2007 decision by Shiite militia leader Muqtada al Sadr 
                                                 
25
 It is important to note that the violence included in this analysis does not include any incidents which 
involved American or coalition forces. Rather, it only contains that in which civilians were targeted by 
local actors, although the identities of those local actors are unknown. 
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to call a ceasefire in the conflicts with both the Sunni population and American forces. While we 
can draw few meaningful conclusions from the regional analyses due to the problems associated 
with some very small sample sizes, the data at the nationwide level suggest that increasing 
American troop density, but not increased development investments or the combination of the 
two, is associated with a significant decline in targeted violence against civilians. At the same 
time, the decision by the Sunni tribes to turn against the insurgency produced a significant 
decline in both targeted and indiscriminate violence and al Sadr’s ceasefire led to a decline in 
targeted violence. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first provide a brief review of Kalyvas’s original 
control and collaboration model, as well as other existing arguments seeking to explain patterns 
of civilian violence. I then return to each of the four regions and provide a series of arguments 
regarding the relationship between the actions of American and Iraqi actors and the patterns of 
violence within them.
26
 Next, I discuss the modeling approach to test the arguments. Fourth, I 
present and discuss the results from the statistical analysis. The final section concludes with 
broader implications for our understanding of this important but still understudied class of 
conflict. 
 
Violence against Civilians 
In Kalyvas’ original model, a conflict space is defined as a “regime of fragmented sovereignty” 
(2006:173) that exists across five different zones. Zones 1 and 5 are the areas of total control by 
the incumbent and the challenger, respectively. In these zones, the controlling actor should not 
                                                 
26
 While each actor operated different regions, I introduce it only once with a full description. For the 
subsequent regions where the actor was present, I discuss the violence in that region and present the 
hypotheses, but I do not repeat the full theoretical account behind them. For example, the Sons of Iraq 
receive a full treatment in the Sunni region discussion, but in the mixed regions, where the SOI were also 
present, I briefly describe how they were present and, unless specifically stated otherwise, offer the same 
hypotheses. 
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have to resort to violence, either selective or indiscriminate, to punish defections, as they are 
expected to be nearly non-existent. In Zones 2 and 4, where those same actors hold control, 
albeit more fragmented than in 1 and 5, the theory predicts that they will rely on selective 
violence, as individuals are incentivized to denounce (i.e., provide incumbents with information 
regarding defections). In Zone 3, neither side holds control and so there should be no 
denouncements, and thus, no selective violence. With respect to indiscriminate violence, the 
theory predicts that both political actors will want to avoid alienating the population, and so there 
should be limited instances of it in Zone 3 as well. In Zones 2 and 4, we would expect the rival 
actor to use indiscriminate violence in these areas, based on the fact that they are operating with 
limited information in those areas. Should rival actors attempt to employ any attacks in the zones 
under total control of the other, the theory predicts that such violence would be indiscriminate for 
the same reason, as they are operating in territory where very few individuals, if any, would be 
willing to assist them.  
The model’s first test beyond the original case of the Greek Civil War was on patterns of 
violence in the Vietnam War (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009), and it provided further evidence of its 
validity, as the Vietcong were shown to employ selective violence in areas it had primary, but 
not dominant control. Conversely, South Vietnamese and US forces were found to rely on 
indiscriminate violence in those areas under Vietcong dominance. While still confirming the use 
of selective violence in areas under a group’s control, Vargas’s (2009) analysis of violence in a 
Colombian town revealed some anomalies that did not fit the theory, as paramilitary groups also 
used selective violence in areas under rebel control, and vice versa. Additionally, rebels were 
also able to use selective violence in zones of relative parity. To explain these surprising 
findings, Vargas suggests that rebels used methods other than murder (e.g., kidnappings, theft, 
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etc.) to foster compliance and that the paramilitaries relied on defectors, rather than civilians for 
intelligence, which allowed them to avoid the need to resort to indiscriminate killing of civilians.  
Other research has suggested that control does not predict the type of violence an actor employs, 
but rather shifts in control force actors to use different strategies in an effort to regain or maintain 
control that appears to be slipping away (Ziemke 2008). Relatedly, others have attributed civilian 
violence to competition among violent groups, as Metelis (2008) argues that the emergence of a 
rival faction can lead an actor to resort to increasingly coercive methods in areas it had 
previously controlled without competition. Similarly, Hultman (2008) and Eck and Hultman 
(2007) suggest that if control begins to slip away, actors may resort to widespread indiscriminate 
violence to demonstrate the inability of the competing actor to effectively provide security. This 
has been found to be particularly relevant in the cases where democracies are the incumbents, as 
the population can hold it accountable for such security failures (Hultman 2012). Along these 
lines, others have suggested that certain structural constraints shape the patterns of violence that 
occurs. For example, Salehyan, Siroky, and Reed (2014) show that rebels who are sponsored by 
a democratic external power are limited in their ability to use indiscriminate violence due to the 
discomfort with such operations within the sponsor’s electorate. Another constraint that might 
also give rise to particular patterns of violence is the availability of resources needed by the 
competing groups. Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) and Weinstein (2007) suggest that groups 
who have access to substantial resources not held by the population will be less likely to employ 
widespread indiscriminate violence, while Wood, Kathman, and Gent (2012) link the concept of 
resources to shifts in the balance of power in the conflict by suggesting that as an actor loses 
ground, its access to resources becomes limited, which in turn, forces it to resort to more 
widespread civilian violence.  
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These efforts suggest a common theme consistent with Kalyvas’s basic model: as actors 
competing for power find it slipping away in the course of the conflict, they are likely to respond 
by increasingly relying on the indiscriminate application of violence against civilians as the 
willingness of those civilians to provide information to them declines. But, as Bhavnani, 
Miodownik, and Choi point out, such studies “stop short of explicitly examining how the number 
of political actors and asymmetric capabilities affect the dynamics of defection and 
denunciation” (2011:138). To address this gap, they develop an agent-based model where three 
political actors of varying capabilities are competing for the support (and assistance) of the 
civilian population. Using data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they test the model’s 
predictions, finding that an actor with larger capabilities is able to employ selective violence in 
areas under incomplete control by the weaker actors because “of its greater access to local 
information (vision) and killing capacity” (Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi 2011:143). At the 
same time, such an actor does not have to rely on selective violence in areas under its own 
control because civilians in such areas lack any incentives to defect to the weaker side, again due 
to its strong information-gathering and killing capacities.   
Bhanvani, Miodownik, and Choi (2011) follow Kalyvas (2006) and break Israel and the 
Palestinian territories into five zones based on political boundaries, where land inside the Green 
Line falls under complete Israeli control, occupied territory where Israel provides security and 
administration is under incomplete Israeli control, and zones of parity are where Israel provides 
security and Palestinians provide civic administration. On the other side, areas where 
Palestinians have weak security control and Israel controls the flow of goods and people were 
designated as areas of incomplete Palestinian control, and all of Gaza was coded as being under 
complete Palestinian control.  
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While these decisions may make some sense, Kalyvas argues that if “a rival actor can 
effectively muster superior military resources…, geography will tend to trump popular 
preferences in producing control” (2006:132). Because Israel has limited the ability of 
Palestinians to develop their own autonomous security force and can quickly fill a security 
vacuum if it so chooses, one has to wonder if it is perhaps more accurate to suggest that while 
Palestinians hold de jure control over the West Bank and Gaza, de facto control rests with Israel. 
Similar problems exist in the Iraq case, as well, and in the next section, I suggest an alternative 
way of categorizing territory in Iraq that still permits us to identify the relationship between the 
political actors and the different types of violence that occurred.  
 
Counterinsurgency, Local Actors, & Selective and Indiscriminate Civilian Violence in Iraq 
In this section, I build off existing insights in an effort to explain the relationship between certain 
actions by various political actors and the patterns of violence that were observed in Iraq. One of 
the first tasks in explaining such dynamics across the different regions of Iraq is to properly 
identify those regions. As discussed, designating zones of control along the lines of previous 
research is difficult to do and requires some arbitrary decisions that might not accurately capture 
what it means to exert control.  
Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, security responsibility was officially 
handled at the provincial level by the United States and its allies before being turned over to Iraqi 
authorities when they had met certain benchmarks in training and effectiveness. However, 
classifying the whole country as being under American control at the outset would be 
problematic for several reasons. First, it would leave no zones under any control of the United 
States’ opponents. Second, it would be difficult to credibly claim that areas such as Sadr City or 
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all of Anbar province were under United States control throughout the conflict. Consider, for 
example, the city of Fallujah, which was in Anbar province but was under de facto insurgent 
control until concentrated efforts by American forces to take the city took place in 2004. Third, 
by and large, the occupation did not ever rely on indiscriminate violence such as the bombings of 
civilians in order to gain compliance. To be sure, coalition forces sometimes targeted civilians, 
but those incidents typically looked more like arrest and detention or the destruction of property. 
Finally, making such designations would prioritize the conflict between the American occupation 
and those set on expelling it over all the other conflicts that were taking place. 
In an effort to avoid these issues, I follow Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) and 
classify Iraq’s regions according to their ethnic composition: Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish. This 
approach makes sense, as I am not so much interested in explaining the relationship between 
control and violence, but rather the effect of a particular strategic or operational decision on 
violence in a district, regardless of which actor controlled it according to some arbitrary coding 
decision. Importantly, this approach also allows us to see how the deployment of those strategies 
and operations varied across different ethno-sectarian communities and understand the extent to 
which those decisions may have been driven by existing violence.  
What did the American security strategies and operations look like? Prior to the January 
2007 surge, they were characterized by “force protection via mounted patrols; deployment in 
large, fortified bases, and operations in large formations without sustained informal contact with 
the population” (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012:22). Such a mechanized force structure, 
according to Lyall and Wilson, was “built for direct battle” and came to prominence as a result 
industrialization and World War I, when a “new ‘modern’ system of military organization, one 
premised on the substitution of machines for soldiers to increase mobility and survivability on 
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contemporary battlefields” (2009:68) took hold.27 From 2004 to 2007, George Casey served as 
the Commanding General of Coalition forces, and in addition to maintaining this force structure 
where American forces played a limited role, he focused on developing Iraqi force capacity 
(Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro 2012).  
As the entrenched insurgency began to frustrate military commanders, politicians, and the 
American public, pressure mounted for President Bush to withdraw American forces in late 
2006. However, in January of 2007, he ordered a temporary but substantial increase in troops and 
a change in strategy. The Surge was the label applied to both the deployment of five additional 
brigades (20,000-30,000 troops) into the country and the broad implementation of a new strategy 
articulated in Field Manual 3-24, which, in contrast to what was in place previously, places 
increased emphasis “on influencing ‘human factors,’ for example, the population’s tolerance for 
insurgent activities, by combining benign measures such as economic reconstruction with 
carefully targeted strikes against violent actors” (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011:768). In 
contrast to that which was in place during the previous period, such a strategy was characterized 
by smaller bases integrated into the surrounding community and dismounted patrols, as well as a 
substantial number of public goods projects intended to create goodwill and improve the local 
economy, which would then lead the civilian beneficiaries of these developments to share 
intelligence regarding the identities of insurgent actors. It is important to keep in mind here, 
though, that while this strategy would have the immediate goal of providing social order, its 
ultimate purpose was to eliminate the attacks that targeted counterinsurgents. Indeed, Berman, 
Shapiro, and Felter acknowledge that the provision of services to the community is meant not to 
                                                 
27
 It should be noted that not all who comment on such issues view the military’s structure in such rigid 
terms. For example, Gentile (2009: 5) emphasizes that the Army has been highly flexible, with “strategic 
shifts in terms of the threats and enemies that the United States has faced. With each of these shifts, came 
a different approach, or way, to fighting wars or preparing for them in peacetime.” 
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maximize its welfare but simply to engender support for a “government whose first priority is 
repressing violence” (2011:782), such as “an ally or occupying power” (2011:777). 
This transition in strategy was intended to allow American forces to overcome the 
identification problem discussed above. By abandoning the relative security of large bases, 
establishing permanently-manned posts throughout the cities and towns of Iraq, and providing 
security and goods and services to the previously skeptical population, so the thinking went, 
individual citizens would gradually come to trust American forces and provide them with the 
information needed to identify and neutralize insurgent actors. As I progress through the 
different ethnic regions of Iraq, I will discuss how this new approach, as well as the pre-2007 
strategy, may or may not have shaped the patterns of violence that occurred within each, as well 
as the potential role of local actors.   
 
Figure 4.2. The Provinces of Iraq 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Districts_of_Iraq 
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Sunni Areas  
Figure 4.3. Indiscriminate and Targeted Violence per Month in Sunni Territory (2004-
2008) 
 
 
Let us begin the discussion with the Sunni areas defined primarily by the nationalist insurgency 
against the American occupation in the pre-Surge period. The Sunni dominated districts were in 
al Anbar province in the west and Salah al Din province in the center, extending from just north 
of Baghdad to the Kurdish regions of Kirkuk and Erbil (See Figure 4.2). Figure 4.3 shows that 
rates of indiscriminate and targeted attacks varied by time. While indiscriminate attacks 
remained at a comparatively low constant level throughout the period, selective violence appears 
to slightly increase up until mid-2006, when it increases dramatically. From this point, it remains 
elevated before a temporary drop in late 2007 and an eventual drop off again in 2008. To what 
extent did these patterns depend on particular actions of American and Iraqi actors?
 
Keeping in 
mind the shift in American strategy in January 2007, I suggest that it is important to split the data 
into pre- and post-Surge components.
28
 
 
                                                 
28
 Each region’s discussion will be split at this same period.  
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics of Violent Attacks and US Counterinsurgent Efforts in 
Sunni-Dominated Areas 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
 Overall 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
140 0.014 0.03 0 0.16 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
140 0.05 0.08 0 0.52 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
140 31.51 70.87 0 552.81 
Avg. Battalion per 
  Capita 
140 0.01 0.01 0 0.06 
 2004-2006 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
84 0.01 0.03 0 0.16 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
84 0.05 0.09 0 0.52 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
84 33.71 88.23 0 552.81 
Avg. Battalion per 
  Capita 
84 0.012 0.013 0 0.06 
 2007-2008 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
56 0.014 0.017 0 0.07 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
56 0.05 0.08 0 0.43 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
56 28.22 30.48 1.67 130.21 
Avg. Battalion per 
  Capita 
56 0.008 0.009 0 0.03 
 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics with respect to both the levels of violence and two 
measures intended to capture the presence of American military forces. After breaking up these 
into pre- and post-Surge periods and keeping in mind that aggregate summaries like this do not 
capture trends within a period of time, we see that violence of both kinds decreased marginally 
from one period to the next. But interestingly, we also see that the indicators of American forces 
also decreased. This suggests that if declines in violence were to be attributed to the Surge, it 
would be due to a change in the behavior and operational approach (i.e., moving away from large 
bases to a more community-based presence), not an increase in numbers, either in terms of the 
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total number of troops or the amount of money dedicated to fostering goodwill among the 
population.  
Sunni Areas (2004 – 2006) 
Starting with the pre-Surge environment, I suggest that ethnic ties, more than security operations 
by the Americans, drove the information-sharing behavior of the Sunni population.
29
 In other 
words, the civilian population had little ability or motivation to work with American forces and 
instead provided co-ethnic Sunni insurgents with information about possible defectors, who were 
then targeted for selective violence.
30
 This is due to a couple of reasons. First, by and large, the 
American forces were not going to resort to the killing of civilians to overcome their 
identification problem. Indeed, there is a good deal of empirical evidence (Hultman 2012; Eck 
and Hultman 2007; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) that democracies are far less 
likely to engage in mass killings during armed conflicts for any number of reasons including 
norms (Harff 2003) or the costs of doing so (Li 2005).  
Second, the willingness to collaborate with a political actor requires an accompanying 
belief by the collaborating individual that he or she will be protected from future threats, but 
there was no sense that the American occupation was going to be permanent. Indeed, Kalyvas 
states that “civilians would rather side with (expected) winner than the loser” (2006:126-27), but 
during this period, the outcome was very much up in the air, as the insurgency was growing 
rapidly and American political leaders were making it clear that they had no intention of 
remaining as an indefinite occupying power. Further, the posture taken by American forces, 
                                                 
29
 Recall that any violence against civilians that might have been perpetrated by Americans is not 
included in the data, so we can assume that the attacks picked up in the data likely were committed by the 
insurgents. 
30
 Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012:22-23) note that while this was dominant force posture in Iraq, 
some local commanders in these Sunni areas had experimented with Surge-like approaches during this 
earlier period.  
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where they were primarily going out on mounted patrols only to then return to base, did not 
allow for any meaningful, trusting relationships between those forces and the population to 
develop. This echoes Kalyvas’s reference to the unwillingness of German sympathizers in 
occupied Ukraine to collaborate because “infrequent German patrols were simply not credible 
protection, and… some villages had yet to see any German troops at all (T. Anderson 1995)” 
(2006:124-25). 
If the population was unwilling to provide information to the United States in its effort to 
defeat the insurgency, what does that mean for patterns of violence during this period? If we 
consider the opposite, that the population did respond to the American presence, we would 
expect that the insurgency would increasingly resort to indiscriminate violence, as it loses the 
support of the population and the accompanying flow of information. In the language of Kalyvas 
and the predictions of his model, these Sunni areas would have switched from being under 
incomplete insurgent control to incomplete American control. However, we do not see such a 
pattern emerge, which suggests that whatever efforts at control were being put forward by the 
American forces in this period in these regions had little effect on selective violence against 
civilians. More formally: 
H1a: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Sunni areas between 2004 and 2006. 
On the other hand, the American forces during this period may be associated with 
comparatively lower levels of indiscriminate violence. The question remains, though, as to the 
reason why such attacks were far less frequent than selective attacks. It may be the case that a 
sufficient number of troops patrolling an area simply makes it more difficult to carry out 
bombings and other large-scale killings. Scholars have long-argued that cities and towns are 
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difficult targets for insurgents due to the typically strong presence of the state (Kalyvas 
2006:133; Kocher 2004; Trinquier 1964:18, Kitson 1960:78), and it may have been the case that 
Sunni insurgents did not want to take many chances with the difficulties that come with carrying 
out such spectacular, fear-inducing attacks.  
 H1b: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Sunni areas between 2004 and 2006.
31
 
Here, I have suggested that while their mere presence may have made it more difficult for 
insurgents to carry out indiscriminate attacks, American forces did little to shape patterns of 
selective violence in the Sunni portions of Iraq between 2004 and 2006. Individual 
noncombatants had little reason to trust in the distant and disengaged American forces, leaving 
de facto control in the hands of the Sunni insurgency, who employed selective violence in their 
effort to maintain it. However, as I discuss in the following subsection, these patterns of violence 
shifted dramatically, as did the posture of American forces and the allegiances of those within 
the insurgency.  
 
Sunni Areas (2007 – 2008) 
After a brief spike in selective violence against civilians living in the Sunni-dominated regions of 
Iraq in the middle of 2006, violence stabilizes and begins to decline in early 2007, disappearing 
almost entirely by 2009. In this section, I detail three potential explanations for this stabilization 
                                                 
31
 At the same time, however, one can imagine that if this were the case, the American forces could not 
have been isolated on their bases to only leave them for short mounted patrols, as such a posture does not 
lend itself to effective monitoring or policing to prevent such actions. It is possible that insurgents could 
maintain control without engaging in such attacks. As noted earlier, indiscriminate violence is likely to 
alienate a population, and if the insurgency could maintain control over the population through selective 
violence, such large-scale attacks are unlikely to be deployed on any regular basis.  
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and eventual decline: one focused on the efforts of American counterinsurgents, a second 
stressing dynamics that occurred within the Sunni insurgency, and the final being an interaction 
of the two.  
The first story would suggest that, despite the apparent decrease in troop presence and 
public goods investment shown in Table 4.1, The Surge altered the behavior of the Sunni 
population vis-à-vis the insurgency, separating the two and leading the population to throw its 
support to the Americans in a way Kalyvas’s model predicts. This new strategy would have 
taken these Sunni areas from Zone 4 where the insurgents have incomplete control to Zone 2, 
where that control, albeit incomplete, now lies in the hands of the American forces. This could 
have happened via a number of causal pathways. First, everyday Sunnis may have taken the new, 
more engaged strategy that defined The Surge as a signal by the Americans that, despite the costs 
involved, they were committed to imposing their authority in Iraq. As a result, the population’s 
best bet for long-term stability and survival lay with the occupation. Alternatively, these citizens, 
who may for whatever reason have grown disenchanted with the instability brought by the 
insurgency, may have felt that with the more enmeshed presence of American forces, they would 
have been protected from retribution now whereas they would not have previously. By simply 
being more present, a political actor can open up lines of communication that were previously 
closed off. Third, the occupation may have successfully generated a sufficient degree of loyalty 
among the population through its provision of goods and services, which itself was made 
possible through the new strategy. Without a strong troop presence able to exercise control, 
others have noted that such efforts are unlikely to have any effect (Harmon 1992; Clutterbuck 
1966; Kalyvas 2006). 
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As a consequence of this shift, the insurgent actors would no longer be able to carry out 
targeted attacks on suspected collaborators, as they no longer would have access to information 
regarding their identities. In most circumstances, and as existing theory (Kalyvas 2006; Ziemke 
2008; Hultman 2008; Eck and Hultman 2007) would suggest, the only option remaining to these 
insurgents would be to turn to indiscriminate attacks, which could be motivated by a number of 
the factors outlined above. For example, they would perhaps use such operations to demonstrate 
the ineffectiveness of the American authority (Hultman 2008, 2012; Eck and Hultman 2007) or 
to gain access to resources that otherwise would have been available if they still held control 
(Wood, Kathman, and Gent 2012).  
However, we do not see any accompanying increase in indiscriminate attacks. In the 
previous three years, the infrequency of indiscriminate attacks by insurgents could have been a 
function of either the intensity of the US presence or, more plausibly, the lack of motivation for 
the insurgents to do so. However, Sunni insurgents in this current period certainly would be 
motivated to use indiscriminate attacks, and the fact that they did not suggests that newly-
implemented change in US strategy may have prevented them from doing so. This leads to the 
following: 
 H2a: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of selective violence 
against civilians in Sunni areas between 2007 and 2008. 
 H2b: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Sunni areas between 2007 and 2008. 
However, an alternative account suggests that the underlying relationship between the 
noncombatant civilians and the American counterinsurgency remained largely static across both 
periods, regardless of the occupation’s strategy change. Instead, it argues that dynamics within 
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the Sunni insurgency produced the decline in selective violence and low levels of indiscriminate 
violence. Just as The Surge has been viewed as a key turning point in the Iraq conflict, so, too, 
has been the decision by Iraq’s Sunni tribal leaders to flip sides and align themselves with the 
American occupation in opposition to the insurgency. While some argue that what came to be 
known as the Sons of Iraq movement emerged in response to the exceptional levels of violence 
that the Al Qaeda (AQI) dominated insurgency used to in its attempt to exert control in the 
community (e.g., Stanliand 2012), others such as Long (2008:77) have suggested that they did 
this for two reasons: 1) following the national elections of 2005, they came to believe that the 
political process held more promise than ongoing violence, and 2) they hoped to eliminate AQI 
as a source of competition for the smuggling and banditry revenues that they had long 
controlled.
32
 Further, Lindsay and Long (2013) argue that Anbar Province, where the Sunni 
insurgency was most active, had actually been pacified prior to the 2007 surge. They note that 
one of the major tribes in the Province, the Albu Mahal, had managed to create its own resistance 
force to combat Sunni extremists, not Americans, and placed hundreds of their men into local 
police forces. Most importantly, they note that “this occurred despite, rather than because of, the 
presence of a U.S. Army battalion in the region” (2013: 183-84). 
This flipping within the insurgency, regardless of its motivations, could have set in 
motion a process that led to a change in control, which carried with it changes in civilian 
allegiances and patterns of violence. Again, Kalyvas (2006: 124-125) offers a variety of 
pathways whereby changes in control can lead to changes in patterns of such civilian 
collaboration, two of which may be relevant here. First, the tribes may have been able to function 
                                                 
32
 It may be possible, however, that if violence turned the population against the insurgency, it was non-
lethal in nature. Also, see Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012) or Long (2008) for a discussion of the 
efforts by Sunni tribal leaders to end their insurgent campaign and align with US forces to defeat al Qaeda 
in Iraq. 
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in a similar capacity to how the American forces are depicted in the previous account, as a 
guarantor of security. If individual civilians had indeed grown tired of the harsh methods of 
control exercised by the insurgency, they would have been able to turn to the tribes for 
protection. In contrast to the occupying forces, the local tribes existed long before the conflict 
began and they were likely to persist after the conflict ended, offering ongoing protection from 
retribution that could not have been guaranteed by temporary occupiers, regardless of a change 
in their strategy. Alternatively, by splitting from the insurgency and exerting control over these 
areas, the tribes placed themselves in a position to efficiently monitor the population. Individuals 
within these tribal communities knew each other, lived next to each other, practiced the same 
faith traditions and spoke the same dialects. As a result, information regarding the identities of 
those still aligned with the insurgency could be transmitted quickly and efficiently to established 
community leaders, who could then punish such individuals for their behavior.
33
  
The implications of this logic are threefold. First, the remaining insurgents would no 
longer be able to maintain control through selective violence, as they no longer held control of 
the territory. Second, as control shifted to the tribes, theory would suggest that they would then 
start to use selective violence to exercise their own control. However, this did not happen, as 
instead, such violence mostly continued at its low rate and eventually declined. To explain this, it 
may be the case that the tribes did not have an identification problem because they already knew 
who the remaining AQI insurgents were and did not need to target civilians to get that 
information, much in the same way that paramilitaries in Colombia relied on defectors, rather 
than civilians, to combat that insurgency (Vargas 2009). As Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 
suggest, these former insurgents knew the “AQI membership, cell structure, the identity of safe 
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 See Lyall (2010b) for a full discussion of how co-ethnics can leverage their connections to the 
community to better gather intelligence.  
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houses and bomb-making workshops, and locations of roadside bombs and booby traps” 
(2012:25). With such information in hand, it would be unnecessary to look to civilians, and the 
SOI could use their own weapons to eliminate the threat. Further, it would probably be the case 
that very few civilians would still be aligned with the remaining AQI insurgency, as its extreme, 
theocratic nature might have conflicted with established norms and hierarchies in what was a 
largely secular population.  
The third implication is that the remaining insurgent actors should have resorted to 
indiscriminate violence. However, the evidence suggest that they did not, as those levels 
remained fairly constant at low levels. One can imagine that what allowed the tribes to not have 
to rely on selective violence against civilians – knowing who all of the insurgents were 
themselves – also made it very difficult for the insurgents to pull off such attacks. Because the 
SOI was comprised of large numbers of former insurgents, they were able to essentially shut 
down the ability of those actors to carry out any sort of attack and clear the territory of those 
elements. This line of thinking echoes a series of examples from Kalyvas (2006: 128-129) 
ranging from Malaya, Vietnam, and German-occupied Soviet Union.    
This account produces the following two hypotheses: 
 H3a: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective violence 
against civilians in the Sunni areas between 2007 and 2008.  
 H3b: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in the Sunni areas between 2007 and 2008. 
This account prioritizes the internal dynamics of the insurgency in explaining the patterns 
of civilian violence in the Sunni regions of Iraq between 2007 and 2008. However, a final story 
suggests that any reductions that occurred in Iraq were the result of the interaction of the efforts 
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that defined The Surge and the standup of the Sons of Iraq. It posits that the SOI were unable to 
accomplish on their own what is detailed in the previous account and that the Surge would not 
have succeeded without the intelligence that was provided by the SOI. Biddle, Friedman, and 
Shapiro argue that rather than keep the intelligence regarding AQI membership, structure, etc., 
for themselves, the tribes passed that information on to American forces, allowing “coalition 
firepower [to become] extremely lethal” (2012:25). This story suggests that trust between the 
SOIs and the American forces improved as a result of the new Surge strategy, allowing them to 
function more as a single actor as opposed to two distinct groups. These authors find evidence 
that this dynamic did have the effect of reducing overall violence in Iraq, including that which 
was experienced by both American counterinsurgent forces and civilians.
34
 
But how might this story translate into predictions regarding patterns of violence 
experienced exclusively by civilians? Much like the previous accounts offered here, the 
interaction of The Surge and the SOI emergence would predict a dampening effect on both 
targeted, selective violence, and indiscriminate attacks. As control slips away from those who 
remain committed to expelling the American forces, they would no longer be able to exercise 
selective violence and would most likely work to transition to employing indiscriminate 
violence. However, in this story, the engaged American forces, coupled with the difficulty in 
maintaining secrecy since the SOI knew their identities, left insurgents largely unable to 
accomplish either. What distinguishes it from the previous account focused solely on the Sons of 
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 It is vitally important to note that Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012) measure violence very broadly, 
using SIGACTS, which is the total number of incidents recorded by the Multi-National Forces Iraq 
SIGACT III database. It contains information about “’enemy executed attacks targeted against coalition, 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations’” (ESOC Civil 
War Dataset Codebook, Version 3, 2012:5). The limitation in this data that is most relevant for the current 
inquiry is that it only captures violence against civilians that takes place where US forces are present to 
record it. This is likely to produce a dramatic undercounting of civilian violence, which would not only 
bias the findings here, but perhaps might also bias their finding that overall violence declined as a result 
of the interaction of The Surge and SOI standup.  
106 
 
Iraq is the idea the civilian population would not have thrown its support to the SOI if it was not 
backed by American firepower, as it served as the reinforcements needed to provide civilians 
with the confidence to know that if they shifted their behavior, they would still be protected. The 
account suggests the following two hypotheses: 
 H4a: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in the Sunni areas between 2007 and 2008.  
 H4b: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective violence against civilians 
in the Sunni areas between 2007 and 2008.  
In this subsection, I have outlined three different causal stories that might explain the 
relationship between political actors present in the Sunni areas of Iraq between 2006 and 2008 
and the patterns of civilian violence that emerged during that time. The first posits that steps 
taken by the American occupation actually changed civilian attitudes in these areas, and 
noncombatants placed their trust in a new American approach that was instituted in January 
2007. The second argues that these noncombatants remained loyal to their tribal leaders and 
when they split from the insurgency, these civilians took their allegiances with them. This was 
not necessarily due to their pre-war linkages (although they were undoubtedly strong) but rather 
because they offered the best chance of both current and long-term stability and security. The 
final story argues that this change in behavior could not have come about if the Sons of Iraq were 
not backed by the military might and capability of American forces and if those forces did not 
have the intelligence provided by the Sons of Iraq. All three will be tested against one another in 
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the empirical analysis section of the chapter. Now, however, I turn to a discussion of the violence 
against civilians that occurred in areas of Iraq dominated by Shia populations.  
 
Shia Areas 
The Shia provinces (Karbala, Babil, Wasit, Maysan, Najaf, Qadisiyyah, Dhi Qar, and Basra) 
extend from the center of the country to the south. As is clear from Figure 4.4, the populations 
living in Shia-dominant areas of Iraq experienced far less violence than their Sunni counterparts. 
Levels of indiscriminate violence remained quite low throughout the period, while selective 
violence also remained low, although it did increase in the latter half of 2006 and remained at 
those levels until the latter months of 2007/early 2008, when it resumed 2004-2005 levels.  
 
Figure 4.4. Indiscriminate and Targeted Violence per Month in Shia Territory (2004-2008) 
 
Whereas violence in the Sunni areas centered on the conflict between nationalist 
insurgents and the American occupation, violence experienced by civilians in these Shia areas 
can perhaps be linked to a wider variety of sources of friction. First, two rival militias – the 
Madhi Army under the control of cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Badr Bridage, which was aligned 
with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a Shiite political party – 
108 
 
fought for dominance within the broader Shiite community. While SCIRI was tied to the 
establishment Shia political hierarchy in Iraq, al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army were viewed as 
possessing some broader appeal on the Shiite street for their willingness to engage the Americans 
in an effort to force their withdraw (Carroll 2005). The tension between the groups, which dated 
back to al-Sadr’s father’s rivalry with Ayatollah al-Sistani, one of the most widely respected 
Shiite religious scholars who gave his “blessing” to SCIRI, frequently boiled up into violent 
clashes in cities like Najaf (2005) and Basra (2008). And even in the absence of violence, media 
outlets reported that “civil strife between Shiites [was] brewing just below the surface” (Carroll 
2005). When violence between the groups erupted, American and Iraqi forces were dispatched to 
suppress it, with Mahdi Army members frequently stating that these operations unfairly targeted 
them, and SCIRI actors given a pass, largely because of their close relationship with al-Sistani 
and the central government (Kamber and Glanz 2008).  
Civilians in these areas were also caught up in intersectarian violence between Sunnis 
and Shia. Shiite shrines and holy sites in places like Najaf were bombed by Sunni militants, 
while prominent members of the Sunni community in cities such as Basra were also targeted as 
sectarian violence rose throughout the country (Daragahi and Fakhrildeen 2006). Violence 
experienced by civilians in these areas may also have stemmed from the efforts by these Shia 
militias, primarily the Madhi Army, to expel the American forces. While not nearly on the same 
scale as the Sunni insurgency, al-Sadr’s forces repeatedly fought the Americans, most notably in 
Najaf in 2004 and in Sadr City, a Shia slum in eastern Baghdad (Arango and Ali 2011).
35
 Any 
civilians who were denounced as aligned with the Americans may have been targeted and 
punished for such transgressions by these Shiite militias. Finally, Kalyvas (2006) notes that a 
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Sadr City, while almost certainly entirely Shia, is in Baghdad province, which was more heterogeneous 
in its sectarian composition overall than those provinces discussed in this section. Violence in these 
mixed areas will be discussed below.   
109 
 
nontrivial amount of violence in the Greek Civil War arose from private feuds between families 
and neighbors or simple opportunism. Such action, while not connected to the larger conflict, can 
often be attributed to it, and it may be the case that this occurred in these Shia areas, as well as in 
other areas.    
Despite these various potential sources of violence, Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2 show that 
violence levels remained small relative to those in the Sunni areas. Kalyvas’s model predicts 
minimal violence of any kind against civilians if no side could plausibly claim control, and if we 
focus on what appeared to be the primary conflict occurring in these areas, that which existed 
between rival Shiite militias, we see that this is largely the case. Both targeted and indiscriminate 
violence was much less frequent than what occurred in the Sunni areas, as the mean number of 
indiscriminate attacks was .2/100,000 population, or one-seventh of the 1.4/100,000 average in 
the Sunni areas. (Distinct from the conflict between rival Shia factions, this can perhaps also be 
attributed to the fact that Sunni militants had a very hard time entering these areas to commit 
such acts, as they would be quickly targeted and eliminated.
36
) Similarly, selective attacks had a 
mean of 1.4, or a little more than one-third of the 5 average in Sunni areas.  
 
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics of Violent Attacks and US Counterinsurgent Efforts in Shia-
Dominated Areas 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
 Overall 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
375 0.002 0.008 0 0.08 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
375 0.014 0.04 0 0.28 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
410 7.41 18.71 0 295.37 
Avg. Battalion per 
  capita 
405 0.0013 0.003 0 0.02 
 2004-2006 
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 This is not to suggest that such attacks did not occur. 
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Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
224 0.002 0.007 0 0.06 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
224 0.011 0.032 0 0.28 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
246 4.35 6.74 0 68.67 
Avg. Battalion per 
  capita 
242 0.0014 0.003 0 0.02 
 2007-2008 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
151 0.003 0.009 0 0.08 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
151 0.02 0.04 0 0.27 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
164 11.99 27.82 0 295.37 
Avg. Battalion per 
  capita 
163 0.0013 0.0024 0 0.014 
 
 
Shia Areas (2004-2006) 
If we follow the same progression as we did with respect to the discussion of the Sunni areas, let 
us first turn to the pre-Surge environment. We also see in Table 4.2 that the American presence 
in these areas was actually quite limited during this period, with a per capita mean of only 0.001. 
A closer inspection of the data also reveals that of the 246 Shia district-half months prior to 
2007, 149 had no American battalions at all. Also, we see that investments in local public goods 
projects was also fairly small, compared to both what it would be in the latter period and what it 
was in the Sunni areas at the same time, where the mean per capita in a district, 31.51, was 
almost eight times greater. For reasons similar to the predictions regarding the inefficacy of the 
American strategy in the Sunni areas during this period, I anticipate that these efforts had little 
impact on the violence experienced by civilians. Shiite civilians had neither the opportunity nor 
incentive to engage in collaboration with American forces, due to their limited interactions and 
uncertainty over whether the Americans would remain to ensure their protection.  
Therefore, 
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H5a: American security efforts are not associated with patterns of selective violence 
against civilians in Shia areas between 2004 and 2006. 
 In contrast with the Sunni areas where American troop density was greater, I suggest that 
the minimal troop strength in the Shia provinces had little impact on indiscriminate violence: 
 H5b: American security efforts are not associated with patterns of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Shia areas between 2004 and 2006. 
In terms of American security efforts put forward within these areas, we see that there is 
little change across the two periods in terms of the number of battalions present in a given 
district, perhaps reflecting their general deference to the idea of self-governance except in the 
periods of open warfare between the two factions. However, we do see a fairly significant 
increase in the amount of money devoted to public goods projects from the pre-2007 period to 
The Surge, suggesting that American forces responded to the visible uptick in selective violence 
that occurred in these areas. As we can see, selective violence goes from an average rate of 0.1 
attack/100,000 in a half-year to 0.2, and mean spending levels almost triple and the maximum 
investment over a 6-month period is over four times the size of the largest investment in the pre-
Surge period.  
 
Shia Areas (2007-2008) 
As discussed above, the purpose of the public goods spending by American forces was to 
generate goodwill among the population, with the ultimate goal of acquiring the information 
needed to eliminate opposing actors. If the American Surge strategy changed from one of limited 
interactions with the population to one defined by greater levels of engagement, we might predict 
that levels of selective violence would decline. But for this to be the case, it would mean that 
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overall de facto control of these areas shifted to the Americans. The population would have to 
believe that the new strategy would be a sustained effort that would supplant existing hierarchies 
and networks, and that the Americans would be remaining in control. However, as I will discuss 
shortly, Muqtada al-Sadr and his supporters, both members of his militia as well as civilians, 
pushed strongly for the rapid departure of American forces and threatened renewed attacks and 
instances of civil disobedience against the occupation if the United States remained in the 
territory beyond previously agreed-upon dates (Arango and Ali 2011). As such, it seems difficult 
to believe that American efforts had any relationship with patterns of violence in these areas in 
the Surge period, as well.  
 H6a: American security efforts are not associated with patterns of selective violence 
against civilians in Shia areas between 2007 and 2008. 
 H6b: American security efforts are not associated with patterns of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Shia areas between 2007 and 2008. 
As is obvious from the several conflicts going on simultaneously within the Shia areas, 
the Americans were not the only actors who might have shaped patterns of civilian violence in 
them.
37
 With its attacks against American forces, attacks on Sunni neighborhoods (to be 
discussed below), and rivalry with SCIRI, the Mahdi Army had been a large source of instability 
early on in Iraq. However, in August 2007, al-Sadr ordered a ceasefire, pledging that his forces 
would refrain from attacking Sunnis, competing Shiite groups (SCIRI in particular), and 
American forces.   
Several factors may have motivated al-Sadr to order the ceasefire. First, it may have been 
in response to the realignment of Sunni groups with the American occupation. Since the 
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 Throughout this chapter, I use the phrase “civilian violence” when referring to the violence that is 
experienced by civilians, whether it is committed by insurgent actors or other civilians.   
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insurgency posed less of a problem, al-Sadr may have decided that he did not want to challenge a 
less-distracted American force, and it may have become clear that the costs of seeking to totally 
eliminate the Sunni population were going to be prohibitive. Further, he had suffered a loss of 
political support that occurred as a result of the Mahdi Army’s killing of fifty people in the holy 
city of Karbala in fighting with SCIRI. His political movement also faced increasing isolation as 
a result of the overreach and opportunism of members of the Mahdi Army. He frequently 
engaged in nationalist rhetoric framed in opposition to the American occupation, but if al-Sadr 
had any aspirations of continuing authority and influence after the departure of American forces, 
he would need to curb his militia’s violent behavior both across the sectarian divide and within 
his own community. 
American military and political leaders believed that this decision, whatever its motives, 
had a dampening effect on violence. In February 2008, when the ceasefire was extended, General 
David Petraeus stated that “The continuation of the cease-fire is an important commitment by al-
Sayyid Moqtada al-Sadr that holds the potential for a further reduction in violence in Iraq” 
(Raghavan and Paley 2008). In his announcement to his supporters of the continuation of the 
ceasefire, al-Sadr stated that he had no tolerance for dissident or rogue elements who would not 
abide by the ceasefire: “If you want to help me, do as you are ordered and implement what I am 
going to say, for I am ordering virtue and banning vice… I fear the day of judgment, so I cannot 
tolerate the disobedience of the disobedient, nor the sins of the sinners, nor the crimes of the 
criminals” (Raghavan and Paley 2008).   
The ceasefire’s enforcement mechanisms resemble an ideal counterinsurgency approach, 
as it reflects an ability to acquire information regarding bad actors and punish them accordingly 
without having to resort to indiscriminate violence. During Friday prayers, the names of the 
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offending members were read aloud, and posters were hung on walls detailing who had been 
purged (or worse) and why (Paley 2008). Most of those who were either fired from the Mahdi 
army or executed received these punishments for committing crimes against civilians, including 
murder. At the same time, al-Sadr’s organization began engaging in social services and settling 
disputes with the goal of further improving its reputation. The implication here is that the Mahdi 
organization was well-placed to find out who was engaging in the bad behavior and punish those 
individuals specifically. The organization was local and was not going to be leaving any time 
soon. This provided a sense of optimism within the communities where it was active, as well as 
amongst Sunnis, who were previously the target of the Mahdi army’s sectarian violence. For 
example, Iraq’s Sunni vice president at the time stated, “We are not afraid of them now. Now we 
don’t have eye-catching sectarian strife” (Paley 2008).    
This discussion implies that whatever its motivations, the Mahdi Army ceasefire should 
result in a decrease in selective and indiscriminate civilian violence in the Shia-dominated 
provinces, as it sought to bring rogue elements who sought to further destabilize the country 
under control. And because the ceasefire and its extensions were strongly supported by both 
American and Sunni officials, we can posit the following two hypotheses: 
 H7a: The Mahdi Army ceasefire of August 2007 is associated with decreased levels of 
selective violence in the Shia areas.  
H7b: The Mahdi Army ceasefire of August 2007 is associated with decreased levels of 
indiscriminate violence in the Shia areas. 
While recognizing the relatively small levels of violence in these areas, this section 
argues that the efforts by American forces, both before and after the 2007 Surge, had little impact 
in limiting the violence that did exist. Instead, it suggests that any reductions that did occur came 
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about by the decision of the Mahdi Army militia’s leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, to institute a 
ceasefire in August of that year. Before turning to an examination of civilian violence in the 
more ethnically or religiously mixed provinces, I will briefly focus attention on the dynamics 
that occurred in the Kurdish-dominated areas.  
 
Kurdish Areas 
 
Figure 4.5. Indiscriminate and Targeted Violence per Month in Kurdish Territory (2004-
2008) 
 
 
In Figure 4.2, we see that the Kurdish dominated areas are located in the northern provinces of 
Iraq – Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Erbil. Figure 4.5 shows that civilian violence in the Kurdish 
areas was very low throughout the period for which data is available. Table 4.3 also confirms 
these low incidents of violence; an average of just 2 indiscriminate attacks per 100,000 people 
and 7 selective attacks per 100,000 every half-year. Table 4.3 also shows the extent to which 
American counterinsurgent forces allowed local Kurdish forces, which were independent of the 
central Iraqi government, to operate and maintain their own security, as no American battalions 
were recorded in these areas. Also, Americans invested little in terms of public goods spending, 
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further illustrating both how little violence was in the area and how little of an American 
presence was required. When considering these observations within Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical 
framework, these Kurdish areas largely resemble Zone 1, where an incumbent enjoys complete 
control and faces no meaningful challenge to its authority. As such, I will now move on to an 
examination of the ethnically and religiously mixed areas of Iraq, where no such stability existed.  
 
Table 4.3. Summary Statistics of Violent Attacks and US Counterinsurgent Efforts in 
Kurd-Dominated Areas 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
 Overall 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
140 0.0004 0.002 0 0.02 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
140 0.002 0.007 0 0.06 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
210 2 5.47 0 49.92 
Average 
  Battalion per 
  capita 
211 0 0 0 0 
 2004-2006 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
84 0.0001 0.0005 0 0.004 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
84 0.0005 0.003 0 0.03 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
126 1.48 2.55 0 11.6 
Avg. Battalion per 
  capita 
126 0 0 0 0 
 2007-2008 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
56 0.0007 0.003 0 0.02 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
56 0.003 0.01 0 0.06 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
84 2.77 8.03 0 49.92 
Avg. Battalion per 
  capita 
85 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Mixed Areas 
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While Sunni-dominated regions of Iraq were defined by the insurgency against the American 
occupation and the Shia regions by intra-group tensions between rival factions, those areas which 
were more ethnically or religiously heterogeneous were thought generally to have suffered from 
the violence associated with intense sectarian war. Such mixed districts were located in four 
governorates, or provinces: Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Ta’meem (renamed Kirkuk in 2006). 
Figure 4.6 displays the aggregate patterns of targeted and indiscriminate violence across these 
areas, which increased substantially in the early to middle of 2006. Targeted violence remains 
elevated into 2007, where it then spikes again in the middle of that year before declining. We see 
that, by and large, indiscriminate attacks remained relatively infrequent compared to targeted 
attacks.  
Figure 4.6. Selective and Indiscriminate Violence in Mixed Areas of Iraq (2004-2008) 
 
Kalyvas’ (2006) theory posits that mixed areas where no one group possesses control should 
have little selective violence, as neither side will want to jeopardize their standing within the 
community and individual citizens have little incentive to collaborate with either the incumbent 
or the challenger. The pattern of violence shown here, at first glance, might suggest that such a 
dynamic did not hold in Iraq, or at least only did so for the first two years of the data. However, 
while these provinces do not possess the same high degree of homogeneity that defines the 
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ethnically dominated regions, Table 4.4 shows that they still tend to contain one strong ethnic or 
sectarian group. Diyala is the most heterogeneous district, followed by Ta’meem/Kirkuk, 
Ninewa, and then Baghdad. Diyala and Ninewa were both Sunni-majority by similar margins, 
with 26- and 31- point differences between the Sunni vote share and the next largest ethnic party, 
respectively. Ta’meem shows a 28-point Kurd advantage over its nearest competitor, the Sunnis, 
and Shia in Baghdad hold a 39-point advantage over Sunnis, the nearest ethnic group. Clearly, no 
province approaches parity in terms of its ethnic or sectarian composition. At the same time, how 
do we then account for the fact that, compared to the Sunni areas where violence was also 
intense, violence did not pick up until much later in these places? Also, why were Shia Baghdad 
and Kurdish Ta’meem far more violent beginning in 2006 than their much more homogenous 
counterparts? 
Table 4.4. Vote shares of ethnic political parties within mixed governorates 
 Sunni Shia Kurd 
Baghdad 21% 60% 1% 
Diyala 48% 22% 13% 
Ninewa 50% 7% 19% 
Ta’meem/Kirkuk 25% 4% 53% 
 
In the remainder of this section and beginning with Shia majority Baghdad, I will attempt to 
answer these questions, and also suggest how American and Iraqi efforts to address the violence 
may have worked.  
Baghdad 
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Figure 4.7. Selective and Indiscriminate Violence in Baghdad (2004-2008) 
 
Baghdad Province was in many respects the epicenter of civilian violence in Iraq, at least in the 
latter portion of the conflict. In Figure 4.7, we see that early on, civilian violence there appeared 
to be fairly limited, but it began to increase in early 2006 before spiking dramatically later that 
year and continuing to increase in the first half of 2007 before declining in the latter half of that 
year and all the way through 2008. Table 4.5 provides the summary statistics of the civilian 
violence and American counterinsurgent efforts in Baghdad province, and some interesting facts 
emerge. First it is clear that targeted violence in Baghdad was high, as there was a mean of five 
attacks per 100,000 people per half-year period. In the early pre-2007 period, there was a mean 
of two such attacks, which increased to a mean of nine attacks in the subsequent period. 
Indiscriminate attacks were comparatively rare over the full period, with a mean of 1.2 per 
100,000 over the five years. In the first three years, there was a mean of 1 attack per 100,000, 
which increased to two in the latter two.  
Table 4.5. Summary Statistics of Violent Attacks and US Counterinsurgent Efforts in 
Baghdad 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
 Overall 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
80 0.012 0.02 0 0.07 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
80 0.05 0.07 0 0.31 
Public Goods 90 18.4 22.88 0 119.85 
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  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
Avg. Battalion 
  per capita 
80 0.004 0.004 0 0.016 
 2004-2006 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
48 0.01 0.01 0 0.05 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
48 0.02 0.03 0 0.13 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
54 10.53 15.61 0 92.24 
Avg. Battalion 
  per capita 
48 0.003 0.003 0 0.014 
 2007-2008 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
32 0.02 0.02 0 0.07 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
32 0.09 0.09 0 0.31 
Public Goods 
 Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
36 30.22 26.88 2 119.85 
Avg. Battalion 
  per capita 
32 0.005 0.004 0.0008 0.016 
 
Scholars, analysts, and journalists have offered several theories to explain this pattern, ranging 
from ethnic segregation and cleansing (Weidmann and Salehyan 2013; Agnew, et al 2008; Korb, 
et al 2008), the standup of the Sunni tribes (Long 2008; Simon 2008; Green 2010), or some 
combination of these and the Surge (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Biddle, O’Hanlon, and 
Pollack 2008; Malkasian 2007; West 2008; Ricks 2009; Robinson 2008). These latter two 
explanations are detailed above in the discussion of violence in the Sunni areas, and so they do 
not need to be repeated here.  
However, a brief discussion of the first potential explanation – the unmixing of Iraqi 
society – is necessary. Weidmann and Salehyan (2013) suggest that what occurred in Iraq, 
particularly its once-ethnically mixed capital city of Baghdad, reflects much of what scholars 
have thought about the onset of ethnic war more generally. With the dismantling of Iraq’s 
military, too few troops, and minimal state capacity to establish order (see Tilly 1978; Kaufmann 
1996; Mueller 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), extreme voices from 
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the Sunni and Shia communities marginalized any moderate ones and forced individuals to cast 
their allegiances to a particular side, regardless of the substantial intermarriage and ethnic mixing 
that had previously defined the pre-invasion secular Iraq state (Telhami 2005; Raghavan 2007). 
After Sunni militants bombed the al-Askari Mosque in February 2006, many Shia joined various 
militias in Baghdad and other areas. Subsequently, the outnumbered Sunnis in the capital region 
fled as Shia “death squads” ethnically cleansed Baghdad’s neighborhoods through violence 
exemplified by that described in this chapter’s introduction. This period of escalating violence 
appears to last about a year and a half, from early 2006 until mid-2007. 
When civilian violence began to decline in the middle of 2007, some have argued that 
this was due to the sequence outlined above; “[T]he killing stopped because there was no one left 
to kill” (Cockburn 2008 from Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012). However, others such as 
Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012:14-18) delve into great detail of events in Bagdad to 
suggest that this was not the case, as Shia militias (namely Sadr’s Mahdi Army), after having 
cleared a neighborhood of Sunnis, simply used that territory as a base from which to launch 
further incursions into more Sunni areas of Baghdad. They conclude that when violence declined 
in mid-2007, there were still Sunni areas of Baghdad that could have been cleansed by the Shia 
militias, and thus, something else must have stopped them from advancing. Instead, these 
scholars argue that the combination of the Sons of Iraq movement and The Surge brought about 
an overall decrease in attacks on both civilians and counterinsurgent forces.  
 
Baghdad (2004-2006) 
This story implies that prior to 2007, the American occupation was largely ineffectual in limiting 
targeted, selective violence in Baghdad. Such an implication would be consistent with the 
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accounts in other regions of Iraq already discussed. With no sustained, engaged presence among 
the residents of Baghdad by the American military and uncertainty about its long-term presence, 
neither Sunni nor Shia individuals had reason to believe that the occupying power could do 
anything to protect them. While the Americans held de jure control of Baghdad, it is perhaps an 
open question as to who possessed de facto control. If we consider selective violence to be fairly 
infrequent (at least when compared to what it would be in later years), it may be the case that 
neither Sunnis nor Shia held control, which would match with Kalyvas’ (2006) assertion that 
regions where no party owns control should experience minimal violence. Alternatively, the 
incentives for these groups to engage in intersectarian violence during this period may have been 
fairly minimal and instead of no one group holding control, it may have been the case that both 
groups were able to police themselves and prevent individuals from perpetrating such attacks 
(see Fearon and Laitin 1996). In neither of these accounts, however, is the American occupation 
relevant, suggesting the following hypothesis:   
H8a: American security efforts are not associated with patterns of selective violence 
against civilians in Baghdad between 2004 and 2006. 
It is important to note here that the selective violence that is recorded here appears at first 
glance to be very different in its motivations than that which is involved in the logic of violence 
detailed by Kalyvas (2006). In his theoretical account, armed actors target civilians after they 
have been identified as someone whose allegiances might lead them to denounce or identify 
those actors to their rivals. In the ethnic cleansing that occurred, it would appear that everyday 
Sunnis were killed simply because they were Sunni. While there may be some truth to this, there 
are probably some other explanations as well. First, the Sunni identity of these individuals meant 
that they could not be trusted to be “loyal” members of a Shia dominated community, and thus, 
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they were killed before they even had a chance to state or demonstrate their allegiances. Second, 
it also may be the case that individual militia members who may have been motivated by reasons 
other than the good of the Shia community targeted particular Sunnis for their own benefit, 
perhaps to acquire their property or as part of private feuds among neighbors or acquaintances.  
Indiscriminate violence during this period, while less frequent than targeted attacks, was still 
certainly present. However, if control of Baghdad was up in the air as suggested above, 
Kalyvas’s logic suggests that such attacks would also be quite rare, as neither side would want to 
jeopardize an uneasy “peaceful” status quo. This outcome might mirror earlier work by Fearon 
and Laitin (1996), where ethnic groups police their own communities to prevent defections by 
individuals that would result in large-scale breakdowns in social order. Again, this low-intensity 
equilibrium could obtain independent of American activities during this period.  
H8b: American security efforts are not associated with patterns of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Baghdad between 2004 and 2006. 
 
Baghdad (2007-2008) 
However, the relative calm did break down with the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari 
Mosque, which ushered in the period of increased levels of both targeted and indiscriminate 
violence that ultimately peaked in the latter half of 2007. Prior to this point, we can imagine that 
violence remained fairly low because the two ethnic groups had not yet found themselves in the 
spiral of violence that scholars have argued is part and parcel of ethnic war (see Snyder and 
Jervis 1999; Posen 1993). 
In the earlier portions of this chapter, I have discussed a number of different factors that 
might have played a role in limiting this violence as it began to decrease in late 2007 and into 
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2008. Many of those theoretical expectations can be applied to Baghdad, as well, as all of these 
factors were in operation there – The Surge, the standup of the Sons of Iraq, and the ceasefire of 
the Mahdi Army.  
In early 2007, The Surge troop increase and change in strategy was implemented to 
address this descent into sectarian violence, as is suggested by Table 4.5. In it we see that mean 
public goods spending increased dramatically, almost threefold. Also, the mean level of 
American forces jumped by half a battalion per district in Baghdad, an average increase of about 
300 troops per district. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the possibility that this new approach 
altered the relationship between the community and the American counterinsurgents. The latter 
were now located on the streets of Baghdad rather than behind the walls of the Green Zone and 
the public goods that they provided generated a sense of loyalty and appreciation. As a result, 
those community members were willing to provide intelligence to American forces dedicated to 
keeping the peace, leading to a decrease in the frequency of targeted attacks against civilians. 
Also, and perhaps even more importantly, by being present in Baghdad’s remaining Sunni 
neighborhoods, they were able to prevent Shia militias from further house by house or block by 
block cleansing. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H9a: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of selective violence 
against civilians in Baghdad between 2007 and 2008.  
At the same time, Figure 4.7 shows that after an initial increase in indiscriminate attacks, 
those also declined. This pattern would make sense. If we assume that the bulk of such violence 
was committed  across sectarian lines, violence actors would want to respond to The Surge by 
demonstrating that they still possessed the capacity to inflict harm on the opposing community. 
But as the new strategy went into effect and additional troops took up their new positions 
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throughout Baghdad, the ability to carry out such attacks would have diminished as it became 
more difficult to cross from one community into another. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
H9b: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Baghdad between 2007 and 2008.  
However, the Sons of Iraq were also active in Baghdad during this period, and as was 
true in the Sunni-dominated areas of the country, they may have played more of a role in limiting 
violence than the American occupation. Prior to the standup, “protection” of the Sunni 
community was left to insurgent actors, who were responsible for the de-stabilization of the 
country such as the mosque bombing in Samarra. However, the SOI were now fighting those 
extreme elements and no longer opposed to the American presence, at least for the short-term. 
As such, their presence in the Sunni areas of Baghdad would not have been with the purpose of 
expelling Americans, but protecting fellow Sunnis. Such protection might have taken two forms. 
First, the presence of the Sons would have made it much more difficult for the Shia militias to 
continue their ethnic cleansing unabated. Should they have tried to do so, the militias would have 
been met with an armed response. Also, they would have been able to protect their fellow Sunnis 
from the remaining extreme elements within the community, as was suggested in the discussion 
pertaining to the Sunni-dominant regions of the country. By being permanent members of their 
communities and former insurgents themselves, the Sons knew who these destabilizing elements 
were and could act quickly to remove them from the environment.  
H10a: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Baghdad areas between 2007 and 2008.  
At the same time, the Sons of Iraq may have also been able to prevent these remaining 
violent Sunnis from attacking Shia areas with indiscriminate violence in an effort to further 
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destabilize the country. As touched on briefly above, this logic would be similar to that which 
was first articulated by Fearon and Laitin (1996), where rival ethnic groups will police their own 
and punish those who attempt to defect by attacking across ethnic lines.   
H10b: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Baghdad between 2007 and 2008. 
As was suggested in the case of the Sunni areas, the reduction of civilian violence in 
Baghdad may have also been the result of the interaction of the new US approach and the 
standup of the Sons of Iraq. In this account, the Sons provided the intelligence to the Americans, 
who then took action to remove the bad actors from the environment, with the same result.   
H11a: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in Baghdad between 2007 and 2008.  
H11b: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective violence against civilians 
in Baghdad between 2007 and 2008.  
As discussed in the beginning of this section, most of the violence in Baghdad was the 
result of efforts by Shia militias to cleanse the capital region of Sunnis. For these accounts 
prioritizing Sunni dynamics and the Sons of Iraq to be accurate, it would have to be the case that 
they provided enough of a deterrent to lead those militias to conclude such efforts were no longer 
worthwhile. But we know from the discussion of violence in the Shia-dominant regions of the 
country that political dynamics on the Shia side of the sectarian divide might have also played a 
role. In particular, Muqtada al-Sadr found himself in a difficult position. Members of his militia 
had jeopardized its standing in the Shia community through its opportunism and predation, he 
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had suffered a drop in support following the clash with SCIRI in Karbala that left fifty Shia 
civilians dead, and the Americans now had the Sons of Iraq working with them. To salvage his 
reputation within his community and perhaps position himself politically in post-occupation Iraq 
or prevent an unwanted showdown with the American military, al-Sadr ordered those loyal to 
him to stand down in the summer of 2007. As noted above, this effort to control what was 
arguably the largest source of violence was largely welcomed by American commanders, as well 
as many Sunnis. As such, we have the following hypotheses: 
H12a: The Mahdi Army ceasefire of August 2007 is associated with decreased levels of 
selective violence against civilians in Baghdad.  
H12b: The Mahdi Army ceasefire of August 2007 is associated with decreased levels of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians in Baghdad. 
In this section, I have offered a series of possible accounts regarding the effect of steps by 
the American occupation and Iraqi actors to limit the violence targeting the civilian population of 
Baghdad, a city that was at the center of the simultaneous conflicts that engulfed the country. In 
contrast to the Shia-dominated districts to the south, Baghdad was quite heterogeneous in terms 
of its sectarian composition. In the earlier period, prior to the full outbreak of sectarian war, 
tension between Sunni and Shia may have existed, but a peaceful equilibrium appears to have 
obtained. However, when that equilibrium was disrupted, most likely with the al-Askari 
bombing, violence was more prevalent here simply because both populations were present. This 
was obviously not the case to anywhere near the same degree in the other Shia areas. I turn now 
to Diyala and Ninewa, where Sunnis possessed a strong numerical advantage over their fellow 
Iraqis.   
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Diyala and Ninewa 
Both Diyala and Ninewa were approximately 50% Sunni, with 48.3% and 49.7% respectively. 
As shown in Figure 4.2, Diyala borders the Shia provinces of Wasit and Babil in the south, the 
Sunni province of Salah al Din to the west, and Kurdish Sulaymaniyah to the north. Shia 
represented the second largest group, with 22%, with the Kurds at 13%. Ninewa is bordered by 
Sunni strongholds of Anbar and Salah al Din to the south and Kurdish Erbil and Dohuk to the 
north and east. Here, Kurds represented 19% of the population and Shia, 7%.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Selective and Indiscriminate Violence in Diyala and Ninewa (2004-2006) 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the patterns of indiscriminate and selective violence against civilians in these 
two provinces. In contrast to these patterns in the overwhelmingly Sunni districts of Anbar and 
Salah al Din, we see that they remained fairly peaceful until early 2006, or shortly after the 
bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, which ushered in the era of significant sectarian strife. 
Following this event, both types of violence increased, although the frequency of selective 
attacks went up dramatically while indiscriminate attacks did so very gradually. Selective 
violence began to ebb in the latter half of 2006 and except for a spike in the middle of 2007, 
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declined back to low levels by the end of 2008. In contrast, indiscriminate attacks remained 
fairly minimal, but do appear to have increased slightly throughout the entire period.  
 
Diyala and Ninewa (2004-2006) 
Up to this point, I have outlined a number of theories regarding the effect of American and Iraqi 
efforts in other regions of the country, and so I will not go into great detail with them here. 
However, I will still provide brief discussions with specific hypotheses. Beginning with the 
American counterinsurgency efforts summarized in Table 4.6, we see that levels of American 
troops and spending were minimal in the pre-Surge period in these two provinces compared to 
the much more Sunni but also more violent Anbar and Salah al Din provinces. Taking what we 
know about the American strategy during this period, we can imagine that the relationship 
between it and all manner of violence in this period is fairly limited.  
H13a: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2004 and 2006.  
H13b: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2004 and 2006.  
 
Table 4.6. Summary Statistics of Violent Attacks and US Counterinsurgent Efforts in 
Diyala and Ninewa 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
 Overall 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
139 0.014 0.03 0 0.15 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
139 0.05 0.13 0 1.16 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
150 7.92 10.42 0 64.89 
Avg. Battalion  
  per capita 
150 0.63 0.8 0 3 
 2004-2006 
Indiscriminate 83 0.01 0.02 0 0.13 
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  Attacks/1,000 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
83 0.04 0.14 0 1.16 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
90 6.87 7.7 0 31.92 
Avg. Battalion 
  per capita 
90 0.67 0.8 0 2.5 
 2007-2008 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
56 0.02 0.03 0 0.15 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
56 0.06 0.11 0 0.6 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
60 9.49 13.44 0 64.89 
Avg. Battalion 
  per capita 
60 0.58 0.81 0 3 
 
An obvious question to ask is why Diyala and Ninewa had much lower levels of civilian 
violence during the 2004-2006 period compared to Anbar and Salah al Din. All four were 
primarily Sunni, although the latter two were far more homogenous than the former set. One can 
imagine that this is due to the difference in the American presence between these two sets of 
provinces. The mean battalion presence in Diyala and Ninewa was .67, while it was 1.51 in 
Anbar and Salah al Din. Also, the level of public goods investments was radically different. In 
the Diyala and Ninewa, the mean level of spending was 6.87, with a max investment of 31.92. 
Conversely, Anbar and Salah al Din saw a mean of 33.71, with a maximum investment over a 
six-month period of 552.81. From this information, one can reasonably argue that the civilians in 
Diyala and Ninewa provinces were not caught up in a situation where the Sunni militants were 
concerned about potential defections to the American occupation. If there were no Americans to 
defect to in Anbar and Salah al Din, these regions perhaps may have better resembled Zone 1, 
where there was total dominance, rather than Zone 2, where there was control, but not 
domination.  
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Diyala and Ninewa (2007-2008) 
Turning to the 2007-2008 period, we see that civilian violence increased dramatically in these 
areas, beginning even in 2006. This is most likely due to a number of factors. First, overall 
sectarian violence throughout the country increased following the bombing of the al-Askari 
Mosque in February 2006. As noted earlier, moderate voices across the sectarian divide were 
drowned out by extremist elements, and the Sunni and Shia suffered from a security dilemma, 
where trust gave way to mutual suspicion. In the absence of any leviathan capable of maintaining 
stable relations, sectarian violence took over. And because Diyala and Ninewa were more 
diverse than Anbar and Salah al Din, we can imagine that they experienced this source of 
violence, where the latter two did not.  
Second, and relatedly, as the insurgency declined in or was forced out of Anbar and Salah 
al Din, it moved to these districts. Baqubah, Diyala’s largest city, had been taken over by al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2007 and its leadership sought to make it the capital of its anticipated 
caliphate. With this new arrival of Sunni extremist fighters, Shia civilians had to either flee south 
in search of protection in the larger Shia communities of Baghdad or possibly be targeted. At the 
same time, Shiites controlled the provincial council seats, as well as the local security forces, 
which were comprised primarily of members of the Badr Organization militia discussed earlier 
(Moore 2007), which would suggest that intersectarian violence would be on the increase.  
Similar dynamics were operating in Ninewa, as well, as al Qaeda elements moved away from 
Anbar and Salah al Din to this region where, instead of a strong Shia minority, there was a 
significant Kurdish presence. And just as Diyala’s security forces were comprised of Shiites, 
much of Ninewa’s was controlled by the minority Kurdish forces, known as the Peshmerga 
(Muir 2008).    
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Because the insurgency shifted locations, we can imagine that the focus of the Americans 
may have shifted as well. Indeed, in 2007 and 2008, American forces engaged in sustained 
campaigns to retake both provinces from the insurgents who had come to control them despite 
the efforts of the local security forces. We might then expect patterns to emerge that were similar 
to those which were discussed toward the beginning of this chapter. As the American forces 
implemented their new strategy of clearing the territory and investing in public goods to win the 
allegiance of the population, remaining insurgents in both Ninewa and Diyala would have 
difficulty either controlling the population with selective violence or perpetrating indiscriminate 
bombings in an effort to continue sectarian cleansing or stem defections to the American side. 
Thus, we can hypothesize the following:  
H14a: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2007 and 2008.  
H14b: American security efforts are associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2007 and 2008.  
Also, the Sons of Iraq were active in these provinces, and it may be the case that they were able 
to combat the remaining insurgent elements on their own, as was posited elsewhere. This would 
lead to the following: 
H15a: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2007 and 2008.  
H15b: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2007 and 2008. 
And finally, we can test the possibility that violence ultimately declined in these provinces due to 
the interaction of the standup of the SOI and the new American military strategy. 
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H16a: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in Diyala and Ninewa between 2007 and 2008.  
H16b: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective violence against civilians 
in Diyala and Ninewa between 2007 and 2008.  
While Sunnis were the largest ethnic or sectarian group in Diyala and Ninewa, violence 
came much later to these areas than Anbar and Salah al Din, which were overwhelmingly Sunni. 
When it did arrive, the dynamics reflected multiple conflicts – ethnic cleansing of Kurds 
(Ninewa) and Shia (Diyala) and insurgent rebellion against the United States. Anbar and Salah al 
Din differed in this respect, as they only experienced insurgency. Still, the American Surge 
strategy, the emergence of the Sons of Iraq, or some combination of the two may have limited 
both forms of violence, as they presented significant obstacles for the Sunni militants who 
wanted to cleanse these neighborhoods of rival groups and prevent local citizens from aligning 
with the American occupation. The effectiveness of these efforts will be explored in the 
empirical section below, but for now, I will conclude this theoretical discussion with the violence 
that took place in Kurdish-majority Ta’meem/Kirkuk.   
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Ta’meem/Kirkuk 
Figure 4.9. Selective and Indiscriminate Violence in Ta’meem (2004-2006) 
 
Violence came to Ta’meem, re-named Kirkuk in 2006, around the same time it came to Diyala 
and Ninewa, the two other mixed areas near the Sunni strongholds of Anbar and Salah al Din. 
(See Figure 4.2 for its location.) Figure 4.9 and Table 4.7 show that selective violence increased 
significantly in the second period, as the mean rate of these attacks went from 4 attacks/100,000 
per half year to 8. Interestingly, indiscriminate attacks actually remained fairly constant in terms 
of the mean rate. However, we can see that the half-year with the highest rate of such attacks 
(6/100,000) occurred in the earlier period.  
 
Table 4.7. Summary Statistics of Violent Attacks and US Counterinsurgent Efforts in 
Ta’meem 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
 Overall 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
30 0.012 0.01 0 0.06 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
30 0.06 0.06 0 0.24 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
40 15.57 16.39 0 62.76 
Avg. Battalion  
  per capita 
40 0.58 0.74 0 2.33 
 2004-2006 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
18 0.01 0.01 0 0.06 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
18 0.04 0.04 0 0.15 
Public Goods 24 10 10.36 0 32.1 
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  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
Avg. Battalion 
  per capita 
24 0.56 0.73 0 2.33 
 2007-2008 
Indiscriminate 
  Attacks/1,000 
12 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 
Targeted 
  Attacks/1,000 
12 0.08 0.07 0.005 0.24 
Public Goods 
  Spending ($ per 
  capita) 
16 23.91 20.26 1.46 62.76 
Avg. Battalion  
  per capita 
16 0.6 0.78 0 2.33 
 
An examination of the qualitative evidence suggests that Sunni insurgents spent much of 
2006 seeking to displace the Kurdish majority that had returned to Kirkuk after being forcibly 
displaced from the area during the Ba’athist era under Saddam Hussein (Windawi and Barnes 
2006). If the insurgency was seeking to establish control over the area and move it from a zone 
of Kurdish control to one of their own, we can imagine that they would first seek to demonstrate 
the inability of those Kurdish forces to protect the population, and so they would carry out 
indiscriminate attacks seeking to sow fear. At the same time, the reliance on such attacks 
suggests they did not yet have the presence necessary to compel civilians to alter their behavior 
such that they would switch and cast their allegiance to the insurgents. However, we can imagine 
that these Sunni insurgents linked to al Qaeda (Oppel and al-Ansary 2006) would not have given 
these civilians an opportunity to do so, as they more likely would have engaged in ethnic 
cleansing, as they did in Diyala and Ninewa. And as was true throughout much of the country 
during this period, primary security responsibility was delegated to local Iraqi forces, as 
American forces remained detached and hands-off. Again, we would expect this pre-Surge 
strategy to have no significant effect on violence:   
H17a: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Ta’meem between 2004 and 2006.  
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H17b: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians in Ta’meem between 2004 and 2006.  
As violence entered the 2007-2008 period and the province was now called Kirkuk, we 
see that targeted attacks continued to increase, while indiscriminate bombings leveled off. When 
targeted attacks declined in late 2007, it does not appear that the American presence changed in 
terms of absolute numbers. Therefore, it may be the case that the change in American strategy, 
which included increased investments in public goods projects, led to an eventual decrease in 
both forms of violence:  
H18a: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Kirkuk between 2007 and 2008.  
H18b: American security efforts are not associated with decreased levels of 
indiscriminate violence against civilians in Kirkuk between 2007 and 2008. 
Again, there is evidence that the Sons of Iraq were in operation in the area (Biddle, 
Friedman, and Shapiro 2012:31), and for reasons already discussed, they may have been better 
positioned to combat the remaining insurgents than the American forces.  
H19a: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective 
violence against civilians in Kirkuk between 2007 and 2008.  
H19b: The Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians in Kirkuk between 2007 and 2008. 
Finally, as was true elsewhere, the decline in both selective and indiscriminate violence may 
have resulted from a combination of the two:  
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H20a: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of indiscriminate violence against 
civilians in Kirkuk between 2007 and 2008.  
H20b: The interaction of American counterinsurgency efforts and the emergence of the 
Sons of Iraq movement is associated with decreased levels of selective violence against civilians 
in Kirkuk between 2007 and 2008.  
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning one additional explanation for the decline in 
indiscriminate attacks between periods. It might be the case that such attacks in the earlier period 
had their intended effect: they spread enough fear among Kurds and other groups that they all 
simply left the area and fled to the stability and security of the other Kurdish regions where 
insurgents did not go. If Kirkuk could be cleansed of remaining Kurds via selective targeting and 
cleansing, it would mean that control had shifted away from the Kurdish forces to the insurgents. 
However, as Figure 4.9 suggests, this control would not last past 2007, as violence of all kinds 
would decline and control would shift back away from the insurgents.  
In this section, I have tried to shed light on the violence that existed across the different 
regions of Iraq. I have suggested why violence occurred in the patterns it did over time, and most 
importantly, I have offered a series of potential causal explanations regarding the effectiveness of 
American and local attempts to control it. I have suggested that the American posture prior to the 
Surge did little to shape the violence experienced by everyday civilians, as it largely avoided the 
messy and difficult work of what might be called “true” counterinsurgency: permanently locating 
forces in the communities, gaining the trust and allegiance of the population, and separating the 
violent actors from those wishing for a return to normalcy. At the same time, in exploring the 
role of domestic political actors, I have suggested the possibility that even with the new Surge 
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approach, American forces were going to have a hard time gaining the trust and allegiance of the 
population, as their long-term status – and their ability to guarantee the population’s security – 
might always have been in doubt. I turn now to the empirical analysis, which is a first cut at 
determining the effect of these efforts on civilian violence.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
This section seeks to determine the effect of American counterinsurgency efforts and steps by 
Iraqi political actors to limit violence in that country. More specifically, it will examine whether 
the billions of dollars invested in public goods and the presence and effort of American service 
personnel had any effect on limiting the violence experienced by everyday Iraqis, or whether the 
Sons of Iraq or ceasefire of the Mahdi Army played a more prominent role. As I did in the 
theoretical discussion above, I break up the analysis into four regions, Sunni, Shia, Kurd, and 
mixed. For the mixed regions, I again separate these according to which ethnic or sectarian group 
predominates. To overcome the potential problems that arise from some of the small sample 
sizes in the region-level analyses, I will conclude the section with an evaluation of the effect of 
these factors on the national level. 
I begin the analysis, however, with a description of the data. Within each of the four 
ethnic or sectarian regions (Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Mixed), provinces are the largest administrative 
unit, and they are further broken down into districts. There are 104 districts spread across 18 
provinces. The level of analysis is the district-half-year.
38
 There are two dependent variables: 
                                                 
38
 The primary reason for using the district half-year, as opposed to the district-month, relates to one of 
the key independent variables, development spending. The average development project lasted 93 days, 
and it is difficult given the data to determine how the funds for projects lasting more than a month were 
distributed across those months. The drawback, of course, is that we lose the sharpness and clarity that 
comes with more fine-grained data. See page 8 of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Iraq Civil War 
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rates of targeted and indiscriminate attacks against civilians at the district-half-year level, which 
is the same level of aggregation used in previous studies (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; 
Berman et al 2013) that explore attacks against counterinsurgent forces.
39
 Kalyvas (2006:141-45) 
engages in a lengthy discussion regarding the nature of and motivations for these two types of 
violence, suggesting that both are attempts to engender “collaboration via deterrence. The 
distinction is based on the level at which ‘guilt’  (and hence targeting) is determined….[O]ne 
way to operationalize this distinction is by noting that selective violence entails personalized 
targeting, whereas indiscriminate violence implies collective targeting” (142). To capture these 
two distinct types of attacks, I rely on data from Condra and Shapiro (2012), who distinguish 
between the killing of civilians that occurs in the course of violence between insurgents and Iraqi 
or Coalition targets and the killing of civilians that occurs independent of such violence.  
Indiscriminate attacks are those recorded instances of attacks where civilians were targeted and 
killed either by bombs or explosives, most of which occurred in public spaces such as 
marketplaces or mosques. In contrast targeted violence includes all recorded instances where 
civilians were killed by “direct fire” or “selective violence” as coded by Condra and Shapiro 
(2012). In looking at the data, “direct fire” describes incidents where individuals were found 
dead with gunshot wounds, while “selective violence” incidents usually were those where 
individuals were found with gunshot wounds, but their bodies also showed signs of torture. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dataset, Version 3, for details: https://webspace.princeton.edu/users/esocweb/ESOC%20Iraq/ESOC-I-
v3_codebook.pdf. 
39
 The tables presented throughout the chapter capture the summary statistics for the two dependent 
variables and the independent variables capturing the variation in American counterinsurgency efforts. I 
do not include summary statistics for the Sons of Iraq standup or the Mahdi Ceasefire discussed below 
because they are measured only with dummy variables.  
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These two categories capture the violence that is characterized by intentional targeting of 
particular civilians. These data come from Condra and Shapiro (2012).
40
 
The first series of independent variables reflect the efforts of American counterinsurgent 
forces. Following Berman et al (2013:16), I use public goods spending, American troop strength, 
and their interaction. Public goods investment is measured using per capita spending carried out 
under the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was designed to allow 
military commanders to gain the population’s support and collaboration by engaging in a wide 
range of small-scale public goods projects at the local level. Projects were developed in 
consultation with local community officials, thus ensuring that they were going to be useful and 
beneficial, which would then maximize the likelihood that civilians would be willing to assist 
them in defeating the insurgency. Troop strength data (Berman et al 2013 from Lee Lindsay 
2013), which was gathered from press accounts, and counts the mean number of maneuver 
battalions present in a district over the course of a half-year.  
The next set of independent variables capture the steps taken by local political actors to 
exert their authority and limit the ability of insurgent actors to carry out further violence. First, I 
include a variable for the emergence of the Sons of Iraq (SOI), which occurred in 2006-2007. 
Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012) note the month and year of the standup of the SOI at the 
US military’s area of operation (AO) level based off of interviews with American commanders 
or when the first payments to the SOI were made by Coalition forces. While the AOs do not 
correspond perfectly to Iraqi political districts, Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012) do note 
which districts most closely correspond to a given AO. I assign a 1 for all half-years during and 
after the SOI aligned with Coalition forces in a given district and a 0 for all others. The second of 
                                                 
40
 The data were collected through a collaboration with the authors and the Iraq Body Count (IBC), a non-
profit that collects and makes public data on civilian casualties from the Iraq War. The count, which by 
IBC’s own admission, is undoubtedly low, comes from media reports of incidents involving civilians.   
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these variables captures the imposition of a ceasefire by Muqtada al-Sadr on his Shiite militia, 
the Mahdi Army (JAM, for the acronym in Arabic). Because JAM had a presence in nearly all 
Shiite-majority districts, all districts where the Shiite vote share was over fifty percent received a 
1 for the three half-years in the data where the ceasefire was in effect (i.e., second half of 2007 
and both halves of 2008). All others receive a 0. Finally, each regression is weighted by 
population and include year effects, as is done in previous research (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 
2011; Berman et al 2013).  
As will be the case throughout the empirical analysis, I use a first differences model that 
controls for pre-existing trends in both the independent and dependent variables, as well as year 
effects. In the model for the Sunni areas, the difference in troop strength and development 
spending and lag the Sons of Iraq standup (SOI) are the independent variables. 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛽1(𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑓𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−2) + 
+𝛽4(𝑆𝑂𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
where 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 captures per capita attacks in district 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the amount of public goods 
spending, 𝑓is the troop density, and 𝛿𝑡 is the fixed effects for the year.  
 
Sunni Region Analysis 
I begin with Sunni-dominated provinces of Anbar and Salah al Din. The first series of 
hypotheses concern selective violence. Hypothesis 1a posited that the American presence prior to 
the Surge had no effect on patterns of targeted, selective violence against civilians in the Sunni-
dominated regions. American forces were believed to have maintained a very disengaged 
presence that gave them little ability to interact with civilians, earn their trust, and provide 
security on their behalf. Hypothesis 2a, in contrast, suggested that the Surge’s change in strategy 
to focus more on public goods provision and increased presence by those forces should have a 
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negative effect on the ability of violent actors to carry out targeted attacks on noncombatants in 
the later period. Hypothesis 3a stated that rather than the Americans shaping patterns of selective 
violence, the standup of the Sons of Iraq during this period should account for these reductions, 
as they were permanent actors in the area, and as such, had the opportunity to earn the trust of 
the population and could protect them from potential retribution by the remaining insurgent 
actors. Finally, Hypothesis 4a suggested that the SOI and American forces combined to produce 
the decline in violence, as the SOI fed intelligence to the well-armed Americans, who could then 
eliminate the insurgents, thereby reducing the targeting of civilians.   
Table 4.8. Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Sunni-Dominated Regions, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP per capita 0.000592 0.000101 -0.000755 
 (0.000602) (0.000700) (0.00112) 
Troops per capita 4.948 1.166 -1.172 
 (3.289) (1.558) (3.902) 
CERP*Troops -0.00941 -0.0243 0.0296 
 (0.00855) (0.0447) (0.0650) 
Troops (t-1) 0.697 -1.412 -2.145 
 (2.128) (1.785) (2.575) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.0343 -0.0375 
  (0.0345) (0.0262) 
2005 -0.0325*   
 (0.0181)   
2007  -0.00968 -0.0102 
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  (0.0178) (0.0178) 
Targeted Attacks (t-1) -0.661 -0.290** -0.300** 
 (0.499) (0.126) (0.125) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup 
(t-1) 
  -0.137 
   (0.106) 
CERP* SOI Standup (t-1)   0.00161 
   (0.00143) 
Troops * SOI Standup (t-1)   5.782 
   (5.627) 
Constant 0.0489*** -0.00266 -0.000249 
 (0.0123) (0.0247) (0.0207) 
    
Observations 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.456 0.436 0.467 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
In Table 4.8, Column 1 provides results related to Hypothesis 1a, and it shows that the combined 
effect of troop density and investment has no significant effect, although the sign is negative 
(p=.291). On their own, the coefficients of the constituent terms are in the opposite direction, 
suggesting that in the absence of the other, targeted attacks were likely to increase. While both 
investments and troop density are related to increased attacks, it is important to note the 
difference in the size of the coefficients, as the relationship between troop density and attacks is 
much greater, and not too far from achieving conventional levels of statistical significance 
(p=.156). Taken together it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions (perhaps due to the 
limited sample size), but there is some evidence that even prior to the Surge, this combination 
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may have had some effect in making it more difficult for insurgents to target individuals, 
meaning that the null result predicted is not supported. While not shown here, I also lag increases 
in troop presence and spending, as well as their interaction going back two years (4 six-month 
periods) and find no effect.  
In Column 2, we see that despite the prediction of Hypothesis 2a, there is no definitive 
evidence that American counterinsurgency efforts had any effect on targeted violence during the 
Surge period. Adding an additional six-month lag on changes in troop density produces a 
negative, but insignificant coefficient. While the coefficient on the interaction of spending and 
troop density is negative, it is not close to statistically significant (p=.596), giving us little 
confidence. Also, as was the case in Column 1, the effect of each of these on their own is in the 
positive direction. Column 2 also allows for an initial investigation of Hypothesis 3a, and we can 
see that the Sons of Iraq appear to have had a negative effect on selective violence, which was 
predicted, although the finding lacks conventional statistical significance (p=.337). Again, I also 
lagged troop presence, spending, their interaction, and the SOI standup and find no effect.  
In Column 3, we have perhaps the full test of the three Surge hypotheses, as it measures 
the independent effect of American forces, the independent effect of the SOI, and their combined 
effect. Here, with respect to Hypothesis 2a, we see that the sign on the interaction term of 
spending and troops has now switched to positive, meaning that this combination, in the absence 
of the SOI, led to an increase in selective attacks on civilians. While this suggests that 
Hypothesis 2a is not supported, I also ran a separate analysis lagging four subsequent six-month 
periods, or two years, which I do not show here. In this analysis, all coefficients for troop density 
are negative, and the one year and two year lags are both statistically significant. Lagged public 
spending also produces a negative effect, with the six- and eighteen-month lags reaching 
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statistical significance. Introducing lags of the interaction of the two again yields a negative 
effect over time, with the six-month, one year, and two year lags all reaching statistical 
significance. (The eighteen month lag is positive, but not statistically significant.) 
On its own, the coefficient on the SOI standup is negative and, although not meeting the 
conventional thresholds of statistical significance (p=.163), it does lend support to Hypothesis 
3a, as well as the idea put forward by Lindsay and Long (2013) that the SOI were effective in 
Anbar, even in the absence American counterinsurgents. Interestingly, none of the lags are 
negative or statistically significant, suggesting that the negative effect may, in fact, only be 
temporary. However, there is still some evidence supporting Hypothesis 4a, as the interaction of 
troop density, investment, and the SOI also produced a negative (and larger) coefficient. Finally, 
the six month and year lags which I also ran here are negative and statistically significant, while 
the eighteen- and twenty-four month lags are negative but not significant. 
Relying on coefficients alone to interpret these marginal effects is difficult, and so Figure 
4.10 allows us to look further understand how these patterns change with the inclusion of the 
Sons of Iraq standup. In the top left graph, we see how levels of targeted attacks change as 
spending and troop density increase independent of the inclusion of the SOI standup variable in 
the model. The other two graphs show the marginal effect of including the SOI variable. We can 
see that when the SOIs were active in an area, the effect of increasing spending and troop density 
appears much more pronounced than when they were absent.  
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Figure 4.10. Marginal Effect of Sons of Iraq Standup on Targeted Attacks on Civilians in 
Sunni Dominated Regions 
 
Hypotheses 1b through 4b involve the effect of these efforts and dynamics on 
indiscriminate violence, where violent actors do not target individuals to engender compliance, 
but rather the entire community. Here, I suggested in Hypothesis 1b that, despite what was 
largely thought to be a restrained and distant posture, the large American troop presence might 
make it more difficult for insurgents to carry out such attacks in the pre-Surge period. Hypothesis 
2b posited that although troop density decreased in these provinces post-2006, the more engaged 
presence made it more difficult for insurgents to carry out these attacks. Likewise, Hypothesis 3b 
examined the possibility that, just as the SOI was able to reduce targeted attacks, so, too would 
they make it more difficult for insurgent actors to use indiscriminate violence. Finally, 
Hypothesis 4 reflects the idea that indiscriminate attacks declined due to the combined, 
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synergized efforts (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012) of American counterinsurgents and the 
Sons of Iraq.  
Table 4.9. Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in Sunni-Dominated Regions, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP per capita 0.000417** 4.73e-05 0.000191 
 (0.000182) (0.000120) (0.000447) 
Troops per capita 2.400* 0.787 0.956 
 (1.270) (0.908) (1.543) 
CERP*Troops -0.00708** 0.00322 -0.00175 
 (0.00258) (0.00892) (0.0253) 
Troops (t-1) -0.0689 0.382 0.278 
 (0.624) (0.879) (0.980) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.0179 -0.0158* 
  (0.0134) (0.00905) 
2005 -0.000876   
 (0.00335)   
2007  -0.00265 -0.00125 
  (0.00861) (0.00686) 
Indiscriminate Attacks (t-1) -0.598*** -0.542*** -0.493** 
 (0.156) (0.135) (0.187) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.00583 
   (0.0435) 
CERP* SOI Standup (t-1)   -9.15e-05 
   (0.000546) 
Troops * SOI Standup (t-1)   0.325 
   (2.196) 
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Constant 0.00293 0.0107 0.00900 
 (0.00179) (0.0108) (0.00786) 
    
Observations 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.445 0.422 0.426 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table 4.9, which is structured in the same way as Table 4.8, shows the results pertaining 
to indiscriminate attacks in Sunni-dominated areas. In Column 1, we see that changes in troop 
density accompanied by changes in investment in public goods produce a statistically significant 
decline in indiscriminate attacks, although the coefficient is quite small, suggesting support for 
Hypothesis 1b. However, this is not for the reason suggested in the theoretical discussion. There, 
I suggested that we might expect to see such a result due to the significant troop density, rather 
than any combined effect. Here, troop density on its own is responsible for a rather strong 
increase in such attacks. (CERP spending is also associated with an increase in attacks, although 
the coefficient is much smaller.) The result of a 0.7 decrease in attacks per 100,000 people for 
every unit increase in dollars spent*troop density raises the possibility that when put into effect, 
even on the limited basis that it was during this period, the effort to “clear, hold, and build” did 
make it more difficult for insurgents to indiscriminately attack civilians. The lagged effects of 
increased troop density, per capita spending, and the interaction of the two, while again not 
shown, are insignificant.  
Interestingly, however, when we move to Hypotheses 2b and Column 2, the lack of 
significant or negative coefficients on the spending and troop density variables indicates that this 
effect did not obtain during the Surge period, suggesting the decline in troops and spending 
during this period in the Sunni areas noted in Table 4.1 was not compensated for by the wider 
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simultaneous change in posture taken by American troops. In Column 2, we can also see the 
effect of the SOI standup, which was discussed as Hypothesis 3b. Here, the effect of the SOI is 
negative, as predicted. And while the result does not achieve conventional levels of statistical 
significance (p=.206), it is suggestive of an effect. The lagged effects of all four variables – 
increases in troop density and spending, their interaction, and the introduction of the SOI – 
across the four subsequent six-month periods are all insignificant, as well.  
In Column 3, the full model, we see that again, American efforts appear to have little 
meaningful effect on rates of indiscriminate attacks in the Surge period, providing further 
evidence against Hypothesis 2b. This is true even after the lags are included. However, 
Hypothesis 3b finds further support, as the Sons of Iraq, when active independent of American 
forces, were associated with declines in indiscriminate violence at statistically significant levels, 
although this effect disappears over the four subsequent time periods. When the SOI is combined 
with American troop density and investment, the coefficient is in the expected direction, but it 
lacks any statistical significance (p=.894). However, the effect does gain significance six months 
and a year later, and remains negative but insignificant following that time. Further, when 
spending and troops are interacted independently with the SOI, there is no discernable effect, 
suggesting again that Hypothesis 4b cannot be supported.  
In Figure 4.11, we again see the marginal effects. In the upper left, we see that the 
interaction of increased spending and troop density does not produce a discernable change in 
violence. The other two graphs show that when the SOI were present in a district, the effect is 
perhaps slightly more negative than when they are not, although there is no significant difference 
between the two.  
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Figure 4.11. Marginal Effect of Sons of Iraq Standup on Indiscriminate Attacks on 
Civilians in Sunni Dominated Regions 
 
 
Table 4.10. Summary of Results from Sunni-Dominated Regions 
Hypothesis Supported (Yes/No/Suggestive) 
Selective Attacks  
1a. American efforts, pre-Surge – no neg. effect No 
2a. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
3a. Sons of Iraq – negative effect Suggestive 
4a. Combined American and SOI – negative effect Suggestive 
Indiscriminate Attacks  
1b. American efforts, pre-Surge – negative effect Yes 
2b. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
3b. Sons of Iraq – negative effect Yes 
4b. Combined American and SOI – negative effect No 
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These results cast some initial doubt on the idea that American forces played a significant 
role in the reduction of violence in the Surge period, at least right away, in the Sunni-dominated 
provinces of Anbar and Salah al Din. Instead, the effect on targeted attacks only becomes 
apparent after a year. Further, the evidence, albeit inconclusive in terms of selective attacks, 
suggests that these efforts did play a role in reducing violence prior to the Surge. Further, they 
did so not just through significant troop density, but with a combination of troops and 
investments in public goods. As noted earlier, individual commanders did engage in “Surge”-like 
efforts during this period in these regions, and it may be the case that they did have the desired 
effect. This, of course, raises the question of why these efforts did not appear to work in the latter 
period. To answer this, it is important to recall that violence moved from these Sunni-dominated 
provinces to more mixed areas, and it may be the case that as violence migrated in 2007, the 
impact of the Surge may show up more in these areas. This possibility will be examined in turn, 
but I now turn to the analysis of the data from the Shia provinces of Iraq.  
  
Shia Region Analysis 
I argued in the development of Hypotheses 5a and b and 6a and b that American efforts in Iraq 
were unlikely to have an effect on the violence experienced by civilians living in the Shia-
dominated regions of Iraq, either prior to or during the Surge period. Even after the change in 
strategy that defined the Surge, Shia leadership pushed strongly for an expeditious American 
exit, which would have made it difficult for everyday Shia to trust that American forces would 
have been there to protect them from retribution should they decide to denounce the violent 
actors in their communities. Instead, in Hypotheses 7a and b, I suggested that the decision by 
Muqtada al-Sadr to enact a total ceasefire in August of 2007 accounted for much of the decline 
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in both forms of violence in the Shia-dominated regions of Iraq, as his group would be able to 
effectively monitor and prevent defections from the ceasefire, which would limit both selective 
and indiscriminate attacks.  
 
Table 4.11. Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Shia-Dominated Regions, by period 
 (1) (2) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 
   
CERP 0.000584 5.60e-05 
 (0.000470) (0.000162) 
Troops 2.091 -0.863 
 (2.584) (1.398) 
CERP*Troops -0.0562 0.0273 
 (0.104) (0.0718) 
Troops (t-1) 3.433 -2.026 
 (3.107) (1.568) 
2005 -0.0146***  
 (0.00520)  
Targeted Attacks (t-1) 0.0600 -0.294*** 
 (0.644) (0.0897) 
Mahdi Ceasefire (t-1)  -0.00812 
  (0.00930) 
Constant 0.0177*** -0.00525 
 (0.00364) (0.00447) 
   
Observations 145 150 
R-squared 0.346 0.285 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.11 displays the results for the targeted violence hypotheses. In Column 1, we do 
not see evidence indicating that the American posture during the pre-Surge period led to a 
decline in targeted attacks in the Shia regions of Iraq. The coefficients on increasing CERP and 
troop density suggest that such measures actually increased violence when the other was absent, 
although neither result is statistically significant (p=.222 and .423, respectively), and the 
coefficient on CERP suggests that there is essentially no relationship. When both increasing 
CERP and troop density are observed, their combined effect becomes negative, although again, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant (p=.593). This negative coefficient suggests that we 
cannot fully confirm the null hypothesis in 5a, but have reason to believe that it is accurate. 
Additionally, and while again not shown, after including lagged measures of increases in 
spending and troop density, as well as their interaction, the lack of effect from each, as well as 
their interaction, remains consistent over the following two years, 
Column 2 captures the Surge period. In this period, the coefficient on increasing troop 
density absent investments is negative. To explain this difference in the effect of troop density 
across periods, we perhaps might consider the relative scale of these increases. Prior to the 
Surge, troop levels in these regions were very small (mean of 0.0013 battalions per capita), and 
increasing them perhaps might have been a source of concern to the violent actors, but doing so 
did not inhibit their ability to act, which led to increases in civilian targeting. However, during 
the Surge, the troops levels were far greater (0.003 battalions per capita), and any increases at 
this level, along with the more engaged posture, may have simply made it more difficult for these 
actors to engage in violence. This negative substantive effect of increasing troop density, while 
not statistically significant (p=.541), would provide evidence against Hypothesis 6a, which 
predicted no effect. However, it is difficult to reconcile this finding with the coefficient on the 
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interaction of increasing troops and development, which is positive, although not statistically 
significant (p=.706). This suggests that when these two were at higher levels than in the pre-
Surge period and increasing, selective violence actually increased. Developing a plausible 
explanation for this is difficult, although it may be that where investments were high, troop 
density was low enough such that violent actors could still target individuals whose loyalties 
were questionable.
41
 Overall, these results cannot confirm the null result posited by Hypothesis 
6a, but they suggest American forces had little effect on selective violence in these areas during 
the Surge. When including the four period lags for each of these variables, the coefficients for 
the first two six-month periods are negative, but they then become positive for the second year, 
and the interaction of increased spending and troop density is actually associated with a 
statistically significant increase in targeted attacks in these regions.  
I also included in Column 2 the lagged indicator of the Mahdi Ceasefire. While 
Hypothesis 7a posited that the Ceasefire should have led to a decline in targeted violence, our 
evidence suggests that we cannot be confident that it did. The coefficient is negative, but small (a 
0.8 attack/100,000) and lacking statistical significance (p=.388) and the lagged indicators, while 
not shown, also lack any statistical support. This lack of an effect may be attributable to the fact 
that, despite the tensions between the Mahdi Army and the SCIRI-backed Badr Organization, 
most of the targeted violence the Mahdi Army engaged in was directed at Sunnis, which would 
have occurred in the more mixed provinces and Baghdad in particular. Such a possibility will be 
adjudicated below, following the discussion of the results pertaining to indiscriminate violence in 
these Shia-dominated areas.   
                                                 
41
 Indeed, troop density and public goods spending in Shia regions during the Surge period were only 
weakly correlated (0.09), indicating that while trying to win the support of the population with 
development aid, the Americans may not have had enough troops present in those areas to protect anyone 
who might have been willing to give them their support.  
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Figure 4.12. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Shia 
Dominated Regions 
 
 
 
In Figure 4.12, we see that increasing spending and troops has no effect on targeted 
attacks in the Shia-dominated regions. However, when we examine their effect in the presence or 
absence of the Mahdi Ceasefire, we see that these efforts produce a substantive, if not significant, 
decline in these attacks.  
The hypotheses relating to indiscriminate violence in these Shia-dominated areas are 
consistent with those relating to targeted violence. However, the results are somewhat different 
substantively, if not statistically. In Column 1 of Table 4.12, the interaction of troop density and 
public goods investment yields a positive effect on indiscriminate violence. While not 
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statistically significant by any means (p=.945) it hints at the possibility that as these factors 
increased at the relatively low levels of the pre-Surge period, it made targeting individuals more 
difficult, and so, violent actors may have then resorted to indiscriminate attacks to limit the 
possibility of defections. At the same time, though, any indiscriminate violence in these areas 
was potentially committed by Sunni extremists to foment sectarian violence, rather than by local 
Shias, and so we should be cautious when drawing any conclusions in this regard. Additionally, 
as was the case with selective violence, indiscriminate attacks increased in the presence of 
increasing force density, while they had almost no relationship with public goods investments, 
although, again, neither coefficient is statistically significant. Finally, the addition of a six-month 
lag in the changed troop presence does not result in a statistically significant change in violence 
(p=.458), although the sign is negative. However, this effect appears to be temporary, as the 
trend of increased attacks in response to increased force density returns in the next period, as the 
twelve-, eighteen-, and twenty four-month lags all possess positive coefficients, with the twelve 
and twenty four month periods reaching statistical significance. Additionally, the lagged 
increases in per capita spending and the interaction of spending and troop density appear to have 
no effect. Based on these results, we can feel comfortable in stating that American efforts in 
these areas prior to the Surge did not have a negative effect on indiscriminate violence.  
Table 4.12. Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in Shia-Dominated Regions, by period  
 (1) (2) 
 2004-2006 2006-2008 
   
CERP -2.31e-05 -6.28e-05 
 (4.78e-05) (4.92e-05) 
Troops 0.494 0.334 
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 (0.475) (0.404) 
CERP*Troops 0.00117 -0.0757 
 (0.0170) (0.0450) 
Troops (t-1) -0.536 -0.620 
 (0.715) (0.430) 
2005 -0.00172*  
 (0.000854)  
Indiscriminate Attacks (t-1) -0.503*** -0.0145 
(0.0949) (0.138) 
Mahdi Ceasefire (t-1)  -0.000319 
  (0.000592) 
Constant 0.00229*** -0.000836*** 
 (0.000360) (0.000267) 
   
Observations 145 150 
R-squared 0.451 0.311 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
             
 
The Surge environment is examined in Column 2. Here, we see that, contrary to 
Hypothesis 6b, indiscriminate violence declines in the presence of increasing CERP and troop 
density, and it only narrowly misses statistical significance (p=.101). This effect is temporary, as 
the coefficient for the lagged interaction is positive for the two years following this initial 
decline. However, in those districts where there is no CERP but troop density is increasing, 
indiscriminate attacks also appear to increase, although the result is not statistically significant 
(p=.413). The six-month lagged change in troop levels also is negative, and with a p-value of 
.158, it suggests that increasing troop density may eventually have had some effect, but attacks 
once again increase in response when additional lags are included. And as was the case in the 
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pre-Surge period, increasing the level of CERP has no real discernable effect, a trend that 
remains consistent throughout the next two years, as well. Finally, with respect to Hypothesis 7b, 
we do not see that the imposition of the Mahdi Army ceasefire had any meaningful effect on 
indiscriminate violence. Again, this lack of a result may stem from the fact that prior to the 
ceasefire, the Mahdi Army focused its violent action in more mixed regions where there were 
Sunni populations, rather than in these regions that were much more homogenous. 
Again if we look at the marginal effects graphs in Figure 4.13, we can see that when we 
include the ceasefire in the model, its effect, as shown in the bottom left figure, does not change 
the effect of spending and troop density on these indiscriminate attacks. Areas without the 
ceasefire, however, see an increase in attacks in response to these American efforts.  
Figure 4.13. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in 
Shia Dominated Regions 
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Table 4.13. Summary of Results from Shia-Dominated Regions 
Hypothesis Supported (Yes/No/Suggestive) 
Selective Attacks  
5a. American efforts, pre-Surge – no neg. effect Suggestive 
6a. American efforts, 2007-2008 – no neg. effect Suggestive 
7a. Mahdi Army Ceasefire – negative effect No 
Indiscriminate Attacks  
5b. American efforts, pre-Surge – no neg. effect Suggestive 
6b. American efforts, 2007-2008 – no neg. effect No 
7b. Mahdi Army Ceasefire – negative effect No 
 
Like those from the Sunni-dominated regions, the data from the Shia regions indicate that 
we cannot have much confidence in the idea that American efforts had a negative impact on the 
violence experienced by civilians, either before or during the Surge.
42
 Neither changes in CERP 
nor troop density, nor the interaction of the two, yielded a statistically significant reduction in 
either selective or indiscriminate violence, regardless of the time period. I have suggested that 
this may be due to the fact local Shia civilians were unlikely to believe in the long-term presence 
of American forces, and were subsequently unwilling to provide them with intelligence 
regarding the identities and whereabouts of existing violent actors. Similarly, the evidence 
suggests that the Mahdi Army’s decision to engage in a ceasefire did not have a meaningful 
impact on violence in the Shia areas. However, I have suggested that this effect, if it exists, is 
likely to be found in the more mixed areas, where the decision to refrain from further ethnic 
cleansing of Sunnis would carry greater impact. I turn now to an analysis of Baghdad, which, 
while majority Shia, contained many Sunnis who would be targeted for such cleansing. 
 
Baghdad Analysis 
                                                 
42
 The lone exception where there is evidence of a negative effect is on indiscriminate violence in the 
Sunni areas prior to the Surge.  
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As with the previous set of hypotheses, I argued in Hypotheses 8a and b that the American force 
presence in Baghdad would have little impact on the violence that took place there before the 
Surge. In Hypotheses 9a and b, I test the possibility that the Surge’s change in posture and 
increase in public goods investment and troop levels into Baghdad actually did have a 
measureable effect in reducing violence. The alternative theory arguing that the Sons of Iraq 
were responsible for any reductions in violence is tested with Hypotheses 10a and b, and the 
interaction of these two is evaluated in Hypotheses 11a and b. Finally, Hypotheses 12a and b 
examine the possibility that the Madhi Army’s ceasefire led to reduced targeted and 
indiscriminate attacks in Baghdad.  
In Table 4.14, we see the results with respect to the targeted violence hypotheses. At the 
outset, it is important to note the small sample size of only 32. Therefore, we should be cautious 
about drawing any definitive conclusions about the results. Column 1 shows that prior to the 
Surge, we do not see a statistically significant association between American efforts in terms of 
troop density and public goods spending and reductions in selective violence against civilians in 
Baghdad. The interaction of troops and spending changes is negative, but it lacks statistical 
significance (p=.183), and the same is true for changes in troop density on its own (p=.453). On 
the other hand, CERP appears to have almost no effect at all during this period on these attacks. 
The lagged changed in troop density is also negative, but its high p-value (p=.922) suggests that 
we can take little from it. The effect, or lack thereof, remains the same when we add in additional 
lags. Hypothesis 8a predicted a null result, however, and based on the sign of the coefficient on 
the interaction and its p-value alone, we cannot confirm that these factors did not have a negative 
effect.  
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Table 4.14. Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Baghdad, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP 9.53e-05 -0.00469 -0.00195 
 (0.000724) (0.00294) (0.00395) 
Troops -2.449 -8.785 -6.872 
 (3.080) (10.45) (21.86) 
CERP*Troops -0.104 0.518 0.0228 
 (0.0702) (0.347) (0.765) 
Troops (t-1) -0.306 14.01 17.34 
 (3.014) (13.02) (13.78) 
2005 -0.0158   
 (0.00912)   
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.0266 0.00250 
  (0.0710) (0.0640) 
Mahdi Ceasefire (t-1)  -0.136** -0.181*** 
  (0.0439) (0.0600) 
Targeted Attacks (t-1) -0.415** -0.159 -0.230 
 (0.158) (0.247) (0.298) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   1.657 
   (1.101) 
CERP*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.0109 
   (0.00658) 
Troops*SOI Standup (t-1)   -83.87 
   (50.25) 
Constant 0.0274*** 0.0681* 0.0869** 
 (0.00492) (0.0337) (0.0341) 
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Observations 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.530 0.521 0.617 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
In Column 2, we have the results for the Surge period. Here, we see that, in contrast to 
the expectation posited in Hypothesis 9a, we see no significant relationship between American 
efforts and targeted violence against civilians during this time. The interaction of changes in 
troop density and spending is associated with increased violence, although the result is not 
statistically significant. Again, changes in CERP spending on its own has little effect, while 
changes in troop density are associated with fewer attacks, although this result is also not 
significant (p=.428). This is in contrast to the result on the lagged changed in density, which is 
positive (p=.318). While do not see confirmation of Hypothesis 9a, this at least substantively 
suggests that the increase in troops brought about an initial spike in attacks over the first six 
months that was brought under control in the subsequent half-year period, and this result is 
robust when including an additional three six-month lags, although they do not achieve standard 
levels of statistical significance. Column 2 allows us to evaluate other hypotheses, as well. 10a 
stated that the standup of the Sons of Iraq brought about the drop in violence. We see that on its 
own, however, the SOI standup did not have a statistically significant effect, although the 
coefficient is in the negative direction. (This effect becomes positive in the subsequent periods, 
however, following the initial dip in such attacks.) Finally, Hypothesis 12a predicted that the 
Mahdi ceasefire of August 2007 was associated with decreased levels of violence. Here, and in 
contrast to its effect in the Shia-majority provinces, the ceasefire does have a significant negative 
association with targeted attacks, both in the subsequent period and the following six months, 
although that result is not statistically significant.  
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Column 3 of Table 4.14 displays the results once they include the interaction of 
American counterinsurgency efforts and the SOI standup. As was the case in Column 2, the 
interaction of CERP and troop density changes is positive, the coefficient on troop changes is 
negative but insignificant (p=.758), and CERP appears to have no discernable effect. Taken 
together, we can reject Hypothesis 9a, although the coefficient does eventually become negative 
for these variables after about a year. On its own, the SOI standup appears to have no effect on 
violence in the following six-month period, or in subsequent ones, which would go against 
Hypothesis 10a. The interaction of changes in troop density and public goods investment with 
the SOI standup produces a positive coefficient that, while not statistically significant (p=.155), 
is certainly suggestive, although we observe no effect when looking at later periods. 
Interestingly, however, when we look at the component parts of the Surge as they interacted 
independently, we see that they do have a negative effect. In particular, the coefficient on the 
interaction of changes in troop density with the SOI is very strong, and is quite close to being 
statistically significant (p=.117). Likewise, the coefficient of the interaction of CERP and the 
standup is also negative, although the coefficient is much smaller (p=.121). However, we can 
still reject Hypothesis 11a, as there is no statistically significant evidence supporting the idea that 
the interaction of American efforts and the SOI led to a decrease in targeted violence. Finally, we 
do see further confirmation of the effect of the Madhi ceasefire (Hypothesis 12a), as its negative 
coefficient is highly statistically significant six months later, although the effect loses 
significance in a second six-month period. 
Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show the marginal effects of these factors on selective attacks in 
Baghdad. In the top left of Figure 4.14, we see that the effect of increasing spending and troop 
density is not different from zero when neither the Ceasefire or the SOI standup are present in 
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the model. Unfortunately, the limited number of observations where the SOIs were present and 
the Ceasefire was in effect do not allow us to see much beyond the fact that targeted attacks on 
civilians increased in these contexts. In areas where the Mahdi Ceasefire was not in effect (i.e., 
the Sunni-majority districts of Baghdad), we see that the effect of the American efforts is not 
altogether different from when they are not included at all.  
 
Figure 4.14. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Targeted Attacks on Civilians in 
Baghdad when SOI Not Present 
 
 
 
In Figure 4.15, when the Sons of Iraq are present, increased spending and troop density 
lead to an increase in violence. When the Ceasefire is included in the model, we see that in areas 
165 
 
where it is in effect, it appears to not alter the effect of the American efforts. Unfortunately, we 
have too few observations to generate meaningful predicted probabilities for how targeted 
violence might shift in areas where the Ceasefire and the SOI are both present, although it 
appears that the effect of the Ceasefire is negligible.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.15. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Targeted Attacks on Civilians in 
Baghdad when SOI Are Present 
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Table 4.15. Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in Baghdad, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP -0.000418 0.000240 0.000277 
 (0.000472) (0.000380) (0.000756) 
Troops 1.327* -0.383 -0.232 
 (0.696) (2.187) (4.207) 
CERP*Troops -0.0227 -0.0502 -0.0782 
 (0.0325) (0.0473) (0.148) 
Troops (t-1) 1.944* 1.631 1.715 
 (1.015) (2.265) (2.637) 
2005 -0.0121***   
 (0.00275)   
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.0268 -0.0264* 
  (0.0207) (0.0135) 
Mahdi Ceasefire (t-1)  0.00352 0.00330 
  (0.00864) (0.00946) 
Indiscriminate Attacks (t-1) -0.229 -0.122 -0.0998 
 (0.237) (0.197) (0.292) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   0.0398 
   (0.230) 
CERP*SOI Standup (t-1)   -7.68e-05 
   (0.00137) 
Troops*SOI Standup (t-1)   -1.615 
   (11.92) 
Constant 0.0152*** 0.00550 0.00561 
 (0.00204) (0.00692) (0.00675) 
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Observations 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.660 0.390 0.396 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
Turning now to Table 4.15, which contains the results of the indiscriminate violence 
analysis. Again, the sample size is small so these results should be interpreted cautiously. In 
Column 1, which examines the effect of American military efforts prior to the Surge, we see that 
the combined effect of CERP and troop density changes has a statistically insignificant (p=.507) 
negative effect on levels of indiscriminate attacks, a trend that continues in subsequent periods, 
although not displayed here. (Further, we see that changes in troop density actually result in a 
statistically significant increase in these attacks, although when introducing the lags, this sign 
becomes negative and insignificant. Changes in spending have no real effect on attacks at any 
point over the following two years. Taken together, we do not appear to have enough evidence to 
confirm the null hypothesis of 8b, although the evidence is certainly suggestive.  
In Column 2, we see no real evidence in support for any of the relevant hypotheses. With 
respect to 9b, we see no statistically significant decline connected to American Surge efforts, as 
the coefficients on both the interaction of CERP and troops and troops by themselves are 
insignificant (p=.323 and .866, respectively). As has been the case for the other models 
pertaining to Baghdad, CERP has a very small, statistically insignificant coefficent. Also, we see 
that the SOI standup does not appear to have any stand-alone effect on violence, meaning 
Hypothesis 10b can be rejected. Finally, in contrast to the finding with respect to targeted 
attacks, the Mahdi ceasefire has no discernable effect on indiscriminate attacks; if there is a 
result at all, it was an increase in such attacks. These results are consistent even after accounting 
for the four six-month lags, and there was no effect on these periods as well. 
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Finally, in Column 3, we again see limited evidence in support of any of the relevant 
hypotheses. We see no significance on the coefficients of the American efforts, even though both 
the interaction of CERP and troop density changes is negative, and remains so after the inclusion 
of the four six-month lags, which are not shown here. As such, we can reject Hypothesis 9b. We 
do, however, see evidence in support of the SOI’s ability to limit indiscriminate attacks, as the 
coefficient has statistical significance, providing evidence in this full model (as opposed to the 
uninteracted model in Column 2) which allows us to confirm Hypothesis 10b, although this 
effect does not last, as increased indiscriminate attacks are associated with the twelve and 
eighteen month lags. However, the interaction of the SOI and American efforts are all 
statistically insignificant, including later lags, which means we can reject Hypothesis 11b, as 
well. Finally, in contrast to its effect on targeted attacks, the Mahdi ceasefire did not have the 
predicted negative impact on this violence, either six months or a year later, when the data ends, 
leading us to reject Hypothesis 12b. 
With respect to the marginal effects of the various factors, we see below in Figures 4.16 
that they are minimal when the SOIs are not present. Here, American efforts had no discernable 
impact, and this does not change in areas where the Mahdi Ceasefire was in effect once it is 
included in the model. Again, we lack enough observations to see how indiscriminate attacks are 
influenced by American efforts and the Ceasefire, although the effect appears to be negative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Figure 4.16. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in 
Baghdad when SOI Are Not Present 
 
 
 
In Figure 4.17, we see in the upper left that indiscriminate attacks appear to increase in 
response to American efforts when the SOIs are present, but where the Ceasefire is also in effect, 
it appears that these attacks decrease. However, the effect does not appear to be significantly 
different from those instances where only the SOI is present (i.e., Sunni dominated areas) and the 
Mahdi Ceasefire is absent.  
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Figure 4.17. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in 
Baghdad when SOI Are Present 
 
 
Table 4.16. Summary of Results from Baghdad 
Hypothesis Supported (Yes/No/Suggestive) 
Selective Attacks  
8a. American efforts, pre-Surge – no neg. effect No 
9a. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
10a. Sons of Iraq – negative effect No 
11a. Combined American and SOI – negative effect No 
12a. Mahdi Ceasefire – negative effect Yes 
Indiscriminate Attacks  
8b. American efforts, pre-Surge – no negative effect Suggestive 
9b. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
10b. Sons of Iraq – negative effect No 
11b. Combined American and SOI – negative effect No 
12b. Mahdi Ceasefire – negative effect No 
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The small sample that constitutes Baghdad province makes it difficult to make strong 
claims. While we cannot say the hypotheses are supported in the data, the coefficients (and 
corresponding p-values) with respect to the combined effect of American efforts and the SOI on 
targeted violence suggest the possibility of an effect. This would not be altogether that surprising 
and would confirm existing evidence of the effect of collaboration between the American forces 
and those Sunni tribes who turned against the insurgency. Why these efforts did not appear to 
yield a corresponding decline in indiscriminate attacks is a question that deserves further 
attention. Perhaps it is the case that such levels were already low and were unlikely to go further. 
Or alternatively, it may be that these indiscriminate attacks were likely to be carried out by Sunni 
extremists in the Shia districts of Baghdad, but the SOI and American troops were concentrated 
in the Sunni districts, which meant that they prevented such attacks in their own areas but were 
unable to police these extremists beyond their own borders. Similarly, the final surprising result 
is the lack of effect by the Mahdi Ceasefire in reducing indiscriminate violence given its 
association with reduced targeted attacks. It may be the case that the Shia militias did not use this 
tactic with any regularity, as they relied primarily on targeting individuals as they moved through 
previously Sunni neighborhoods. While future qualitative work may want to explore these 
findings further, I turn now to an examination of the analysis of Diyala and Ninewa, where 
Sunnis were the largest of the several ethnic groups present. 
 
Diyala and Ninewa Analysis   
The relevant hypotheses in Diyala and Ninewa concern the American forces, the Sons of Iraq, 
and the interaction of the two. As noted, violence in these areas remained fairly low up until the 
pacification of the more violent –and more homogenously Sunni – provinces of Anbar and Salah 
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al Din. At that point, civilian violence migrated to these provinces. I argued in Hypotheses 13a 
and b that the American force presence in these would have little impact on the violence that 
took place there between 2004 and 2006, both because there was relatively little violence and the 
forces that were present were minimal. In Hypotheses 14a and b, I tested the possibility that as 
violence shifted to these areas and the Surge was implemented, American efforts actually had a 
dampening effect on civilian violence. Hypotheses 15a and b test the proposition that the Sons of 
Iraq actually produced the declines in violence, while Hypotheses 16a and b concern the 
interaction of the Sons of Iraq and American efforts.  
 
Table 4.17. Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Diyala and Ninewa, by period 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP 0.000635 -0.00187 -0.00164 
 (0.00102) (0.00184) (0.00133) 
Troops -1.978 2.979 -1.263 
 (5.975) (11.27) (9.013) 
CERP*Troops -0.0414 -0.0551 0.0597 
 (0.194) (0.214) (0.286) 
Troops (t-1) -1.436 0.400 2.194 
 (8.547) (3.834) (7.290) 
2005 -0.0308*   
 (0.0161)   
2007  0.0206* 0.0195 
  (0.0109) (0.0143) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  0.0118 0.000690 
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  (0.0272) (0.0302) 
Targeted Attacks (t-1) 1.526** -0.372*** -0.310*** 
 (0.639) (0.103) (0.106) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   0.322 
   (0.808) 
CERP*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.0109 
   (0.0101) 
Troops*SOI Standup (t-1)   -6.869 
   (24.80) 
Constant 0.0237** -0.0315*** -0.0316*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00790) (0.0109) 
    
Observations 54 56 56 
R-squared 0.790 0.826 0.835 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
 
We see in Column 1 of Table 4.17 that American troops had no significant effect on targeted 
violence within these mixed areas where Sunnis comprised the largest ethno-sectarian group. 
The coefficient on the change in troop levels is negative but insignificant (p=.746), as is the 
lagged change (p=.869). Adding three additional six-month lags changes the sign on these 
coefficients to positive, but the effect is not significant. Changes in CERP have no discernable 
effect, and while the interaction of changes in CERP and troop levels is also negative, again, the 
effect is not statistically significant. Again, the additional lags do not produce any significant 
effects, either. While we cannot confirm the null hypotheses posited in 13a, the results are highly 
suggestive.  
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With the results in Column 2 we can see that there is little evidence supporting the idea 
that the Surge strategy – either the development investments or the troops density – had any 
effect on targeted violence during the latter period. The impact of changing CERP is still very 
minimal and statistically insignificant in the results presented, as well when the four additional 
lags are included, while the changes in troop levels actually produced increases in violence, 
although the result is not statistically significant (p=.796). This effect, however, turns negative 
eighteen months out, but it is insignificant. Also, the interaction of the two is negative, but again, 
lacks statistical significance (p=.801). When the additional lags are included, the coefficient for 
the contemporaneous period becomes positive, and the first three lags are also positive but 
insignificant. Also, in this model, we see that on its own, the emergence of the Sons of Iraq is 
linked to an increase in targeted attacks, although again, the result is not statistically significant 
(p=.672), and it does turn negative but insignificant after six months.  
Finally, in the third column, we see the full model where American efforts are interacted 
with the emergence of the Sons of Iraq. Again, we see no significant effects on the part of either. 
The coefficient of changes in American troop density becomes negative, although still 
insignificant (p=.889). When the lags in increased troop density are included, the first year sees 
an insignificant increase in attacks followed by an eventual insignificant decrease in the second 
year out. The interaction of the CERP and troop changes switches to positive, suggesting that 
separate from the Sons of Iraq, American efforts may actually be linked to increases in targeted 
attacks, but again, the finding is statistically insignificant (p=.836). After six months, the effect 
becomes negative but insignificant. This, coupled with the lack of a corresponding finding in 
Column 1 means that Hypothesis 14a is not supported. At the same time, we again see no 
support for the idea that the emergence of the Sons of Iraq played a role in stopping selective 
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violence in the short term, although the effect does become negative and slightly significant after 
one year (not shown). Finally, the interaction of American efforts and the SOI standup appears to 
have had little effect on targeted violence in Diyala and Ninewa, as the interactions of the 
constituent components and overall all return insignificant results. The three-way interaction 
appears to yield increased violence, while the SOI interacted with CERP and troop changes 
individually produce negative coefficients, but neither are statistically significant. However, 
when we introduce further lags, the first six-month period experiences a slightly significant 
decrease in attacks, and the effect remains negative, although insignificant, twelve months and 
eighteen months later.  
Figure 4.18. Marginal Effect of Sons of Iraq Standup on Targeted Attacks on Civilians in 
Diyala and Ninewa 
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In Figure 4.18, we see that without the inclusion of the SOI variable, the effect of 
increasing spending and American troops is associated with increasing rates of attacks. When the 
variable is included, we do not see much of a change in areas where the SOIs are not present. In 
contrast, and even though we lack the observations needed to generate appropriate confidence 
intervals, it appears that in areas where the SOIs were present, American efforts did have a 
substantial negative effect on targeted attacks in these two districts.  
 
Table 4.18. Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in Diyala and Ninewa, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP 0.000196 -3.42e-05 -0.000477 
 (0.000432) (0.000298) (0.000318) 
Troops -0.737 2.905 4.321** 
 (1.130) (3.790) (1.995) 
CERP*Troops -0.0821 -0.0649** 0.0964* 
 (0.0974) (0.0266) (0.0474) 
Troops (t-1) -1.008 0.570 0.777 
 (2.234) (2.213) (1.686) 
2005 -0.00645**   
 (0.00270)   
2007  0.00257 0.00274 
  (0.00395) (0.00330) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  0.0159 0.0203*** 
  (0.0121) (0.00720) 
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Indiscriminate Attacks (t-1) 0.0488 -0.605*** -0.619*** 
 (0.0807) (0.171) (0.132) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.726*** 
   (0.178) 
CERP*SOI Standup (t-1)   0.00275 
   (0.00237) 
Troops*SOI Standup (t-1)   16.19** 
   (5.982) 
Constant 0.00524*** -0.000612 -0.00374 
 (0.000994) (0.00214) (0.00259) 
    
Observations 54 56 56 
R-squared 0.645 0.343 0.675 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
 
I turn now to the patterns of indiscriminate attacks in Diyala and Ninewa, and as Table 
4.18 shows, the results are quite different from those of the targeted attacks, at least in the later 
period. First, however, we see that in Column 1, American efforts once again, do not appear to 
have had any meaningful impact on indiscriminate attacks, even after including the four lagged 
periods. CERP’s coefficient is negligible, and while troop density changes and the interaction of 
CERP and troop changes are both negative, neither is statistically significant (p=.526 and .414, 
respectively). Here, we again cannot confirm the null of Hypothesis 13b, but the results are 
certainly suggestive. In Column 2, we see that the interaction of CERP and troop changes 
produces a statistically significant negative effect on indiscriminate violence against civilians 
during the Surge period, which would provide some initial support for Hypothesis 14b. This 
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effect disappears however, once we account for the additional lags. We also see that in this main 
effects model, the SOI standup is linked to a statistically insignificant increase in indiscriminate 
attacks (p=.213), but the effect loses statistical significance once we include the lags.  
If we move to the third model with the interactive effects, we first see that in the absence 
of the Sons of Iraq, the combination of CERP and troop changes is actually related to a (weakly) 
statistically significant increase in indiscriminate attacks, although this effect disappears once we 
include the lags. Troop changes on their own are also linked to an increase in such attacks, and 
this remains consistent with the inclusion of the lags. This more fully specified model suggests 
that we can actually reject Hypothesis 14b. However, the Sons of Iraq, in the absence of 
American troops, are linked to a statistically significant increase in indiscriminate attacks in the 
six months after their emergence. Interestingly, when we include the one year and eighteen 
month lags, this short term effect becomes significant in the negative direction, although it loses 
significance at the one year mark and actually turns positive eighteen months later, suggesting 
that Hypothesis 15b is not supported. Finally, we some interesting texture when we turn to 
Hypothesis 16b, which suggested that the interaction of American efforts and the SOI standup 
would yield a decline in these kinds of attacks. We see that only when all three are present – 
American troops, CERP, and the SOI – do indiscriminate attacks decline, although this effect 
becomes insignificant and eventually positive as we include the additional time lags. However, 
when looking at the effect of only CERP and the SOI, we see no significant impact on violence, 
and when looking at the effect of troops and the SOI, we see a statistically significant increase in 
bombings and the like. Thus, we have mixed results for Hypothesis 16b, but they are nonetheless 
suggestive of some effect, at least in the short term.  
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Once again, marginal effects graphs can help us understand these effects. Figure 4.19 
illustrates a negative effect on indiscriminate attacks as American troop density and public goods 
spending increase. When the SOI standup is included in the model, we see not much of an effect 
in areas where the SOIs are not present, but the slope of the effect appears to be steeper in areas 
where the SOIs are present, although the inability to generate confidence intervals prevents us 
from determining if the effect is significantly different.  
Figure 4.19. Marginal Effect of Sons of Iraq Standup on Indiscriminate Attacks on 
Civilians in Diyala and Ninewa 
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Table 4.19. Summary of Results from Diyala and Ninewa 
Hypothesis Supported (Yes/No/Suggestive) 
Selective Attacks  
13a. American efforts, pre-Surge – no neg. effect Suggestive 
14a. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
15a. Sons of Iraq – negative effect No 
16a. Combined American and SOI – negative effect No 
Indiscriminate Attacks  
13b. American efforts, pre-Surge – no negative effect Suggestive 
14b. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
15b. Sons of Iraq – negative effect No 
16b. Combined American and SOI – negative effect Suggestive 
 
In Diyala and Ninewa, we see some tentative support for the idea that American efforts 
and the standup of the Sons of Iraq had a negative effect on violence. Specifically, indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians declined under changing levels of troops and CERP, and the presence of the 
Sons of Iraq. This alliance had no effect on selective attacks in the short term, but when lags are 
introduced, the effect does become significant. Further, indiscriminate attacks appeared to 
decrease in the period immediately following the emergence of the Sons of Iraq, such attacks in 
Diyala and Ninewa appear to have increased as a result of their emergence, but once additional 
lags are introduced, the effect is negative, but temporary.   
 
Ta’meem/Kirkuk 
Here, I address the patterns of violence in Ta’meem, or Kirkuk. As noted, this province was of 
mixed ethnicity, but was predominantly Kurdish. Like Diyala and Ninewa, violence came later 
on in the conflict as it migrated from Anbar and Salah al Din. Unfortunately, we only have 
twelve observations, and so drawing any meaningful conclusions about the true relationships 
between American and Iraqi efforts and the violence that occurred is difficult, if not impossible. 
Nonetheless, I will briefly discuss the statistical findings, and I should note that there are not 
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enough observations to conduct the lagged analyses. As shown in Column 1 of Table 4.20, we 
cannot see any discernable effect of American efforts in the pre-2007 period on targeted 
violence. The combined effect of changes in CERP and troop density appears to have a 
decreasing effect on targeted violence, but on its own, troop density appears to increase violence 
while CERP’s effect is highly negligible. All of these results fail to achieve statistical 
significance, but we cannot confirm the null hypothesis of 17a. Moving to Column 2, the 
combined effect of CERP and troops during the Surge period, as well as those of the individual 
constituent terms, is negative, but they lack meaningful statistical significance, meaning that 
Hypothesis 18a is not supported. The effect of the SOI standup appears to also have dampening 
effect, but again, we do not see any statistical significance, meaning we cannot say that 
Hypothesis 19a has support. Finally, in Column 3, we see that the interaction of American troops 
and CERP, without the SOIs present, has no statistically significant effect, providing further 
evidence that we cannot claim support for Hypothesis 18a. Also, the Sons of Iraq, on their own, 
now appear to have a positive relationship with violence, which would provide further evidence 
against Hypothesis 19a. Finally, we see that the interaction of CERP and troops, along with the 
SOIs’ emergence, has no significant effect on selective violence, although the signs suggest that 
it increases. This is evidence against Hypothesis 20a.  
Table 4.20. Targeted Attacks on Civilians in Ta’meem/Kirkuk, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP 0.000336 -0.00385 -0.000917 
 (0.000264) (0.00596) (0.00594) 
Troops 21.38 -53.40 53.12 
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 (43.78) (160.7) (156.5) 
CERP*Troops -0.241 -1.449 -4.939 
 (0.761) (1.474) (4.001) 
Troops (t-1) 8.527 -93.32 105.7 
 (30.98) (333.9) (298.4) 
2005 -0.0615   
 (0.0266)   
2007  0.0220 0.194 
  (0.319) (0.262) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.0954 0.658 
  (0.835) (0.936) 
Targeted Attacks (t-1) -0.830* -0.366 3.177 
 (0.208) (2.370) (3.974) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   0.0537 
   (0.0550) 
Constant 0.0811* 0.0101 -0.209 
 (0.0212) (0.381) (0.327) 
    
Observations 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.976 0.888 0.942 
       Interactions of SOI with CERP and Troops dropped due to collinearity. 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 When we look at Figure 4.20, we see little effect from American efforts, as the effect is 
slightly negative when the SOIs are not included in the model. This remains the case when that 
variable is included, but the SOIs are not present. In areas where they are present, once again, we 
lack enough observations to draw meaningful conclusions.  
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Figure 4.20. Marginal Effect of Sons of Iraq Standup on Targeted Attacks on Civilians in 
Ta’meem/Kirkuk 
 
 
Moving to indiscriminate attacks, we actually see the opposite substantive effect in 
Column 1 of Table 4.21 from what we observed with respect to selective violence. It appears that 
while selective violence decreased in response to changes in CERP and troop density during the 
pre-Surge period, indiscriminate attacks increased. This also differs from what occurred in 
Diyala and Ninewa, but, again, because we are dealing with so few observations, everything is 
likely to be highly collinear (indeed, several of the interactions were dropped because of this) 
and so we should be wary about putting much stock in these findings. That being said, we can 
probably confirm the null hypothesis of 17b. We can also reject Hypothesis 18b, as both models 
2 and 3 return a positive coefficient on this interaction in the Surge period, and the coefficient is 
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highly significant in model 2. We can also reject Hypothesis 19b, as the positive coefficient on 
the stand-alone of the SOI standup suggests that indiscriminate attacks did not decline as the 
SOIs emerged. Finally, while the coefficient on the three-way interaction of CERP, troops, and 
the SOI standup is negative, it lacks statistical significance, meaning that we can reject 
Hypothesis 20b. Figure 4.21 largely confirms these results, as the interaction of increased 
American troops and spending is likely to yield an increase in such attacks. Once the SOI 
variable is included, we see little effect when the SOIs are not present, and we again lack enough 
observations to see exactly how these effects shift when the SOIs are present.  
Figure 4.21. Marginal Effect of Sons of Iraq Standup on Indiscriminate Attacks on 
Civilians in Ta’meem/Kirkuk 
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Table 4.21. Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in Ta’meem/Kirkuk, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 
    
CERP -0.000348 0.000123 0.000546 
 (0.000183) (0.000156) (0.000356) 
Troops 13.73 -6.675 2.941 
 (111.1) (3.227) (7.299) 
CERP*Troops 0.566 0.574*** 0.552 
 (1.231) (0.0550) (0.174) 
Troops (t-1) 8.036 16.64 31.00 
 (87.29) (6.754) (10.53) 
2005 -0.0262   
 (0.0220)   
2007  0.0266** 0.0357 
  (0.00558) (0.00971) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  0.0184 0.0406 
  (0.0124) (0.0167) 
Indiscriminate Attacks (t-1) -0.198 -0.632*** -0.524 
 (0.975) (0.0591) (0.133) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.00332 
   (0.00216) 
Constant 0.0249 -0.0329** -0.0466 
 (0.0257) (0.00702) (0.0112) 
    
Observations 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.643 0.934 0.980 
       Interactions of SOI with CERP and Troops dropped due to collinearity. 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.22. Summary of Results from Kirkuk/Ta’meem 
Hypothesis Supported (Yes/No/Suggestive) 
Selective Attacks  
17a. American efforts, pre-Surge – no neg. effect Suggestive 
18a. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
19a. Sons of Iraq – negative effect No 
20a. Combined American and SOI – negative effect No 
Indiscriminate Attacks  
17b. American efforts, pre-Surge – no negative effect Yes 
18b. American efforts, 2007-2008 – negative effect No 
19b. Sons of Iraq – negative effect No 
20b. Combined American and SOI – negative effect No 
 
Again, it is important to stress that these results from Ta’meem should be taken with 
skepticism, as conducting statistical analysis with twelve observations is hardly a standard 
practice. We see little evidence in support of the hypotheses, but this should not be altogether 
surprising. In many respects, however, the conclusions we draw from this analysis are not that 
different from those of other areas of Iraq. For example, the only meaningful difference between 
what took place in Ta’meem and what occurred in Diyala and Kirkuk is the fact that the 
combined presence of American efforts and the Sons of Iraq did not result in a drop in 
indiscriminate attacks in Ta’meem, while they did in the other provinces. This may be due to the 
fact that Diyala and Kirkuk had a population that was likely to get along well with the SOIs, as 
they were predominantly Sunni areas. On the other hand, Ta’meem is majority Kurdish, and 
these residents largely may have been reluctant to trust those from other ethnic groups in an 
environment where ethnicity was highly salient. It also may have been the case that the SOIs in 
Ta’meem were not looking to protect the larger population, only their own co-ethnic Sunnis. 
Thus, the majority Kurds may have been left to fend for themselves, or rely strictly on the 
Americans for protection, although this appears to have not been an effective strategy either. 
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Aggregated Analysis 
As noted, drawing meaningful conclusions is difficult when sample sizes are so small. Also, 
while it is important to see the trends in the individual districts, such analyses prevent us from 
observing any potential overall effect, in essence leading us to perhaps miss the forest for the 
trees. Therefore, I conclude the empirical analysis by looking at the effect of American troop 
levels and investments, the Sons of Iraq standup, and the Mahdi Ceasefire on selective and 
indiscriminate violence throughout the entirety of Iraq. Table 4.23 shows the effect of these 
factors on selective, targeted violence at the aggregated national level. A number of things stand 
out. First, we see that in Column 4, which reflects the entire period from 2004 to 2008, 
increasing troop levels has a negative effect on targeted attacks. In the first six-month period, we 
see a slightly significant effect, but by the next six-month period, the effect is larger and even 
more significant. When we add in another two six-month lags (not shown), the six-month effect 
gains further significance, while the year and eighteen-month lags lose significance, and the two 
year lag regains significance. However, the interaction of spending and troops is insignificant. 
Given the findings of recent work highlighting the importance of public goods provision in 
reducing attacks on counterinsurgent forces (Berman, Felter, and Shapiro 2011; Berman et al, 
2013), the lack of a result here is somewhat surprising. Indeed, the small and insignificant 
coefficient on the interaction of the two suggests that the public goods make it more difficult to 
reduce these attacks than if the increased forces were simply operating or policing an area on 
their own. (This lack of effect is robust to the inclusion of the additional lags, as well.) 
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Table 4.23. Targeted Attacks on Civilians Nationwide, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 2004-2008 
     
CERP 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Troops -1.692 0.651 0.818 -2.831* 
 (2.104) (2.277) (3.007) (1.569) 
CERP*Troops 0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.032) (0.05) (0.007) 
Troops (t-1) -1.558 0.669 0.878 -3.048** 
 (1.411) (2.55) (2.457) (1.353) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.035 -0.035** -0.03*** 
  (0.034) (0.015) (0.011) 
Mahdi Ceasefire (t-1)  -0.048* -0.049*** -0.02* 
  (0.028) (0.015) (0.012) 
Targeted Attacks (t-1) 0.475 -0.232** -0.231*** -0.076 
 (0.651) (0.094) (0.051) (0.046) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   0.054 0.111 
   (0.121) (0.1) 
CERP*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.0004 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Troops*SOI Standup (t-1)   -1.866 4.032 
   (6.654) (5.512) 
Constant 0.2** 0.009 0.009 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.013) (0.01) 
     
Observations 299 306 306 605 
R-squared 0.4883 0.3885 0.3891 0.1614 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 This depressing effect on targeted attacks that we do fine could be driven by two 
potential causes, each working in different regions of the country. First, where insurgent 
challengers previously dominated, such as the Sunni areas, Kalyvas’s logic of control might 
apply. Prior to the Surge period, we can imagine that areas where insurgents were in control and 
the American presence was weak or non-existent resembled Zone 4. However, with the 
implementation of the Surge, these actors were no longer in control and these areas transitioned 
either to Zone 3, where neither side held real control, or perhaps ultimately to Zone 2, where the 
Americans held control. Regardless of the zone, these actors no longer had access to the 
information from the population that allowed them to use selective violence to control the 
population living under them. Alternatively, in regions such as Baghdad where Shiite militias 
were engaged in ethnic cleansing, which, as discussed, took the form of targeted attacks on 
individuals, the arrival of more American forces simply may have made it more difficult for 
them to continue carrying out these types of attacks. Increased patrols and checkpoints may have 
increased the monitoring ability of the occupation, and information provision may have had little 
to do with it.  
 Other trends emerge, as well. Prior to the ceasefire, the Mahdi Army was cleansing Sunni 
neighborhoods, and once the order came to refrain from such activities, al-Sadr’s followers 
appeared to heed the edict, while at the same time being deterred by the increased American 
presence. Column 4 shows that targeted attacks decline in the six months following the ceasefire 
order, but when a second lag is included, the coefficient remains negative but becomes 
insignificant. In the Sunni areas beyond Baghdad, as the SOIs rose to challenge insurgents and 
win the allegiance (and information) of the population, those insurgents no longer had access to 
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flows of information regarding potential defectors, and so they were unable to carry out targeted 
attacks like they had been able to do previously. Again, though, this effect is short-lived, as 
targeted attacks increase once again in the following six months, although the result is 
insignificant. Finally, we see that the combined effect of the SOI standup and American public 
goods investments and troop density did little to change the levels of targeted attacks, suggesting 
that the SOIs were actually hampered by the American efforts when they were present 
simultaneously.
43
 Adding the additional lags does not change this result.  
 Figure 4.22 shows these effects graphically when the SOIs are not present. Here, 
American efforts have little effect on their own in shaping patterns of targeted attacks, and this is 
also true in areas where the Ceasefire was not in effect. Where the Ceasefire is present, however, 
we see that targeted attacks experience a substantial decrease as a result of the interaction of 
increasing American troop density and public goods spending.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 One can speculate as to whether an association with the Americans raised questions in the minds of the 
Sunni population about the trustworthiness of co-ethnics aligned with the occupation, who they wanted 
out.   
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Figure 4.22. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Targeted Attacks on Civilians 
Nationwide when SOI Are Not Present 
 
 
 Figure 4.23 shows the marginal effect of the Mahdi Ceasefire when the Sons of Iraq are 
present. Here, we see slight increases in targeted attacks as a result of the efforts of American 
forces and the presence of the SOIs. When we include the Mahdi Ceasefire variable, we see that 
targeted attacks still increase in response to these efforts in the districts where it is in effect, 
although the effect is most likely insignificant. On the other hand, where the Ceasefire is not in 
effect, targeted attacks appear to decline.  
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Figure 4.23. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Targeted Attacks on Civilians 
Nationwide when SOI Are Present 
 
  
When we move to indiscriminate attacks, we see some interesting differences. While 
Table 4.23 shows that increasing troop density reduced the rate of targeted attacks during the 
whole period, Table 4.24 shows that neither public goods investments nor more troops prevented 
bombings and other similar kinds of attacks in public areas at any point, even after including the 
lags. It is difficult to reconcile this finding that more troops doesn’t mean fewer indiscriminate 
attacks with the above finding that it becomes harder to target an individual person for violence 
under the same circumstances. However, if we look at the other factors, we see that the SOIs are 
associated with a significant decline in these types of attacks. Recall that many of the SOIs were 
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former insurgents themselves, and as such, they would be in a position to identify those actors, 
who could then either be neutralized by their own forces or a collaborating American unit. It is 
important to mention here, though, that this would not require any increased troop density or 
public goods provision on the part of the Americans. Rather, all that would be necessary is their 
firepower, which would not necessarily be reflected in the data. The key element, though, is the 
identification provided by the SOIs; without it, it is perhaps an open question as to whether the 
American efforts would have had an effect similar to that that was found with respect to the 
targeted attacks. Somewhat perplexingly, however, is the temporary effect, as the lagged effects 
of the standup are positive and insignificant. 
Table 4.24. Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians Nationwide, by period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 2007-2008 2004-2008 
     
CERP 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Troops 0.428 -0.221 -0.332 0.059 
 (0.734) (0.905) (0.621) (0.289) 
CERP*Troops -0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.01) (0.001) 
Troops (t-1) -0.314 0.453 0.306 -0.258 
 (0.425) (0.539) (0.506) (0.249) 
Sons of Iraq Standup (t-1)  -0.013 -0.012*** -0.01*** 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mahdi Ceasefire (t-1)  -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Targeted Attacks (t-1) -0.206 -0.225*** -0.214*** -0.155*** 
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 (0.137) (0.081) (0.059) (0.043) 
(CERP*Troops)*SOI Standup (t-1)   -0.039 0.029 
   (0.025) (0.18) 
CERP*SOI Standup (t-1)   0.0003 0.0002 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Troops*SOI Standup (t-1)   1.32 0.212 
   (1.373) (1.016) 
Constant 0.006*** 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
     
Observations 299 306 306 605 
R-squared 0.3741 0.2187 0.2274 0.1943 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Here, we also see that the Mahdi Ceasefire had no meaningful effect on indiscriminate 
violence. (Adding a second six-month lag does bring the first lag statistical significance, but 
then, in the following six months, the effect becomes positive and significant.)  
  Finally, we can also look at the relevant marginal effects. The upper left graph of Figure 
4.24 shows the effect of American efforts on indiscriminate violence across Iraq when the SOI is 
not present and the Mahdi Ceasefire is not included in the model. When we do include the 
Ceasefire, we see that its marginal effect appears to be significant, as the effect of the American 
efforts appears to be much stronger in districts where it is in effect than in areas where it is not.   
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Figure 4.24. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians 
Nationwide when SOI Are Not Present 
 
 
The top left graph in Figure 4.25 shows the marginal effect American efforts when the 
SOI are present, and the effect appears to be minimal. The other two graphs include the Ceasefire 
variable, and once again, indiscriminate attacks appear to increase in response to American 
efforts when the Ceasefire and the SOI are present, although the effect does not appear to be 
significant.   
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Figure 4.25. Marginal Effect of Mahdi Ceasefire on Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians 
Nationwide when SOI Are Present 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
This extended paper has explored patterns of selective and indiscriminate violence in the 
different regions of Iraq during the period of civil war between 2004 and 2008. Specifically, it 
examined how American counterinsurgent efforts, as well as attempts by local actors to exert 
their authority, impacted these outcomes that have so far been neglected in the existing literature. 
When looking sub-nationally at the district-level, we see that the American efforts, even 
following the Surge of 2007, did little to alter the violence that the population endured in the 
short term. In fact, American efforts on their own seem to only have had a statistically significant 
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effect in reducing indiscriminate violence in Sunni-dominated Anbar and Salah al Din prior to 
the Surge, and this effect was observed only with respect to troop density, not spending, 
suggesting that the mechanism behind this result has less to do with information provision to 
counterinsurgents and more to do with simple troop numbers. However, we did see some effect 
among the local actors in the regional-level analyses. The Sons of Iraq are associated with lower 
levels of both forms of violence in the Sunni areas, both where they dominated and in districts 
that were more mixed. Further, I anticipated that the interaction of the SOI standup and the 
American efforts of the Surge would have decreased both forms of violence in the Sunni-
dominated areas of Anbar and Salah al Din, but, instead, we saw that the only significant result 
from this interaction occurred with respect to indiscriminate attacks in Surge-era Diyala and 
Ninewa. 
 Most of the time, adding additional lags of these independent variables produced no 
significant change in these results. However, in a few cases, it did. For example, the interaction 
of American efforts and the SOI standup was associated with a decline in targeted violence in 
Anbar and Salah al Din after the initial six-month lag. This is a case where the effect became 
significant. But there are others where a significant effect became insignificant or the direction of 
the effect switched over time, as was the case with the role of the Sons of Iraq in Diyala and 
Ninewa provinces (mixed, Sunni majority). Here, the Sons of Iraq were associated with a 
statistically significant increase in indiscriminate attacks in the six months after their emergence. 
But when we included the one year and eighteen month lags, this short term effect becomes 
significant in the negative direction, and its effect was insignificant at the one year mark and 
actually significantly positive eighteen months out. These fluctuations perhaps speak to the wider 
difficulty in establishing permanent stability, regardless of which actor is attempting to exert 
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control. These settings are highly dynamic and fluid, and both challengers and incumbents seek 
to adjust and respond to the other, sometimes increasing their efforts in particular areas (e.g., the 
Surge), or moving on to places where they may find more success (e.g., Sunni insurgents moving 
from Anbar and Salah al Din to other nearby provinces). 
 But these results must be taken cautiously, as the extremely small sample sizes prevent us 
from having much confidence in them. To overcome this limitation, I concluded the analysis 
with an examination of the effect of these various factors at the national level. Here we see that 
increases in American troop density did produce a statistically significant decrease in targeted 
attacks on civilians, but the same effect did not materialize with respect to indiscriminate 
violence. At the same time, the Sons of Iraq did appear to have a negative influence on both 
forms of violence. I suggested that they were able to capitalize on their preexisting knowledge of 
the insurgency to limit its ability to maintain control through any form of violence. The Mahdi 
Army operated almost entirely through targeted attacks, but when their leader, Muqtada al Sadr, 
called for an end to the sectarian cleansing, it appears that this call was largely heeded, as we 
also see an associated between the ceasefire and a decline in these attacks. But again, some of 
these effects were muted or reversed by the inclusion of additional lags, again providing 
evidence that any stability that can be generated can also quickly disappear.  
These findings lend further support to some existing arguments, while complicating 
others. First, the trends in violence depicted in the various figures lend tentative support to the 
hypothesis of Long (2008) and Lindsay and Long (2013) that much of the violence that plagued 
Anbar had petered out by the time the Surge was put into effect, and interestingly, the evidence 
here suggests that the density of American forces had something to do with it. On the other hand, 
the results indicate that the arguments for the combined effect of the Surge and the Sons of Iraq 
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(e.g., Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012) have little support. In contrast to earlier work 
showing the relationship between public goods investment (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011) 
and such investments along with troop density (Berman, et. al. 2013) and attacks against 
counterinsurgents in Iraq, we see that the effect of such spending on civilian violence is nearly 
non-existent, suggesting that the effect of information-sharing on violence may be more limited 
than previously believed.  
For policymakers and war planners, this presents an interesting and difficult question – is 
this money well spent? If the goal is to end attacks against counterinsurgents, then sure, it seems 
to be worthwhile. But if the goal is to create space for broader stability and order, then it appears 
the story is a bit more complicated. Although, to be sure, the posture those troops take within the 
conflict environment will ultimately matter. Sitting behind a base wall probably will not do the 
trick, but dismounted patrols and acting as a consistent presence might. 
 But because American troops are no longer present in Iraq, any stability that was brought 
about during this period has to be maintained by local actors. An unsettling implication of the 
finding that these local actors can, in some cases, temporarily increase the population’s safety 
and sense of security is that they can just as easily be responsible for the opposite, and it would 
appear that as of this writing, that these forces and institutions have largely failed to prevent a 
breakdown in order. Over 9,800 civilians died in Iraq in 2013, and another 17,000 in 2014 (Iraq 
Body Count). As the Islamic State continues to advance, the numbers are perhaps only likely to 
increase.  
These trends in Iraq’s post-occupation history highlight an inherent difficulty that extends 
beyond this conflict to wars of occupation more generally. Occupying forces do possess the 
capacity to create and foster order. But the absence of violence does not mean that such order is 
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self-sustaining. The policy goals that require occupation frequently involve instituting and 
supporting a local government that would not be able to withstand a challenger on its own, hence 
the occupation. To establish order that is self-enforcing requires the willingness of those 
challengers to accept the occupier’s preferred local ally or be defeated. Both of these pathways 
are costly. Earlier chapters in this dissertation have shown that these costs are frequently 
prohibitive for occupiers whose populations back home might not see the effort as necessary, 
which leads them to abandon these conflicts before these goals can be achieved and these war-
ravaged societies once more into the abyss of violence. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
  
 The papers of this dissertation extend several strands of the conflict literature. 
Specifically, they contribute to our understanding of war outcomes, the role of public opinion in 
shaping support for military action, and the dynamics of violence experienced by civilians in 
intrastate war. They do so through the context of wars of occupation. The existing literature 
concerning war outcomes has long-held that despite their advantages in interstate wars, 
democratic states are ill-suited for such conflicts. But it has yet to demonstrate systematically 
how any disadvantages they have might separate them from their autocratic counterparts. 
Chapter 2 showed that while democracies may not win or lose these types of conflicts any more 
than nondemocratic states, they abandon these efforts at much lower levels of casualties. This 
structural explanation of conflict outcomes contrasts with much of the policy- and doctrine-
focused scholarship involving counterinsurgency, which arose in response to the struggles in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. These efforts have focused largely on identifying strategic and operational 
steps that occupiers might take to achieve conventional victory over insurgent opponents, but this 
finding suggests that the problems run much deeper than what takes place on the battlefield. As 
long as democratic institutions back home allow for those opposed to these conflicts to organize 
and challenge the leaders who prosecute them, achieving success is likely to be an incredibly 
difficult endeavor.   
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 Chapter 2 demonstrated a relationship between the public’s sensitivity to casualties and 
conflict outcomes, but it did not concretely identify whether it is the casualties themselves that 
lead to the withdrawal of support or if the public looks to elites to provide context and meaning 
to those deaths. In Chapter 3 I used an experiment to identify the conditions under which these 
two competing mechanisms might operate. Existing experiments typically portray elites as 
divided along traditional partisan lines, but I argued that this characterization does not accurately 
capture the reality that foreign policy ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ exist in both parties. I showed that 
under these cross-cutting circumstances, casualties play a limited role in determining support, as 
only political independents changed their opinions when presented with news of deaths of 
American servicemembers. At the same time, public attitudes were not influenced by elites when 
those elites were unified in their support for the conflict, but they did react negatively when they 
saw that elites were fractured across standard party lines.  
 Finally, Chapter 4 shifted gears to fill a gap in our understanding of the dynamics of 
violence in such conflicts. In contrast to much of the recent scholarship from the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan that focused on attacks on counterinsurgents, it used subnational data from the 
Iraq War to evaluate the effect of American counterinsurgency efforts on patterns of violence 
against civilians. The findings indicate that of both American public goods spending and troop 
density, only increasing troop density has a meaningful negative impact on violence, and the 
effect is only observed in the case of targeted, or selective attacks. These efforts had no 
significant impact on indiscriminate violence, either in isolation or when present together. At the 
same time, I found that the standup of the local Sunni tribes against the insurgency, known as the 
Anbar Awakening did reduce the rate of both selective and indiscriminate attacks on the 
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population. Further, the order by Muqtada al Sadr to his militia, the Mahdi Army, to stand down 
also resulted in a drop in selective attacks.    
 While these essays shed light on some important findings, there is still work to be done. 
First, I intend to further revise Chapters 3 and 4 for publication. Chapter 4, for example, is 
currently too long, but I wanted to present as much detail as I could regarding the particular 
circumstances that shaped violence within the different regions of Iraq. As I proceed with this 
paper, I will narrow its focus to the national level results, which show a clear contrast in the 
effect of American counterinsurgent efforts on selective and indiscriminate violence.  
 Beyond the dissertation itself, additional questions remain. First, it is worth exploring 
how these conflicts start in the first place. Occupations are quite common throughout the 
historical record, and they range from instances of colonial control that lasted for hundreds of 
years to relatively short occupations such as those that occur during wartime (e.g., German 
occupation of France). However, violent rebellion is relatively rare, with only 114 instances 
appearing in the historical record as shown in Chapter 2. The next project I intend to pursue will 
identify the conditions, both within the occupied territory and the politics of the home state, that 
give rise to these episodes. 
 Building off of the findings of Chapter 4, I also will to investigate the matter of post-
occupation violence. Occupiers can reduce violence, but its absence does not necessarily mean 
that the grievances that motivate armed conflict have been resolved, nor has the opportunity to 
take up arms been limited. Some states manage to remain stable following the occupier’s 
departure, but others fall back into chaos. Determining the conditions that increase the likelihood 
that domestic groups will reopen hostilities will also further our understanding of these difficult 
and seemingly intractable conflicts.  
